TURKEY/IRAQ: ASSISTING TURKEY WITH BORDER SECURITY

S E C R E T ANKARA 000324 SIPDIS SIPDIS SECDEF FOR DUSD(P) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2028 TAGS: PREL PTER KCRM MARR MOPS TU IZ IR SUBJECT: TURKEY/IRAQ: ASSISTING TURKEY WITH BORDER SECURITY REF: ANKARA 182 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (S) Summary: U.S. intelligence cooperation in support of Turkish operations against the PKK has transformed our bilateral relations. As we look for ways to lower Turkey's reliance on purely military means to protect its borders, Turkey has expressed an interest in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, to include UAVs, aerostats, and inexpensive ground sensor arrays. We should offer Turkey our help in identifying appropriate ISR capabilities as well as employment and integration strategies. This will complement not only our PKK strategy, but also help interdict AQI/foreign fighter transit out of Iraq and drug, human, and weapons trafficking across the Iraqi, Syrian, and Iranian borders. End Summary ¶2. (S) Our enhanced intelligence cooperation against the PKK has opened the eyes of Turkey's military to the capabilities of modern, properly managed and integrated ISR systems. It has forced Turkish officers to confront the inadequacies of their own out-dated and poorly integrated systems. Our intelligence cooperation has also rebuilt trust and confidence among the Turkish and U.S. militaries that was damaged by March 1, 2003 and subsequent Iraq-related developments. Positive engagement at High Level Defense Group (HLDG) talks in Washington January 28-30 is evidence of a dramatically improved relationship. ¶3. (S) The PKK threat is not the only or even potentially most important problem along Turkey's rugged and inaccessible borders. Smuggling of drugs, arms, other commodities, and people across that border helps fund the activities of the PKK and other terrorist groups. A more ominous threat, which could increase dramatically as we establish stability in Iraq, is the potential for foreign fighters, including al Qaeda and Iran-backed terrorists, to seek to leave Iraq through Turkey on their way to Western Europe and the U.S. ¶4. (S) As we consider non-kinetic tools for helping Turkish military, and where appropriate, civilian security authorities counter multiple threats in the border region, modern ISR systems offer effective and flexible capabilities, reducing manpower requirements and casualties. They are a platform for engaging the Turkish military on a common problem, as well as for improving Turkish capabilities and ensuring interoperability for NATO and other joint missions. ¶5. (S) The Turkish military has so far taken a piecemeal approach to identifying and addressing its ISR needs with regard to border security. In January 2007, the GOT identified an urgent need for an aerostat system (a transportable balloon reconnaissance system) to enhance border security. In February 2007, the Turks visited two U.S. manufacturers of this system. A follow-on site survey in April 2007 to the planned area of employment was canceled. ODC Turkey was later informed that Turkey decided the system would not meet its operational requirements, a fact disputed by its producers. ¶6. (S) The GOT concluded a deal with an Israeli manufacturer in 2004 to provide 10 Heron UAVs with a scheduled delivery of October 2007. The Israeli system was chosen over the US Predator UAV. It is a line-of-sight system with limited range, service ceiling, and payload. Reportedly due to problems in integrating Turkish-made sensors on the Israeli UAV, entry into service has been delayed. In the interim, the Turkish Armed Forces leased a wholly Israeli-owned and operated Heron system that is currently deployed in the southeast. This $10M one-year lease will likely expire in the June/July 2008 timeframe and is intended to fill the gap until the delivery of the procured Heron systems in coming months. More recently, Turkish officials have expressed an interest in low-cost ground sensor arrays for use along its borders. In support of this, EUCOM J-2 is investigating options for the employment and monitoring of an un-manned sensor architecture deployed to known crossing points/routes using excess sensor capacity provided by CENTCOM. While this would provide a near-term solution to this aspect of border security, the longer term resolution should involve a Turkish-owned and monitored system. ¶7. (S) In view of the developments described above, we believe the Turkish military would be receptive to a U.S. offer of assistance to: -- Define Turkish requirements for ISR support to the border security mission, especially on the Turkey-Iraq border; -- Identify appropriate ISR systems and capabilities; and, -- Develop an integrated ISR-based border security system that meets identified requirements. ¶8. (S) As part of this effort, ODC Turkey is working with appropriate U.S. military agencies and DSCA to provide a briefing in April to senior members of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) on a "low end" ISR architecture. The briefing will include discussions of a fused capability, with some recommended systems, to enhance Turkish signals, imagery, and electronic intelligence gathering capabilities, as well as command and control and intelligence fusion. The goal is to provide a suite of sensors and C2 which meets Turkey's needs, and is interoperable with fielded and projected U.S. and NATO systems. ¶9. (S) While it is difficult to determine a price tag for this effort without a full needs assessment, potential sources of funding for sensors could include Turkish national funds, used for either FMS or commercial acquisitions, and potentially 1206 funding to support this as a counter-terrorism initiative. Training of personnel and exchanges to support enhanced intelligence collection and fusion could be covered through various US funding sources as well as grant IMET funding with Turkish approval. ¶10. (S) Post recommends that we move forward quickly to engage the Turks in technical discussions of its border security needs. Essential to the effectiveness of improving Turkey's border control capabilities will be similar efforts, even if at a more rudimentary level, on the Iraqi side of the border. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON