THE STATE STRIKES BACK: CLOSURE CASE FILED AGAINST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000513 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2023 TAGS: PGOV ECON TU SUBJECT: THE STATE STRIKES BACK: CLOSURE CASE FILED AGAINST TURKEY'S RULING PARTY REF: A. ANKARA 502 ¶B. ANKARA 473 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: The closure case filed March 14 against PM Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a body blow to Turkey's political and economic stability. Turkey's entrenched secular establishment establishment has chosen to try to fight the AKP where the inept political opposition has failed. The closure case will embolden the nationalist/Kemalist opposition and distract Erdogan and the GOT, making it increasingly difficult for them to focus on a range of issues of interest to the USG. It will also endanger Turkey's already tenuous prospects for EU membership and put at risk an already shaky economy. How the country reacts - and where it ends up - will be the true measure of its democratic development to date. End summary and comment. ¶2. (U) The evening of Friday, March 14, the chief prosecutor of the Court of Appeals, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya - former President Sezer's final appointee - filed a case with Turkey's Constitutional Court requesting the closure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The 162-page indictment, accompanied by voluminous binders of supporting materials, accuses the AKP of being the center of anti-secular activities intended to take Turkey toward sharia (Islamic) law. It asks the Court to impose a 5-year political ban on as many as 71 AKP administrators, including PM Erdogan, President Gul, and numerous party vice chairs and MPs. It came on the fifth anniversary of PM Erdogan's election as an MP in Siirt. Process -------------- ¶3. (U) The legal process for party closures is a well-worn path in Turkey, which has seen 26 parties closed in 44 years. The profile of the AKP case is high, but the process remains the same: --The Constitutional Court will first decide whether the indictment is technically complete. Copies will then be distributed to all parties, and AKP will have one month to prepare its initial defense; it has the right to ask for extra time. --The Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals will then present his views. His statement will be sent to the AKP. --Later, both sides will deliver oral arguments to the Constitutional Court. --The Court rapporteur will collect all documents and prepare a report; once copies of that report are distributed to the 11 members of the Court, Court President Hasim Kilic will set a date for the Court to take up the case in camera. --For a party to be closed, at least a 7-judge majority must vote in favor; earlier constitutional amendments raised the bar - before 2001, it could be accomplished by simple majority. --According to Article 84 of the Constitution, once the Court decides on a party's closure, those party members named in the final decision will lose their seats in parliament the day that decision is published in the Official Gazette. --In practice, prior to such a ruling coming down, the party to be closed creates a new party; sitting MPs give up their membership in the old party and shift allegiance to the new one; this means most AKP MPs would retain their seats and likely retain a sufficient majority to govern. The Real Case -------------- ¶4. (C) Rule of law will generally be observed in procedural terms. This case, though, has little to do with law. Erdogan's AKP won nearly 47% of the vote in the July 2007 ANKARA 00000513 002 OF 003 election, formed a single-party government and elected its candidate, Abdullah Gul, president. In the mind of the entrenched state institutions - the military and judiciary - AKP constitutes a threat to the sacred Kemalist order of society. With no effective political opposition, the field is left to those state institutions. They loathe and fear all that AKP represents: the conservative, more pious Anatolian people; grassroots (as opposed to the Turkish Republic's traditional top down) politics; loss of "regime" control and change of the status quo. ¶5. (C) For the "regime," nothing less than Turkey's future is as stake. This became more acute: --with passage of the constitutional amendments designed to allow girls with headscarves to attend university, Erdogan's statement in Madrid that the headscarf had become a "political symbol" and the controversial guidance the Gul-appointed head of the Higher Education Council (YOK) used to force the hands of university rectors. --as the PM proposed a series of measures for the Southeast that Kemalists view as furthering ethnic divisions and separatism, as well as rewarding those who support terrorists. --as the Turkish National Police (TNP),with vocal GOT support, started to crack down on the "deep state" (retired military and others who work behind the scenes to ensure the Kemalist state's survival) with recent raids and arrests of the "Ergenekon" gang. The regime will fight to preserve its control and vision of what Turkey should be, even if the price to be paid is extreme. Potential Consequences -------------- ¶6. (C) That price may indeed be high. Commentators across the political spectrum who have come down nearly universally on the side of democracy and the ballot box also warn of the potential for political and economic instability. The case will likely drag on for months, weakening and distracting the government. It will be harder for Erdogan to pursue such difficult issues as the PKK, the Southeast, Iraq, Armenia, and Cyprus. And while EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn has urged the GOT to continue with reforms and stated that Turkey's accession process continues full steam, Turkey's road to the EU has just taken a lengthy detour that will become much worse if the AKp closure case succeeds. ¶7. (SBU) Turkish financial markets, already on soft footing (ref B),could be hit hard. Traditionally, Turkish investors have sold the Lira in reaction to political crises. From Friday market close to Monday opening, the Lira fell just 2.4%, but further depreciation is likely. EFG Securities downgraded the entire Turkish equity market to "sell" from "neutral" in response to the court case, lack of GOT action on reforms and worsening global conditions. Industry groups, too, are calling for calm, pointing to the ballot box and warning of the dangers of prolonged instability. Some have pointed out that past party closures have solved nothing, reminding people that AKP itself, is the improved successor to two closed parties, Refah and Fazilet. Where Turkey Is -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Plenty of people quietly welcome this move, even if theirs are not the loudest voices; they feel they are finally being represented and vindicated by the state institutions they trust. The public voices -- whether political, economic and media -- are calling for parties to be punished at the ballot box, not by the courts. This refrain emanates even from mainstream, establishment columnists such as Hurriyet's Ertrugul Ozkok, who wrote that in a democracy, parties can only be defeated at the ballot box, called for Turkey to overcome its party closing mentality and suggested that AKP could use turn this crisis into an opportunity. A leader of one small party remarked that Turkey needs to stop being a ANKARA 00000513 003 OF 003 graveyard for political parties. The leader of the opposition Nationalist Action Party (MHP) Devlet Bahceli, proposed that the Constitution be amended so that only individuals, not entire parties, can be charged, unless the issue is one of terrorism. ¶9. (C) AKP has been meeting regularly in crisis sessions since March 14 and has issued instructions to its members not to comment or speculate on the closure case, according to a ConGen Istanbul contact. Erdogan continued with his planned travels this past weekend, drawing crowds and applause throughout the Southeast, as he described the case anti-democratic and as against not just the AKP but the 16 million-plus voters who brought them back into office last July as well. He dusted off their election slogans: "We continue down this road; There is no turning back; Everything for Turkey." How We're Playing -------------- ¶10. (C) So far the USG line that in democracies, the voters determine the political future, is in synch with that of the European Union and most Turkish commentators. It is important to underscore that what we support is democracy and democratic processes. With the US a favorite and frequent whipping boy here, some blame us for every crises, and this one is no exception. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON