DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES ARMENIA, GEORGIA WITH FM

S E C R E T ANKARA 000440

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AM AJ GG TU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES ARMENIA, GEORGIA WITH FM
BABACAN, MFA OFFICIALS

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 b, d


1. (C) SUMMARY. DAS Bryza stressed to FM Babacan and MFA
Deputy U/S for Eastern Europe (former Soviet Union),Africa,
East Asia and Pacific Cevikoz, March 3, the need to move
forward on normalizing Turkey-Armenia relations and resolving
Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K),though this will be difficult until
after Armenia's domestic political crisis clarifies. Cevikoz
underscored the need for compromise and Turkey's concern with
instability next door. The Georgian opposition remains
disorganized but has begun to de-escalate tensions, while
Presidents Putin and Saakasvili have begun to take small
steps toward normalizing Russia-Georgia relations. Turkey,
per Cevikoz, has begun to detect growing opposition among
some European countries to offering Georgia NATO/MAP, in
Bucharest, and believes now might not be the time to push
this issue. Bryza noted the USG has not yet reached a
position on Georgia's MAP. Whatever the U.S. decides, it
will be important to underscore continued, strong support for
Georgia. END SUMMARY.

ARMENIA
--------------


2. (C) The situation in Yerevan has deteriorated following
Armenian President Kocharian's unexpected decision to use
force to clear protesters March 1, DAS Bryza told FM Babacan
and MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz in separate meetings, March 3.
Many Armenians were thus questioning the legitimacy of a
Sargsian presidency, which will complicate efforts to
normalize Turkey-Armenia relations and negotiate a resolution
to the N-K conflict. Bryza lamented the tragic violence and
political chaos in Yerevan, noting that Sargsian seemed to be
a more flexible politician than Kocharian.



3. (C) Bryza informed both Babacan and Cevikoz that he
planned to travel to Yerevan within days to start a dialogue
between the government and opposition. Asked by Babacan if
Sargsian could consolidate his presidency over the next three
to six months, Bryza predicted he could, noting that Sargsian
was a calm, confident politician and the opposition may have
overplayed its hand and angered many citizens in the capital.
Still, the GOAM's violence had called into question the
legitimacy of a Sargsian presidency. Ter-Petrossian's
options might now include extracting a government promise to
waive any retribution against him and his supporters,
democratic concessions to the opposition, a role for him in
the new government, or, more pessimistically, continued
confrontation. LTP would have to decide if continuing
protests is a good idea and recognize that it will undermine
Turkey-Armenia normalization and any chance of achieving
resolution on N-K. Sargsian will need the country unified to
reach these goals.


4. (C) Cevikoz underscored the concern with which Turkey
views the violent events in Armenia. "This is not Kenya," he
stated. "We cannot have this in our neighborhood." He
implored Bryza that LTP and Sargsian need to get together and
compromise. Kocharian is still the president and should use
his office to help broker a deal. Otherwise, the divisions
in Armenian society could become permanent. He cautioned
Bryza not to use Turkey-Armenia relations as a rationale for
compromise; neither LTP nor Sargsian will react positively to
this. This is a domestic issue; the key is to get back to
where we stood a few months ago. Cevikoz suggested that both
sides might react more positively to the message that
continued conflict will be exploited by Azerbaijan and make a
resolution on N-K impossible.


5. (S) Bryza noted Armenian FM Oskanian's claim of continued
Armenian support for normalization with Turkey based on:
formal recognition of the TU-AM border, diplomatic relations,
opening the border, and a historic commission. Babacan asked
about the real support among Armenian citizens for the
genocide resolution and for territorial claims on Turkey.
Armenian-Americans and Armenia's Dashnak Party are obsessed
with these issues, said Bryza. Armenian citizens worry about
life -- the economy, Armenia's isolation -- and see
normalized relations with Turkey as important to their
betterment. Referring to AGR, Babacan appreciated that last
year the Administration expended a lot of effort to make sure
nothing went wrong in U.S.-Turkey relations. To Turks, 1915
is about their grandparents' and great-grandparents' struggle
in World War I and Turkey's Independence War; nobody wants
their ancestors to be called killers, especially without
concrete evidence or a scientific study. The GOT wants to

see things settled in Armenia. Babacan said he had made
statements that 2008 is an opportunity to work with the new
Armenian government. Turkey will be ready to go ahead when
they are.

GEORGIA
--------------


6. (C) The situation in Georgia is better now, according to
Bryza, as the opposition has reached compromise with the
government on key issues, such as reducing to five percent
the threshold for political parties to enter parliament and a
reorganization of the public broadcasting board; negotiations
over the central election commission continue. The
opposition and government have also agreed to May 28
parliamentary elections. Bryza described Russian FM Lavrov
as constructive during their chats at President Saakashvili's
inauguration and wanting concrete steps to normalize
Russia-Georgia relations. He noted that we appear to have
made it through Kosovo's independence declaration without
Russian recognition of Abkhazia.


7. (C) Turkey detects a growing number of European countries
which do not support offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP)
to Georgia at NATO's Bucharest Summit in April, said Cevikoz.
Turkey shares their concerns that now might not be the time
to provoke confrontation with Russia. Bryza noted that the
USG position on Georgia's MAP is not finalized, and surmised
that MAP could calm Georgian concerns over being abandoned to
fend for itself as Russia sustains pressure on the separatist
conflicts. But he agreed that it would be tough to persuade
Allies. Whether or not the United States makes a push, it
will be important for us to demonstrate our continued strong
support for Georgia.


8. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON