TURKEY: NATIONALIST OPPOSITION LOOKING TO CASHING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000607

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: NATIONALIST OPPOSITION LOOKING TO CASHING
IN ON PARTY CLOSURE

REF: ANKARA 553

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, for Reasons 1.4 (b
,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The opposition Nationalist Action Party
(MHP) since its entry into parliament in July 2007 has
shrewdly managed to corner the governing Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and exploit its weaknesses. MHP is
keenly aware that hiving off votes from AKP is its only hope
to strengthen its base. MHP has steered a course,
opportunistic and well-played, that is credible both in the
eyes of conservative Turks and, in a backward way, for the
state. If the current legal process against AKP succeeds in
disbanding the party, MHP is positioning itself to feast on
the remains. END SUMMARY.

Shaping a New "Constructive Opposition"
--------------

2. (C) MHP's first act after the parliamentary election was
to participate in the August 2007 election of presidential
candidate Abdullah Gul. Although MHP voted for its own
candidate, the act of showing up (along with the tiny
Democratic Left Party) pushed attendance over the 367 quorum
threshold set by the Constitutional Court last May, after
which opposition parties' boycott forced the government to
call early elections. MHP administrators were criticized for
enabling Gul's election, but they cast themselves as
advocates of democracy and claimed AKP would bear the
responsibility for electing the president.


3. (C) Since then, MHP has struggled to carve out its
territory against AKP, working to distinguish itself from the
counter-productive and impotent squirmings of the Republican
People's Party (CHP). MHP found some purchase on AKP's
constitutional revision project, but as that ambitious
program moved to the back burner there was less to attack.
More fruitful was the lack of military action early last fall
against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in
Northern Iraq -- MHP labeled some AKPers "separatists" -- but
when Turkey finally launched airstrikes across the border in
December, MHP Vice Chairman and party whip Oktay Vural
acknowledged it had become harder for MHP to exploit
government inaction.


4. (C) The constitutional headscarf amendments returned MHP
to center stage. When PM Erdogan in January suggested the
headscarf ban at universities could be resolved in a single
sentence, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli jumped on the opening.
While criticizing the PM for not seeking compromise, he
declared MHP's opposition to the ban and proposed parliament
take up the issue immediately, without waiting for more
comprehensive constitutional reform, on the basis of equal
access to public services. MHP distinguished between service
providers and service receivers -- in a secular state, only
the latter should be permitted to wear the headscarf in the
government domain. In short order, the two parties hammered
out revised constitutional language on both equal access and
the right to education and agreed to amend Article 17 of the
Higher Education (YOK) Law, regulating attire at
universities. The controversial effort to lift the ban
stalled out when CHP applied to the Constitutional Court to
review the amendments.

The Devil (and Salvation) in the Details
--------------

5. (C) The proposed YOK Law revision was MHP's opportunity to
side-step the controversy and leave AKP holding the bag. By
maintaining firmly that only kerchief-style headcoverings
tied under the chin should be allowed in universities, MHP
staked out ground that appeared supportive of religious
tenets, nationalist, and opposed to AKP. The kerchief style
is truly Anatolian, they claim; the "turban" style associated
more with AKP is "foreign" and a "political symbol." Should
a young woman believe her head must be covered for reasons of
faith, then let her do so in an "authentically Turkish
style," argues Hediye Akdere, MHP Women's Auxiliary Chair.
AKP's Education Committee chairman tells us the party has no
intention of bringing forward MHP's turban-exclusive

ANKARA 00000607 002 OF 002


language, leaving MHP free to accuse AKP of bad faith.

AKP's Party Closure Case
--------------

6. (C) MHP officials have been virtually jovial since the
March 14 indictment seeking to close the ruling party, making
clear that an apparently principled stand is a tool to dig
into AKP. They claim to oppose party closure while
remaining utterly uninterested in explaining how to prevent
it. Oktay Vural explains that Turkey must somehow strike a
balance between protecting parties ("the sine qua non
institution of democracy") and protecting democracy itself
against the ravages of AKP -- a party MHP officials variously
tell us does or does not have an Islamic agenda.


7. (C) MHP's leaked proposal to amend the constitution
involves eliminating party closures, but expanding the
punishment on individuals to a lifetime political ban, vice
the current five-year ban. MHP Secretary General Cihan
Pacaci admits his party has no intention of accepting AKP's
expected counterproposal to amend the constitution to prevent
party closures -- instead they will force AKP to take sole
responsibility for the amendment effort and for going to
referendum.

Traditional Allies Appear at Odds
--------------

8. (C) The tricky line MHP is walking has placed genuine
strain on MHP's long-standing affinity with the military.
MHP facilitated Gul's election, despite the Turkish General
Staff's (TGS) April 27, 2007 e-memo, which made clear that
Gul was an unsuitable candidate from the military
perspective. In December, Kirikkale deputy and former Health
Minister Osman Durmus called on CHOD General Yasar Buyukanit
to resign for having allowed legalization and politicization
of PKK terrorists in the form of pro-Kurdish Democratic
Society Party (DTP) MPs' entry into parliament. Although
Vice Chairman Vural denied Durmus was speaking for the party,
he also dismissed the prospect that the party, known for its
rigid discipline, would punish Durmus.


9. (C) One little-noted event gives some indication of the
mistrust and mutual animosity between MHP and the military.
In January, a group of retired officers and their fur-clad
wives arrived at MHP headquarters to deliver a black wreath
to express outrage at MHP's stance on lifting the headscarf
ban. MHP members literally chased the retired officers and
their wives down the street, tossing the wreath after them.
Bitterness reached a peak at the beginning of March after the
military pulled back from its cross-border ground operation;
Bahceli accused the military of legitimizing the PKK through
use of military terms like "command and control center," and
the CHOD called the accusations "treasonous" (reftel).


10. (C) COMMENT. Polls show MHP holding at the 13-14 percent
range -- what it garnered in the July 2007 elections. But
MHP is poised to make the most of the pending closure case,
whether AKP is closed or splinters under the threat of
closure. National security analyst Faruk Demir assesses that
MHP has played the role of catalyst since entering
parliament: it has repeatedly instigated fundamental change
in its environment, but somehow side-stepped the consequences
of the chemical reaction. From Gul's presidential election to
the headscarf amendments, MHP has played the role of AKP
enabler, without becoming irrevocably tainted by association.
Bahceli has thrown AKP leaders off their reform game and
embroiled them in political controversies. At the same time,
MHP's cooler relationship with the military comports with the
public's message last July that soldiers should steer
clear of politics. In retrospect, the noose that Devlet
Bahceli famously threw to the crowds at election rallies
may not have been for jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, but
may have been intended for AKP to hang itself. END COMMENT.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON