TURKEY: PRESIDENT GUL'S NEW TAKE ON ACTIVISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000575 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRESIDENT GUL'S NEW TAKE ON ACTIVISM REF: A. ANKARA 00011 ¶B. 07 ANKARA 2405 ¶C. 07 ANKARA 2234 ¶D. 07 ANKARA 2944 Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, for Reasons 1.4 (b ,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Six months into his tenure as Turkey's president, Abdullah Gul was striding confidently across the world stage while walking more carefully on the domestic tightrope. It is an image that encapsulated his presidency up to March 14, 2008, the day the chief public prosecutor filed for closure of his former party and proposed that Gul personally be subject to a 5-year political ban. With a fortitude that few might have expected, Gul had worked to renew the presidency despite growing polarization between entrenched Kemalists and the burgeoning power of Turkey conservative middle class, from whence he comes. Gul is a multi-dimensional force who aims to be the president of all Turks and to further his country's international standing; at the same time, he remains his "former" party's man, with critics evaluating his every move in terms of his alleged Islamic agenda. The closure case, regardless of outcome, reveals that what had appeared to be a working accommodation between the presidency and state establishment was only skin deep. END SUMMARY. Building Relationships, Inside and Out -------------- ¶2. (C) Initial open insubordination by the military toward the new president had gradually been supplanted by a working relationship that Gul nurtured with strong language on national security issues. Gul's apparent accommodation with the Turkish General Staff (TGS) was reflected in his recent invitation to Iraqi President Talabani, at which he had hinted for several months. In January, TGS chief Buyukanit restated his view that there was no benefit to meeting with Talabani, but in contrast to a similar statement made in February 2007, indicated that the TGS could not impose its view on other institutions of the state. Two days after Gul chaired his third National Security Council meeting (February 20),which the press portrayed as having been preoccupied by the headscarf controversy, the military launched a limited land operation (CBO) against the PKK into Northern Iraq while Talabani received his invitation to Ankara -- he visited March 7, a week after the CBO wrapped up. Long-time Embassy contact Hasim Hasimi, who met with Gul for two hours on March 9, says Gul will reciprocate the visit sometime in the next two months. ¶3. (C) Bilkent University Professor Umit Cizre suspects the military's changed tone reflects its keen eye on public opinion rather than a change of heart. When the TGS detected criticism of its disrespectful attitude toward Gul from otherwise non-partisan press commentators, it began to at least appear more respectful. Under the surface, Cizre and others predict, a cold war will play out on issues like constitutional reform or military inflexibility on Cyprus. The military -- which has made no public comment on the party closure case against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) -- continues to use what levers and proxies it has, including sympathetic journalists and opinion-makers, and especially the like-minded courts. Yet having failed in its Spring 2007 gambit to prevent Gul's ascendency to Cankaya, TGS has had to come to terms with its new occupant. ¶4. (C) On foreign issues, the Presidency has remained shoulder-to-shoulder with -- if not out ahead of -- the Prime Ministry and Foreign Ministry on implementing GOT foreign policy priorities: increasing Turkey's regional and global influence, supporting international efforts to resolve the Cyprus and Middle East conflicts, combating terrorism, supporting the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq, enhancing ties with the Turkic Central Asian states, and strengthening Turkish development assistance through the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TIKA). ¶5. (C) Gul's stature and foreign policy experience might allow him to lean forward courageously and offer the PM some ANKARA 00000575 002 OF 003 space to be bold and creative on some of Turkey's long-standing foreign policy challenges, such as Armenia. One recent example was Gul's congratulatory letter to Armenian President-elect Sargsian, which expressed optimism for Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, even as Sargsian's election remained in dispute. As FM, Gul was known to be a pragmatist on relations with Armenia, and implemented a number of limited measures to help relax Turkey's isolation of Armenia. And the Gul presidency re-opens a channel to pursue normalized relations with Armenia that was shuttered during the Sezer presidency. The close ties Gul has forged with Azerbaijani President Aliyev will be no less important. ¶6. (C) Gul has restored the role of international advocacy to his office. His deft ability to connect on a personal level has strengthened Turkey's bilateral relations in countries where personal relationships matter, such as in Central Asia. These ties had weakened with his predecessor unwilling to travel officially to any country which had not reciprocated a state visit from a Turkish president, no matter what the time elapsed. As Turkey eyes a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),Gul is bringing Turkey to greater international prominence -- something he also sought as foreign minister. Gul advocated for a UNSC seat and Izmir's Expo 2015 candidacy at the Dakar summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Among his more notable achievements, Gul brokered an unprecedented meeting last fall between Abu Mazen and Shimon Peres. Gul has been credited with having played a crucial role in ensuring that all political parties participated in a democratic election was held in Pakistan. Willing to leverage Turkey's strong historical ties to Pakistan, Gul traveled to Islamabad in December 2007, during the state of emergency, and met not only with President Musharraf, but also, separately, with all opposition party leaders, including Sharif and Bhutto, where he cited Turkey's experience consolidating its democracy at the ballot box, and urged the opposition to unify and participate. The meeting with Gul, in fact, set the stage for Nawaz Sharif's first trip to Islamabad since returning to Pakistan from his exile in Saudi Arabia. ¶7. (C) According to MFA contacts, operational relations between MFA and the presidency are smooth. Gul has an exceptionally large, experienced foreign policy staff, hand-picked from MFA. As the former FM, MFA knows his style. If we've heard one complaint, it is that Gul's -- and Erdogan's -- frequent international travel has meant FM Babacan does not spend much time in the Ministry in Ankara, leaving some key issues unattended to. ¶8. (C) Gul's unique brand of personal politics and willingness to take risks has led to missteps. The media and opposition chastised him in November 2007 for disregarding protocol and sullying the office of the presidency by personally calling on visiting Saudi King Abdullah at his hotel room rather than receiving the King at the Presidential Palace in Cankaya. The January 2008 visit of Sudanese President Bashir, and the state dinner given in his honor, made Gul appear to have a tin ear to public opinion. One leading liberal columnist termed the visit a source of shame and embarrassment for the nation. President Gul and the GOT have pursued a "zero-problems" regional policy and good-neighborliness. The next test is likely to come from Iran, whose President Amedinejad has for months sought an invitation. Gul accepted his advisors' counsel to wait until after the Iranian Majles elections. Reaching Out to the People -------------- ¶9. (C) President Gul enjoys high favorability ratings, in keeping with the public's general admiration for his office, but he hasn't rested on the prestige of his seat. He has broken with the practice of his predecessor by inviting people of all walks of life to the presidential palace. He hosts lunches with intellectuals and writers, some of whom are controversial, like Elif Shafak. During his inaugural visit to the Southeast, he told the military he supports them in their fight against terrorists but extended a warm hand to the people. On March 11, he used his meeting with a delegation of Democratic Society Party (DTP) officials to ANKARA 00000575 003 OF 003 both acknowledge the Kurdish problem as Turkey's "most important problem" and to warn DTPers against referring to statements of convicted terrorist Abdullah Ocalan. PM Erdogan, by contrast, refuses to meet with DTP until they renounce terror. Hasim Hasimi, who spoke with Gul about that meeting, believes Gul and Erdogan are playing a good cop/bad cop routine to keep a balance in AKP's outreach to DTP (an act they perfected earlier when Gul was FM). On March 27, Gul is beginning a series of meetings with heads of all parties in parliament to try and ease tensions arising over the party closure case and reactions to it. The Notary of Cankaya? -------------- ¶10. (C) Excessive harmony with the government has already cost Gul some of the capital -- and prominence -- he brought with him as both victim and victor in the presidential election. Gul has approved nearly everything the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has sent to him; he has returned no item to parliament. Of more than 500 personnel assignments that have crossed his desk, he has rejected none, causing critics to refer to him as the Notary Public of Cankaya (the presidential palace). In part, Gul has been countering the blanket rejections of President Sezer, who held up appointments in the thousands on the grounds that all the appointees were Islamists and therefore unsuitable. Press objections to specific Gul appointments have been limited to the very few noted in reftel B and to Efkan Ala, former Governor of Diyarbakir appointed to be Prime Ministry U/S (a 2007 IV participant who has favorably impressed Mission officers). The appointment of the Higher Education Council (YOK) Chairman Yusuf Ziya Ozcan in December was also controversial (reftel D); Ozcan has become a lightning rod for criticism in the ongoing headscarf controversy with numerous criminal cases lodged against him. Apolitical Criteria -------------- ¶11. (C) Gul once stated publicly that he would not look into the appropriateness or desirability of a law before signing it, but only consider whether it complied with the law. Critics observe that he can hide behind this stance to support the government on controversial issues. Gul's justification of his January approval of Turkey's smoking ban (to take full effect in 18 months) focused on bringing Turkey into line with European standards. Critics scoff that the EU is a convenient excuse to push forward social control measures ultimately motivated by religious aims. Gul has openly stated that he favors the headscarf ban being lifted, saying that beliefs should be freely practiced at universities; he waited for nearly two weeks -- up to the day Turkey launched its land operation -- to approve the constitutional amendments that had passed with 411 (of 550) votes. ¶12. (C) COMMENT. Gul's successes thus far speak to both his force of character and the military's less certain footing after the series of domestic political defeats. The PKK is a topic on which the President and the TGS can work in harmony; security trumps all. But the penetration of alleged proponents of an Islamist agenda into the institutions of the state is for the TGS and Kemalist allies -- particularly the judiciary -- also a security issue. The prosecutor's pursuit of a political ban on Gul may take some creative legal work, as the presidency is officially an apolitical position and the president can only be tried for treason. As the Constitutional Court now evaluates (if it accepts hearing the closure case) whether AKP (and Gul) violated the secularism principle, sources of governing authority will be contested, as will the new president's leadership. END COMMENT. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON