TURKEY: A NONPROLIFERATION PARTNER ON ITS OWN TERMS

S E C R E T ANKARA 000692 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR/PRA FOR FRIEDT, EUR/SE FOR MALIK, ISN/CPI: FOLEY AND RUSSELL, ISN/ECC ACHURCH, NJOHASON, DOE FOR PENTOLA AND COLAHAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2033 TAGS: KNNP PREL PARM ETTC TU IR SY SUBJECT: TURKEY: A NONPROLIFERATION PARTNER ON ITS OWN TERMS REF: A. 06 ANKARA 3416 ¶B. 06 STATE 128425 ¶C. 07 ANKARA 1415 ¶D. 06 ANKARA 4279 ¶E. STATE 24222 ¶F. ANKARA 467 ¶G. ANKARA 614 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As the only NATO ally bordering Iran and Syria, Turkey plays a pivotal role in our nonproliferation efforts in the region. Turkey shares our nonproliferation goals, but is also sensitive to its relations with neighbors. Turkey is frequently called upon by the U.S. and others to take action to interdict or prevent suspect shipments, and has been consistently helpful when it receives timely and accurate information. Turkey has been taking unilateral action to prevent suspicious shipments, has established an interagency taskforce on nonproliferation, and is expanding outreach to industries. As a transshipment country, GOT has expressed a desire for partners and Allies to step up efforts to prevent shipments at the point of origin. Prosecution of suspects involved in the AQ Khan network, while slow, continues. The GOT remains committed to bringing these individuals to justice, and we have received assurances that they are no longer able to conduct business. Ratification of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE or 123) Agreement, in addition to opening up business opportunities for U.S. firms as Turkey moves forward with the development of civilian nuclear power, will enhance cooperation in this vital area. End summary. Ally with Shared Objectives -------------- ¶2. (C) Turkey's civilian and military leadership strongly supports U.S. and international nonproliferation policy and efforts. During meetings with U.S. officials and CODELs and in speeches, senior Turkish government and military officials frequently express support for international nonproliferation efforts, and a desire for all states in the Middle East (including Iran, but also Israel) to terminate efforts to develop WMD and their delivery systems. As a reflection of its commitment to nonproliferation, Turkey is a signatory to all major international nonproliferation treaties (Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty),participates in all major export control regimes (Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee), and supports U.S. initiatives including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI). Turkey was a GI founding member and hosted the second GI meeting in February 2007. Turkey's enthusiasm for GI waned after Cyprus became a member. Turkey has been actively engaged in PSI, and hosted a major PSI exercise "Anatolian Sun" in May 2006 (Ref A). Interdictions: Timely Info Yields Solid Cooperation -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) A review of over a dozen USG requests spanning the past two years for GOT to interdict or inspect flights and shipments of concern or investigate suspect firms shows a solid record of cooperation when information is timely, accurate, and sufficiently detailed. Turkey has generally been responsive to our requests, ranging from conditioning overflight clearance on inspection of suspect aircraft and cargo, to demanding flights between Iran and Syria land in Turkey for inspections, to investigating cases of Turkish firms attempting to circumvent export controls and ship sensitive equipment and technology to and from countries of concern (e.g. Pakistan, Syria, Iran, and North Korea). The exceptions to this positive record occurred when very limited lead time was provided to the GOT, or when the information provided lacked sufficient details. ¶4. (S) GOT has resisted requests for a blanket requirement for all passenger flights between Iran and Syria to submit to inspections (Ref B). Concerned about maintaining its relationship with its neighbors and fearful of retaliatory measures, Turkey has nonetheless conducted random inspections of cargo and charter flights between Iran and Syria since July 2006 (Ref C),and continues to be on the look out for "suspicious flights" (e.g. those that change their flight plans on short notice). Turkey has required Iranian and Syrian aircraft to land when we have presented them with specific information about individuals or shipments of concern, and has required inspection as a precondition for oveflight clearance when advised that suspicious cargo is being transported (Ref D). ¶5. (S) The GOT has been responsive over the last two years to our concerns about the Turkish firm Tet Makina, which is seeking to provide to Pakistan dual-use equipment that can be used to advance nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Most recently, when we provided information on the company's activities through diplomatic channels, Turkish officials confirmed that the the firm is under surveillance and took action to place the company on export control watch lists (refs E-G). The MFA has expressed confidence that, as a result of GOT action, the company will not be able to export the equipment. GOT Taking Initiative -------------- ¶6. (S) MFA contacts have underscored that it is in Turkey's own interest to stop proliferation activities. In addition to responding to the many requests it receives from allies (not only from the U.S., but also from Israel, and numerous EU members),Turkey has undertaken unilateral action to intercept suspect shipments from entering and departing Turkey. MFA Deputy Director General for Iranian Affairs Babur Hizlan has told us that Turkey has been conducting random inspection of both rail and truck cargo upon entry and departure at the Turkey-Iran border. ¶7. (C) MFA Deputy Director General Ahmet Gun, who chairs a nascent interagency nonproliferation taskforce, noted improvements in GOT interagency coordination and intelligence sharing. Gun said the taskforce (comprised of the MFA, Turkish General Staff, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, intelligence agencies, the Turkish Atomic Energy Council (TAEK),and Customs),now meets monthly and is beginning to break down traditional rivalries among GOT agencies, and overcome information stove-piping. The taskforce is also able to convene on short notice to respond to cases requiring urgent action. Gun emphasized that accurate and timely intelligence is critical to help the MFA maintain credibility within the taskforce. The GOT has also resuscitated an industrial outreach program, according to Gun. On March 25, the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade held a briefing for an Istanbul-based industry group whose membership includes companies involved in exporting or brokering technical equipment. The briefing outlined GOT export controls and regulations. Gun said more outreach is being planned for the near future. ¶8. (C) Gun noted that increased vigilance on the part of the GOT has resulted in a number of trucks carrying suspicious cargo into Iran being stopped at the Gurbulak border crossing on the Turkey-Iran border. Since the passage of UNSC Resolution 1803, Turkey has stopped a number of trucks at the Turkey-Iranian border destined for a variety of European countries and worked with relevant embassies to establish the bona fides of the equipment and its end-users. When in doubt, according to Gun, the GOT is going to err on the side of caution to prevent proliferation. Gun voiced concern that there have been a number of cases when problematic shipments have transited EU countries without incident. Only when the shipments reached Turkey did members of the EU request Turkey to halt the shipment. Gun provided a specific example of a shipment from Germany to Iran that stopped in a Bulgarian port for three days before reaching Turkey. Germany did not ask Bulgaria to take action when the items were in Bulgaria, and only asked Turkey to intervene. Gun stressed that Turkey will do its part to combat proliferation threats, but asked allies and partners to do more to stop the shipment of sensitive items at their country of origin. Investigating and Prosecuting Proliferators -------------- ¶9. (S) The GOT is prosecuting individuals linked with companies in the AQ Khan network (Techno-Electric and 3E Industrial). Two separate proceedings, one for organized smuggling and the other for document forgery, remain active. Hearings on the cases took place on February 20 (organized smuggling) and March 10 (forgery); next court dates are July 25 and July 6, respectively. Delays thus far are attributed to Turkey's inability to obtain cooperation from Switzerland and Netherlands to obtain the testimony of defendants Tinner and Slebos, respectively. The MFA assured us that the prosecution will continue, but noted that it is not in a position to intervene in the pace of the judicial process. We have also received assurances from Gun that the entities and individuals involved remain under surveillance by both Customs and intelligence agencies, and that he is "one hundred percent" certain that they are no longer able to conduct business, including with government entities. Comment: Importance of PUNE Agreement -------------- ¶10. (C) The GOT has linked its implementation of our bilateral agreement on nonproliferation (EXBS agreement) to ratification of the 123 Agreement. Turkey has expressed frustration over the fact that the U.S. has still not ratified the agreement after initialing it over seven years ago, even as it has actively pursued a similar agreement with India, who is neither in the NPT nor a NATO ally. Bringing the 123 Agreement into force will open up opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in Turkey's recently launched competition for developing civilian nuclear energy. For U.S. companies considering a bid on Turkey's nuclear program, timing is important. Interested investors are required to submit their bids by the end of September. U.S. companies will be unable to participate in the competition without the 123 Agreement in place. In addition, approval of the Agreement will allow the USG to deepen its engagement with Turkey on nonproliferation and facilitate our efforts to enhance the GOT's ability to detect and deter proliferation activities. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON