AFTERMATH OF TURKEY'S REDEPLOYMENT FROM IRAQ

S E C R E T ANKARA 000431 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2038 TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IZ US TU SUBJECT: AFTERMATH OF TURKEY'S REDEPLOYMENT FROM IRAQ REF: ANKARA 430 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: As reported in reftel, the military and government have come under public criticism here for having withdrawn Turkish troops from northern Iraq "in response to US pressure" that was conveyed in remarks Secretary Gates and the President made on February 28. One senior officer complained to us that the US stance had suggested a lack of trust and would be harmful to US-Turkish relations. Turkish authorities privately are adamant that the withdrawal order preceded Secretary Gates' talks here and that the US should have/must have known this (we did not). While intelligence sharing and coordination continues in the CIFC on PKK centers in northern Iraq, action now appears to be shifting to the diplomatic and political side. Iraqi President Talabani visits Ankara March 7-8, Turkish PM Erdogan will make two trips to key capitals in the Kurdish-dominated regions of southeast Turkey in mid-March, and discussions are taking place about elevated Turkey/KRG dialogue. End Summary ¶2. (SBU) The Turkish press has been awash for days with reporting, commentary and opposition leaders' remarks revolving around the proposition that Turkey's "premature" withdrawal from northern Iraq at the end of last week took place because of US pressure allegedly reflected in the visit of and public remarks by Secretary Gates and, separately, the President on February 28. TGS held a 90-minute press briefing on March 3 to describe the limited and specific nature of Turkey's land operation and the results it achieved, as well as to debunk the notion that Turkey kowtowed to US pressure. A high point came when an exasperated CHOD Gen. Buyukanit said he would "take off his uniform" if anyone could prove the charge that US pressure resulted in the TGS decision to pull out. Leaders of Turkey's two main opposition parties took up the "US pressure" and "premature pullout" themes to criticize the government and the military. This led to a public TGS complaint on March 4, supported by PM Erdogan, refuting the opposition's charges. The odd alliance of the TGS and Erdogan's AKP government against the military's natural secular allies has been noted by many here. ¶3. (S) Public backbiting found reflection in private comments by Turkish military figures. One senior officer complained that given US foreknowledge of Turkey's limited plans and intentions, our public calls for Turkey to finish and get out of Iraq quickly had demonstrated a lack of trust by the US, damaged our bilateral relations, and undermined the Turkish armed forces. This officer asserted that the withdrawal of Turkish forces was already one-third complete by the time of Secretary Gates' talks here and that "surely the US knew SIPDIS this." We have responded that we were not aware of any pullout until early February 29 (after Gates' departure) and did not get any official information about this until TGS put out a press release in the middle of that day. We have also defended the positions taken by the President, Secretary Gates and other US officials as motivated by concern, which had been stated at the highest political levels before Turkey's operation began, about its potential impact on Iraq's political stability. ¶4. (S) Further ground forces' operations in the immediate future seem unlikely. However, we have every reason to expect that air and artillery strikes will continue and that Turkey intends to keep the option of further limited land operations on the table. We have urged the leadership here to be cautious on what Turkey does on the military side in coming weeks and to be sure the respective security and political costs and benefits of its actions are carefully weighed. ¶5. (C) In the meantime, the initiative on Turkey's PKK and Kurdish issues will shift for the next couple of weeks to the diplomatic and political sides -- as US officials have strongly urged the government to do for some time. -- President Talabani will visit Ankara March 7-8. Preliminary plans include meetings with President Gul, PM Erdogan, business leaders, journalists and others. Turkey plans a working visit, but is proposing the protocol add-ons of its presidential guest house, a formal banquet in Talabani's honor, and lunch with the prime minister. A presidential aide reported that Gul is determined to make the visit a success and to minimize potential problems. He wants in particular to exclude any opportunity for the Turkish military, which fought against Talabani when he was allied with the PKK and its now-jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan in the 1990s, to show disrespect to the Iraqi leader. For that reason, no military honor guard or salute is planned. -- The prime ministry has announced Erdogan travel to key cities in the Kurdish-dominated southeast over the March 15-16 and March 22-23 weekends. Long discussed economic development initiatives seem likely to lead Erdogan's approach to the region. -- Quiet talks are underway by and on behalf of Presidency/PM foreign affairs advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, who led a Turkish delegation to Baghdad at the end of February, to meet with KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON