TURKEY: PRESIDENT GUL'S NEW TAKE ON ACTIVISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000575

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRESIDENT GUL'S NEW TAKE ON ACTIVISM

REF: A. ANKARA 00011


B. 07 ANKARA 2405

C. 07 ANKARA 2234

D. 07 ANKARA 2944

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, for Reasons 1.4 (b
,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Six months into his tenure as Turkey's
president, Abdullah Gul was striding confidently across the
world stage while walking more carefully on the domestic
tightrope. It is an image that encapsulated his presidency
up to March 14, 2008, the day the chief public prosecutor
filed for closure of his former party and proposed that Gul
personally be subject to a 5-year political ban. With a
fortitude that few might have expected, Gul had worked to
renew the presidency despite growing polarization between
entrenched Kemalists and the burgeoning power of Turkey
conservative middle class, from whence he comes. Gul is a
multi-dimensional force who aims to be the president of all
Turks and to further his country's international standing; at
the same time, he remains his "former" party's man, with
critics evaluating his every move in terms of his alleged
Islamic agenda. The closure case, regardless of outcome,
reveals that what had appeared to be a working accommodation
between the presidency and state establishment was only skin
deep. END SUMMARY.

Building Relationships, Inside and Out
--------------

2. (C) Initial open insubordination by the military toward
the new president had gradually been supplanted by a working
relationship that Gul nurtured with strong language on
national security issues. Gul's apparent accommodation with
the Turkish General Staff (TGS) was reflected in his recent
invitation to Iraqi President Talabani, at which he had
hinted for several months. In January, TGS chief Buyukanit
restated his view that there was no benefit to meeting with
Talabani, but in contrast to a similar statement made in
February 2007, indicated that the TGS could not impose its
view on other institutions of the state. Two days after Gul
chaired his third National Security Council meeting (February
20),which the press portrayed as having been preoccupied by
the headscarf controversy, the military launched a limited
land operation (CBO) against the PKK into Northern Iraq while
Talabani received his invitation to Ankara -- he visited
March 7, a week after the CBO wrapped up. Long-time EMBASSY
contact Hasim Hasimi, who met with Gul for two hours on March
9, says Gul will reciprocate the visit sometime in the next
two months.


3. (C) Bilkent University Professor Umit Cizre suspects the
military's changed tone reflects its keen eye on public
opinion rather than a change of heart. When the TGS detected
criticism of its disrespectful attitude toward Gul from
otherwise non-partisan press commentators, it began to at
least appear more respectful. Under the surface, Cizre and
others predict, a cold war will play out on issues like
constitutional reform or military inflexibility on Cyprus.
The military -- which has made no public comment on the party
closure case against the ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) -- continues to use what levers and proxies it has,
including sympathetic journalists and opinion-makers, and
especially the like-minded courts. Yet having failed in its
Spring 2007 gambit to prevent Gul's ascendency to Cankaya,
TGS has had to come to terms with its new occupant.


4. (C) On foreign issues, the Presidency has remained
shoulder-to-shoulder with -- if not out ahead of -- the Prime
Ministry and Foreign Ministry on implementing GOT foreign
policy priorities: increasing Turkey's regional and global
influence, supporting international efforts to resolve the
Cyprus and Middle East conflicts, combating terrorism,
supporting the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq,
enhancing ties with the Turkic Central Asian states, and
strengthening Turkish development assistance through the
Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA).


5. (C) Gul's stature and foreign policy experience might
allow him to lean forward courageously and offer the PM some

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space to be bold and creative on some of Turkey's
long-standing foreign policy challenges, such as Armenia.
One recent example was Gul's congratulatory letter to
Armenian President-elect Sargsian, which expressed optimism
for Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, even as Sargsian's
election remained in dispute. As FM, Gul was known to be a
pragmatist on relations with Armenia, and implemented a
number of limited measures to help relax Turkey's isolation
of Armenia. And the Gul presidency re-opens a channel to
pursue normalized relations with Armenia that was shuttered
during the Sezer presidency. The close ties Gul has forged
with Azerbaijani President Aliyev will be no less important.


6. (C) Gul has restored the role of international advocacy to
his office. His deft ability to connect on a personal level
has strengthened Turkey's bilateral relations in countries
where personal relationships matter, such as in Central Asia.
These ties had weakened with his predecessor unwilling to
travel officially to any country which had not reciprocated a
state visit from a Turkish president, no matter what the time
elapsed. As Turkey eyes a non-permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC),Gul is bringing Turkey to
greater international prominence -- something he also sought
as foreign minister. Gul advocated for a UNSC seat and
Izmir's Expo 2015 candidacy at the Dakar summit of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Among his more
notable achievements, Gul brokered an unprecedented meeting
last fall between Abu Mazen and Shimon Peres. Gul has been
credited with having played a crucial role in ensuring that
all political parties participated in a democratic election
was held in Pakistan. Willing to leverage Turkey's strong
historical ties to Pakistan, Gul traveled to Islamabad in
December 2007, during the state of emergency, and met not
only with President Musharraf, but also, separately, with all
opposition party leaders, including Sharif and Bhutto, where
he cited Turkey's experience consolidating its democracy at
the ballot box, and urged the opposition to unify and
participate. The meeting with Gul, in fact, set the stage
for Nawaz Sharif's first trip to Islamabad since returning to
Pakistan from his exile in Saudi Arabia.


7. (C) According to MFA contacts, operational relations
between MFA and the presidency are smooth. Gul has an
exceptionally large, experienced foreign policy staff,
hand-picked from MFA. As the former FM, MFA knows his style.
If we've heard one complaint, it is that Gul's -- and
Erdogan's -- frequent international travel has meant FM
Babacan does not spend much time in the Ministry in Ankara,
leaving some key issues unattended to.


8. (C) Gul's unique brand of personal politics and
willingness to take risks has led to missteps. The media and
opposition chastised him in November 2007 for disregarding
protocol and sullying the office of the presidency by
personally calling on visiting Saudi King Abdullah at his
hotel room rather than receiving the King at the Presidential
Palace in Cankaya. The January 2008 visit of Sudanese
President Bashir, and the state dinner given in his honor,
made Gul appear to have a tin ear to public opinion. One
leading liberal columnist termed the visit a source of shame
and embarrassment for the nation. President Gul and the GOT
have pursued a "zero-problems" regional policy and
good-neighborliness. The next test is likely to come from
Iran, whose President Amedinejad has for months sought an
invitation. Gul accepted his advisors' counsel to wait until
after the Iranian Majles elections.

Reaching Out to the People
--------------

9. (C) President Gul enjoys high favorability ratings, in
keeping with the public's general admiration for his office,
but he hasn't rested on the prestige of his seat. He has
broken with the practice of his predecessor by inviting
people of all walks of life to the presidential palace. He
hosts lunches with intellectuals and writers, some of whom
are controversial, like Elif Shafak. During his inaugural
visit to the Southeast, he told the military he supports them
in their fight against terrorists but extended a warm hand to
the people. On March 11, he used his meeting with a
delegation of Democratic Society Party (DTP) officials to

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both acknowledge the Kurdish problem as Turkey's "most
important problem" and to warn DTPers against referring to
statements of convicted terrorist Abdullah Ocalan. PM
Erdogan, by contrast, refuses to meet with DTP until they
renounce terror. Hasim Hasimi, who spoke with Gul about that
meeting, believes Gul and Erdogan are playing a good cop/bad
cop routine to keep a balance in AKP's outreach to DTP (an
act they perfected earlier when Gul was FM). On March 27,
Gul is beginning a series of meetings with heads of all
parties in parliament to try and ease tensions arising over
the party closure case and reactions to it.

The Notary of Cankaya?
--------------

10. (C) Excessive harmony with the government has already
cost Gul some of the capital -- and prominence -- he brought
with him as both victim and victor in the presidential
election. Gul has approved nearly everything the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government has sent to him; he has
returned no item to parliament. Of more than 500 personnel
assignments that have crossed his desk, he has rejected none,
causing critics to refer to him as the Notary Public of
Cankaya (the presidential palace). In part, Gul has been
countering the blanket rejections of President Sezer, who
held up appointments in the thousands on the grounds that all
the appointees were Islamists and therefore unsuitable.
Press objections to specific Gul appointments have been
limited to the very few noted in reftel B and to Efkan Ala,
former Governor of Diyarbakir appointed to be Prime Ministry
U/S (a 2007 IV participant who has favorably impressed
Mission officers). The appointment of the Higher Education
Council (YOK) Chairman Yusuf Ziya Ozcan in December was also
controversial (reftel D); Ozcan has become a lightning rod
for criticism in the ongoing headscarf controversy with
numerous criminal cases lodged against him.

Apolitical Criteria
--------------

11. (C) Gul once stated publicly that he would not look into
the appropriateness or desirability of a law before signing
it, but only consider whether it complied with the law.
Critics observe that he can hide behind this stance to
support the government on controversial issues. Gul's
justification of his January approval of Turkey's smoking ban
(to take full effect in 18 months) focused on bringing Turkey
into line with European standards. Critics scoff that the EU
is a convenient excuse to push forward social control
measures ultimately motivated by religious aims. Gul has
openly stated that he favors the headscarf ban being lifted,
saying that beliefs should be freely practiced at
universities; he waited for nearly two weeks -- up to the day
Turkey launched its land operation -- to approve the
constitutional amendments that had passed with 411 (of 550)
votes.


12. (C) COMMENT. Gul's successes thus far speak to both his
force of character and the military's less certain footing
after the series of domestic political defeats. The PKK is a
topic on which the President and the TGS can work in harmony;
security trumps all. But the penetration of alleged
proponents of an Islamist agenda into the institutions of the
state is for the TGS and Kemalist allies -- particularly the
judiciary -- also a security issue. The prosecutor's pursuit
of a political ban on Gul may take some creative legal work,
as the presidency is officially an apolitical position and
the president can only be tried for treason. As the
Constitutional Court now evaluates (if it accepts hearing the
closure case) whether AKP (and Gul) violated the secularism
principle, sources of governing authority will be contested,
as will the new president's leadership. END COMMENT.

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WILSON