TURKEY: KURDISH REACTIONS TO THE CROSS-BORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000436 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER OSCE TU IZ SUBJECT: TURKEY: KURDISH REACTIONS TO THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATION Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b),(d ) 1.(U) This is a joint Embassy Ankara - Consulate Adana cable. ¶2. (C) Summary: The military's recent cross-border operation against terrorist PKK camps in northern Iraq drew a less virulent reaction in Turkey's Southeast than PKK sympathizers had hoped. Several thousand gathered in Diyarbakir, Batman, and Istanbul at Democratic Society Party (DTP)-organized rallies to protest the incursion. Though southeastern Kurds were pleased with the limited extent of the operation, they are now looking for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to takes steps toward a lasting solution to Turkey's long-standing Kurdish issue. Turkish media have been featuring lively discussions on whether the GOT should take steps to revise current amnesty provisions to make it easier to include PKK rank-and-file, afford local administrations more autonomy, and loosen restrictions on public use of the Kurdish language. AKP will have to deliver concrete non-military steps soon to quell skepticism in the region about the government's sincerity regarding Kurds. End summary. -------------- Demonstrations Fail to Attract Large Crowds -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Contacts in the southeast told us that the public reaction to the Turkish ground incursion into northern Iraq was less virulent than PKK sympathizers had hoped. The largest demonstration, in Diyarbakir, drew about 10,000 participants, including DTP deputies Aysel Tugluk, Selahattin Demirtas, and the DTP mayor of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir. Approximately a dozen people were injured. A March 1 rally in Batman drew 5,000 people who chanted, "This is enough." Police detained 16. Several hundred demonstrated in Istanbul on March 1; police dispersed the crowd and detained 26 people when demonstrators tried to march on the popular "Istiklal" shopping street. ¶4. (C) Sertac Bucak, a Kurdish politician who heads a small party, told us that ethnic Kurds are tired of the PKK and many blame the militants for provoking the Turkish military action. Yilmaz Akinci, a Diyarbakir-based journalist, said the PKK expected larger crowds at the protest rallies and believed more young people would respond to calls by PKK-linked organizations to stage riots in major cities. In Diyarbakir, he said, only about 200 youths heeded the call, causing limited damage. ¶5. (C) Many observers remarked that the PKK is now trying to appeal to people on religious grounds. In Diyarbakir, the demonstration featured an appearance by a mullah who criticized the AKP government for targeting fellow Muslims in northern Iraq. Serdar Sengul, an aide to Diyarbakir mayor Baydemir, told us the DTP is cultivating contacts with Islamic NGOs, many of which are disappointed with the AKP. Prior to the July 2007 parliamentary election, AKP had resisted military calls for cross-border strikes but is now sanctioning the operations. ¶6. (C) Kurdish political activist Ibrahim Celik told us that a number of Kurdish Muslims are increasingly frustrated that the AKP version of Islam allows free range for Turkish nationalism, but continues to restrict expressions of cultural identity by the Kurdish community. Some protesters also attacked the offices of Mustazaflar, an Islamic organization many believe is linked with the AKP. (Comment: In the 1990s, Turkish Hizbullah, an underground paramilitary organization, used religious justifications for assassinating PKK sympathizers. The PKK has since softened its Marxism-Leninism and embraced Islam; with these latest moves, it appears the PKK feels threatened by the steady encroachment of the AKP into its support base among poor urban Kurds and wants to enhance the potency of its Kurdish nationalism message by adding religion into the mix. End comment.) -------------- Post-Operation Expectations -------------- ¶7. (C) Former MP and Cizre mayor Hasim Hasimi told us southeastern Kurds were pleased the operation ended sooner than they had expected. Most credited USG influence for the brevity of the operation. They now expect the USG to push the GOT to enact social and political changes in the Southeast. Hasimi believes the AKP had not lived up to its promises to tackle the socio-political aspects of the Kurdish problem. Silencing all arms must be the first step. As long as the conflict persists, any positive measures risk being perceived as compromise. Then, a lasting solution ought to include a comprehensive amnesty or enhanced repentance law that goes beyond the existing Turkish Penal Code Article 221, as well as recognition of the Kurdish identity and Kurdish language and cultural rights. The new Constitution is an opportunity to honor Kurdish identity and culture, he thought. Good GOT working relations with both the Iraqi central government and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) are essential to strengthening domestic measures. ¶8. (C) Hasimi does not believe AKP has plans to take non-economic measures to improve the Kurdish problem. Contacts close to the PM have told Hasimi that their "Southeast Plan" will focus on economic initiatives, in part responding to the latest polling, which reportedly shows poverty remains the top concern in the region. He personally is disappointed that AKP has "buried its intention" of enhancing Turkish democracy, but warns that AKP's economic measures may ultimately backfire if people perceive them as "buying support" in the Southeast. ¶9. (C) Other contacts noted that, while the public response has been relatively subdued, the ground operation has reinforced the conviction among many in the Southeast that the GOT's agenda extends beyond the PKK and includes putting pressure on the KRG. Sengul remarked that Ahmet Davutoglu, the PM's senior foreign policy advisor, has "neo-Ottoman" designs on the Middle East that include expanding Turkish influence in northern Iraq. All our contacts warned that massive unrest would break out across southeastern Turkey if Turkish forces were to clash with KRG Peshmerga. -------------- AKP Plans for Reform -------------- ¶10. (C) AKP's Diyarbakir MP Abdurrahman Kurt told us the PM wants to approach this sensitive issue in a non-confrontational manner. AKP will not introduce a package with a large splash. Instead, it will institute a series of policy reforms that combine political, economic, and social measures. The party already has initiated social projects to deliver food to local communities, and has been working to strengthen the decision-making authority of local administrations. Twenty-four hour broadcasting on state-run TRT television is in the works (Kurt could not specify a launch date),and the party is working on economic plans to reduce regional disparities. AKP is also considering introducing a Kurdish language and literature course at a southeastern university. Kurt believes the pace of reforms will depend on the political environment, and the decisions would come straight from Erdogan -- the only figure who can ensure that all AKP MPs support measures such as Kurdish-language courses in public schools. -------------- Turkish Media Focused on the Kurdish Issue -------------- ¶11. (U) Turkish media in recent days have given extensive coverage to the need for a political solution to the Kurdish issue. Liberal "Radikal" featured the ideas of over 30 prominent intellectuals and Kurdish politicians on how to achieve a lasting solution. The president of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV),Can Paker, argued that following the recent military success, the government should take non-military steps as soon as possible, including working to reintegrate PKK members into Turkish society. Ankara University Professor Baskin Oran argued for an immediate amnesty, introduction of a massive economic stimulus package for the Southeast, and recognition of Kurdish cultural identity. Other recognizable figures, such as DTP Group Chairman Ahmet Turk, Kurdish writer Umit Firat, and Human Rights Foundation President Yavuz Onen, emphasized the need to devolve more authority to local administrations, recognize the Kurdish identity in a new Constitution, and allow the public use of Kurdish language in reading, writing, and speaking. ¶12. (U) Several journalists have dedicated recent columns to discussing the possibility of a political solution to the Kurdish problem. "Milliyet's" Hasan Cemal urged the government to adopt a new Constitution that strengthens local administrations, diminishes the military's political role, and recognizes different languages and cultures. "Radikal's" Ismet Berkan wrote that in order to break the vicious cycle, Turkey should take symbolic steps such as providing elective courses in Kurdish language and literature in primary and high schools, and remove obstacles to providing municipal services in multiple languages. Such steps would lead to an atmosphere that would break the backbone of terrorism, Berkan thought. "Sabah's" Muharrem Sarikaya believes internal divisions within AKP would make it difficult for PM Erdogan to push through political and cultural reforms. Military pressure would also militate against reforms, argued Sarikaya, citing TGS Chief General Buyukanit's March 3 statements to the press opposing education in languages other than Turkish. ¶13. (C) Comment: The relatively limited response to the operation in the Southeast reflects an overwhelming sense of conflict-fatigue and the decreased ability of the PKK to mobilize crowds. No one in the region, however, would defend the GOT offensive as a step towards a solution of the PKK problem or the Kurdish question more broadly. This skepticism about the government's sincerity regarding the Kurds and the KRG could easily tip into widespread disorder if Turkish forces were to confront KRG Peshmerga in Iraq. The military action does, however, allow the AKP to demonstrate that it is tough on terrorists while at the same time moving forward with some of the initiatives under consideration for addressing the Kurdish issue. Such efforts would have been politically much more difficult for the GOT to consider even a few months ago. End comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON