DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES ARMENIA, GEORGIA WITH FM

S E C R E T ANKARA 000440 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AM AJ GG TU SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES ARMENIA, GEORGIA WITH FM BABACAN, MFA OFFICIALS Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 b, d ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. DAS Bryza stressed to FM Babacan and MFA Deputy U/S for Eastern Europe (former Soviet Union),Africa, East Asia and Pacific Cevikoz, March 3, the need to move forward on normalizing Turkey-Armenia relations and resolving Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K),though this will be difficult until after Armenia's domestic political crisis clarifies. Cevikoz underscored the need for compromise and Turkey's concern with instability next door. The Georgian opposition remains disorganized but has begun to de-escalate tensions, while Presidents Putin and Saakasvili have begun to take small steps toward normalizing Russia-Georgia relations. Turkey, per Cevikoz, has begun to detect growing opposition among some European countries to offering Georgia NATO/MAP, in Bucharest, and believes now might not be the time to push this issue. Bryza noted the USG has not yet reached a position on Georgia's MAP. Whatever the U.S. decides, it will be important to underscore continued, strong support for Georgia. END SUMMARY. ARMENIA -------------- ¶2. (C) The situation in Yerevan has deteriorated following Armenian President Kocharian's unexpected decision to use force to clear protesters March 1, DAS Bryza told FM Babacan and MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz in separate meetings, March 3. Many Armenians were thus questioning the legitimacy of a Sargsian presidency, which will complicate efforts to normalize Turkey-Armenia relations and negotiate a resolution to the N-K conflict. Bryza lamented the tragic violence and political chaos in Yerevan, noting that Sargsian seemed to be a more flexible politician than Kocharian. ¶3. (C) Bryza informed both Babacan and Cevikoz that he planned to travel to Yerevan within days to start a dialogue between the government and opposition. Asked by Babacan if Sargsian could consolidate his presidency over the next three to six months, Bryza predicted he could, noting that Sargsian was a calm, confident politician and the opposition may have overplayed its hand and angered many citizens in the capital. Still, the GOAM's violence had called into question the legitimacy of a Sargsian presidency. Ter-Petrossian's options might now include extracting a government promise to waive any retribution against him and his supporters, democratic concessions to the opposition, a role for him in the new government, or, more pessimistically, continued confrontation. LTP would have to decide if continuing protests is a good idea and recognize that it will undermine Turkey-Armenia normalization and any chance of achieving resolution on N-K. Sargsian will need the country unified to reach these goals. ¶4. (C) Cevikoz underscored the concern with which Turkey views the violent events in Armenia. "This is not Kenya," he stated. "We cannot have this in our neighborhood." He implored Bryza that LTP and Sargsian need to get together and compromise. Kocharian is still the president and should use his office to help broker a deal. Otherwise, the divisions in Armenian society could become permanent. He cautioned Bryza not to use Turkey-Armenia relations as a rationale for compromise; neither LTP nor Sargsian will react positively to this. This is a domestic issue; the key is to get back to where we stood a few months ago. Cevikoz suggested that both sides might react more positively to the message that continued conflict will be exploited by Azerbaijan and make a resolution on N-K impossible. ¶5. (S) Bryza noted Armenian FM Oskanian's claim of continued Armenian support for normalization with Turkey based on: formal recognition of the TU-AM border, diplomatic relations, opening the border, and a historic commission. Babacan asked about the real support among Armenian citizens for the genocide resolution and for territorial claims on Turkey. Armenian-Americans and Armenia's Dashnak Party are obsessed with these issues, said Bryza. Armenian citizens worry about life -- the economy, Armenia's isolation -- and see normalized relations with Turkey as important to their betterment. Referring to AGR, Babacan appreciated that last year the Administration expended a lot of effort to make sure nothing went wrong in U.S.-Turkey relations. To Turks, 1915 is about their grandparents' and great-grandparents' struggle in World War I and Turkey's Independence War; nobody wants their ancestors to be called killers, especially without concrete evidence or a scientific study. The GOT wants to see things settled in Armenia. Babacan said he had made statements that 2008 is an opportunity to work with the new Armenian government. Turkey will be ready to go ahead when they are. GEORGIA -------------- ¶6. (C) The situation in Georgia is better now, according to Bryza, as the opposition has reached compromise with the government on key issues, such as reducing to five percent the threshold for political parties to enter parliament and a reorganization of the public broadcasting board; negotiations over the central election commission continue. The opposition and government have also agreed to May 28 parliamentary elections. Bryza described Russian FM Lavrov as constructive during their chats at President Saakashvili's inauguration and wanting concrete steps to normalize Russia-Georgia relations. He noted that we appear to have made it through Kosovo's independence declaration without Russian recognition of Abkhazia. ¶7. (C) Turkey detects a growing number of European countries which do not support offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia at NATO's Bucharest Summit in April, said Cevikoz. Turkey shares their concerns that now might not be the time to provoke confrontation with Russia. Bryza noted that the USG position on Georgia's MAP is not finalized, and surmised that MAP could calm Georgian concerns over being abandoned to fend for itself as Russia sustains pressure on the separatist conflicts. But he agreed that it would be tough to persuade Allies. Whether or not the United States makes a push, it will be important for us to demonstrate our continued strong support for Georgia. ¶8. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON