Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA671
2008-04-08 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY'S RULING PARTY MAKES ITS FIRST MOVE

Tags:  PGOV TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6417
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0671/01 0991413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081413Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5850
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000671 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S RULING PARTY MAKES ITS FIRST MOVE

REF: ANKARA 644 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G Weiner for reasons 1.4(b),(
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000671

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S RULING PARTY MAKES ITS FIRST MOVE

REF: ANKARA 644 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G Weiner for reasons 1.4(b),(
d)


1. (C) Summary and comment. Turkey's ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) revealed the first moves in its
strategy to survive the party closure case now pending in the
constitutional court. Following AKP's April 7 Central
Decision Making and Administrative Board meeting, party
officials announced they plan to focus on an EU-related
reform package, and seek opposition support for party
closure-related constitutional amendments as a secondary
priority. AKP's options were limited; constitutional reform
efforts are cloaked in self-interest and risk continued
polarization. Passing the proposed "democratization"
package, including long-awaited revisions to controversial
Penal Code Article 301, will not be easy but may restore
AKP's EU credentials with Turkey's liberals and Western
governments. Erdogan may hope to regain the advantage by
emphasizing Turkey's (vice AKP's) interests, laying any
damage to the accession process and/or economy at the
opposition's feet. The party's "high road" move is unlikely
to end divisiveness or gain AKP the allies needed to pass
constitutional reform proposals; the far-right Nationalist
Action Party (MHP) fervently opposes Article 301 amendments
and has been uncooperative on party closure reform. AKP
leaders seem to be betting an EU reform agenda offers the
best cover as they prepare their defense against the pending
closure case. End summary and comment.

2. (C) AKP leaders announced April 7 a plan to revive
EU-related reforms, including long-debated penal code
amendments and a commercial code overhaul. The party
introduced to parliament the same day a bill amending Penal
Code Articles 301 and 305, having finally resolved
intra-party disputes over the proposed 301 language. Most
media portrayed the EU-focused approached as a positive
effort to defuse tensions that have gripped the country since
the March 14 filing of a closure case against AKP. AKP's
options were, in fact, limited (reftel). The party's EU
focus was a source of strength in the past and will shore up
support from liberals and business circles, as well as
Western governments. Making controversial constitutional

amendments to party closure provisions the top priority, as
some AKPers wanted, would only have further ratcheted up
tensions and substantiated accusations the party was acting
solely out of self-interest. Amidst calls for compromise,
AKP will now make constitutional reforms subject to
opposition buy-in.


3. (C) PM Erdogan seems to have heeded the AKP faction
advocating a less confrontational approach. By walking back
from earlier proposals to block the closure case by amending
Constitution Articles 68 and 69, AKP has signaled it will
prepare a defense and allow the case to proceed. AKP MP and
party Vice Chair Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat said Erdogan will
establish working groups to craft AKP's defense (reportedly
headed by DPM Cemil Cicek) but assured the press following
the six-hour April 7 meeting the party will ease public
concerns and avoid escalating tensions. Party leaders may be
hoping an emphasis on economic reforms and stability,
including strengthening EU ties, will shift the burden of
compromise to the opposition. Erdogan took the high road at
AKP's April 8 party group meeting, stating that AKP's
priorities are greater democracy, modernization and
prosperity for Turks. Given the potentially severe economic
and political consequences for Turkey posed by the closure
case, Erdogan insinuated that blame for harming the country's
interests would rest with opposition parties if they failed
to compromise.


4. (C) MHP may not be willing to carry that burden when it
comes to amending Article 301 or constitutional reforms on
party closures. The far-right party has steadfastly resisted
changing Article 301. MHP leader Devlet Bahceli recently
reiterated Article 301 is strictly off limits. In fact, MHP
threatened to immediately sever relations with AKP if an
Article 301 bill is introduced to parliament. MHP Deputy
Chairman Mehmet Sandir warned, "AKP must avoid revitalizing
the EU process in order to avert the closure case." MHP has
conditioned support for party closure changes on banning
individuals rather than parties from politics, a risky
trade-off for AKP MPs already targeted by the judiciary.
Opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) and Democratic

ANKARA 00000671 002 OF 002


Left Party (DSP) are clearly against constitutional reforms
and unlikely to back Article 301 changes; CHP has threatened
to file a legal challenge if the measures are approved, as it
has done repeatedly with other legislation passed this term.
AKP's new strategy may win support in Brussels and Washington
and with some AKP voters, but offers little chance of a
parliamentary alliance. In the long-run, AKP may be willing
to horse-trade Article 301 for MHP's support on
constitutional reforms or, alternatively, run 301 to the
ground to prove its EU reform credentials and bolster its
image as the party willing to sacrifice all for Turkey's
democratic future.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON