Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA31
2008-01-08 06:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: GOT ON NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO PKK

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV IZ TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000031 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2018
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GOT ON NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO PKK
PROBLEM

REF: A. ANKARA 0021

B. 07 ANKARA 2935

Classified By: Charge Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000031 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2018 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV IZ TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: GOT ON NON-MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO PKK PROBLEM REF: A. ANKARA 0021 ¶B. 07 ANKARA 2935 Classified By: Charge Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. The GOT is taking preliminary steps to address the political and economic demands of its Kurdish population, in conjunction with recent military attacks against terrorist PKK targets in northern Iraq. Both PM Erdogan's government and the Turkish General Staff (TGS) understand military operations alone will not solve Turkey's terrorism problem; the strikes have created the needed political space for non-military actions. The January 3 Diyarbakir bombing, vehicle arsons and other security incidents since the strikes (septel),widely attributed to the PKK, complicate the government's task. Warmer public sentiment toward the US resulting from more extensive cooperation against the PKK also gives the GOT cover to pursue its domestic agenda in synch with US considerations. President Gul's visit to the US will give both countries' leaders a chance to test Turkish readiness to pursue non-military options and the pace it is prepared to adopt. End summary and comment. DIYARBAKIR BOMBING STRENGTHENS RESOLVE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) A January 3 bombing by PKK in Diyarbakir that killed 5 and wounded scores (ref A) has not deterred PM Erdogan from pursuing a variety of non-military measures to combat the PKK problem. Traveling to the region, Erdogan said the attack strengthened the government's determination to combat terror and continue democratization efforts. Pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) members deplored the bombing, calling for the apprehension of those responsible and emphasizing the need to maintain public peace. Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) leaders Massoud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani, and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani also reportedly denounced the explosion, calling it a brutal, terrorist act targeting Kurds. A PKK website on January 4 indirectly claimed responsibility for the bombing, praising the explosion and berating the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for inciting hatred against Kurds and joining forces with the military. ¶3. (SBU) Meeting with NGO representatives in Diyarbakir, Erdogan said a government report on overall conditions in the area will soon be released, noting the problem is not linked only to security
issues. In his message emphasizing unity and solidarity in the bombing's aftermath, PM Erdogan accused the bombers of targeting civilians, maintained the PKK has lost direction and challenged PKK claims that it represents Kurdish interests. In a January 3 interview, President Gul indicated the government plans to pursue a comprehensive approach to combating PKK terrorism, simultaneously implementing strategies that were previously attempted separately. Gul reiterated that isolating the PKK through military means is not enough; the key is to win over the people in the region and make them feel they belong to Turkey. AMNESTY A PREREQUISITE, BUT A HARD SELL -------------- ¶4. (C) Debate continues over how to structure an "amnesty" aimed at demobilizing PKK fighters. Despite resistance, including from within his own party, Erdogan announced December 9 that he was working with the military on amnesty proposals (ref B),noting the effort would expand existing provisions in Turkish law (Penal Code Article 221). PM Erdogan's chief foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu told Charge privately January 4 the PM has directed the Special Committee on Terror to revise existing laws. Debate has centered on Penal Code Article 221, which exempts from punishment militants who have not been involved in terrorist attacks; a few PKK members have benefited from Article 221 since it was adopted in 2003, but not in the numbers expected. Publicly, Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin stated January 7 that his ministry has not been tasked to work on any revision to Article 221. The government reportedly also is considering a new law to encourage PKK members to leave the organization and stop recruiting efforts. According to Deputy PM Cemil Cicek, the government is evaluating why eight previous laws failed to persuade the bulk of PKK fighters to lay down their arms. ANKARA 00000031 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) AKP Diyarbakir MP (and ethnic Kurd) Abdurrahman Kurt cautioned that a comprehensive package of reforms is unlikely, given the sensitivity of the changes under discussion; a more gradual roll-out would have a greater chance of success. Were there a sweeping change on language rights, for example, the majority of Turks might feel the nation's unity was under threat. That said, ethnic Kurds need to believe the state is genuinely committed to resolving these long-standing complaints, Kurt said. ¶6. (SBU) Erdogan's amnesty efforts will be a hard sell domestically, whether aimed at demobilizing existing PKK members or thwarting PKK recruitment efforts. While many commentators acknowledge that some type of amnesty is a prerequisite to neutralizing the PKK, opposition remains strong. Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal told CNN Turk on December 25 that he would oppose legislation granting amnesty to PKK leaders and those involved in crimes; he didn't comment on a more narrow amnesty for those not involved in attacks. Far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli criticized the PM's proposal, saying an amnesty would mean "pardoning the murderers of our martyrs and innocent people." Pro-Kurdish Democratic Society party (DTP) MP Sirri Sakik stated Erdogan's plan has no chance of success. Noting the shunning of DTP MPs in parliament, he questioned why PKK members would believe the government is committed to solving the underlying problems of Turkey's ethnic Kurds through democratic means. WITNESS PROTECTION -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Efforts to strengthen Turkey's witness protection program may also contribute to diluting PKK support. Parliament adopted a law December 27, 2007 guaranteeing the safety and strict confidentiality of the identity of witnesses testifying against criminal and terrorist groups. Prosecutors will determine who is eligible to participate in Turkey's witness protection program, which provides financial help, relocation and identity changes. On January 3, parliament debated a separate bill to allow members of terrorist organizations and organized crime groups who have not committed serious crimes to turn themselves in (along with immediate relatives). They would then receive a new identity and be relocated if a court determines they face a serious threat. MHP Gaziantep MP Hasan Ozdemir praised the bill, calling the program of utmost importance in fighting terror and organized crime. CHP and DTP oppose the legislation. DTP Batman MP Ayla Akat Ata and Sirnak deputy Hasip Kaplan argued the law would be ineffective because it focuses on repentance instead of addressing the root problems of terrorism. DIALOGUE -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Turkish officials have continued careful outreach to Iraqi leaders on the PKK issue. Turkey's Ambassador to Iraq, Derya Kanbay, met with Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi in Baghdad on January 1 to discuss the PKK and Turkey's recent military operations. Kanbay reportedly assured Hashimi Turkey is taking measures to avoid harming civilians. TGS Deputy CHOD General Ergin Saygun plans to travel to Baghdad January 23 for talks with US and Iraqi officials prior to visiting the US. Erdogan advisor Davutoglu told Charge January 4 that an invitation to Iraqi President Talabani may soon be forthcoming. Media report the GOT is ready to meet with Talabani if he demonstrates support for a diplomatic framework. Talabani's January 2 call for Turkey's Kurds to support AKP-led democratization efforts are helpful in this respect. Talabani reportedly told Bugun newspaper that fighting the GOT is tantamount to fighting against the interests of the Kurdish people. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM -------------- ¶9. (SBU) AKP is expected to use constitutional reforms to expand some rights and freedoms for Kurds. The party proposes to redefine "Turkishness" to eliminate religious or ethnic links, and make it more difficult to close political parties (pro-Kurdish parties have been shut down numerous times). AKP plans to release a draft text for public review soon. Debate is expected to continue through the year, with a referendum possible by December. ANKARA 00000031 003 OF 003 ECONOMIC PROGRAMS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Following AKP's strong showing in the Southeast in the July elections, PM Erdogan has taken initial steps to address underlying economic problems in the region. In November, the GOT announced a four-year plan to target development assistance on three key southeast cities -- Gaziantep, Sanliurfa and Diyarbakir -- designed to jump-start economic growth and drive down high unemployment rates. Deputy Prime Minister Nazim Ekren and other ministers met with locals in December to look for ways to increase investments and employment. Industry Minister Zafer Caglayan recently told the press that special incentives for the east and southeast are the second stage in the fight against terror. Caglayan said Erdogan will announce incentive details once plans are finalized. Renewed focus on completing the ambitious Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) is aimed at generating new employment and business opportunities in agriculture, animal husbandry and transportation, according to government sources. Consulate Adana business contacts note that people in the southeast have heard many words but seen no action to persuade them concrete incentives are in the works. In the short-term, the GOT continues to implement its popular "koydes" program to improve roads, schools, clinics and potable water in the southeast and elsewhere in the country. CULTURAL MEASURES -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Limited Kurdish language broadcasts continue and the state-controlled network, TRT, announced plans to begin satellite broadcasting in Kurdish and seven additional languages, including Armenian. Contacts in the southeast note government support for the use of Kurdish in education remains almost non-existent; they pin their hopes for greater cultural freedom on EU membership and constitutional reform. THE MOOD IN THE SOUTHEAST -------------- ¶12. (C) AKP is walking a fine line in the southeast, balancing its nascent cooperation with the military against protecting its political gains in the region. Consulate Adana business contacts in Diyarbakir and Batman acknowledge AKP is still strong in the region but said its recent tactics, if continued, could cause support to diminish if the GOT fails to make good on its promises to help the region. Many others in the area are disappointed with DTP and tired of the violence, according to former MP and Cizre mayor Hashim Hashimi. AKP efforts to address hardship conditions, including by working through religious organizations to provide food and clothing, continue to garner support. Hashimi noted that renewed Turkish-US cooperation against the PKK has helped defuse tension in Turkey, including in the southeast, and counter anti-Americanism. His contacts in Diyarbakir and Sirnak, including some close to the PKK, are interested in searching for a solution. ¶13. (SBU) The Diyarbakir bombing is seen by some as the PKK's reaction to AKP's inroads into its territory and an attempt to intimidate people in the region. Former Turkish intelligence deputy undersecretary Cevat Ones called the bombing "suicide" for the PKK. He told Sabah newspaper the bombing opens the way for DTP to play a more autonomous, political role. Ones urged DTP to replace the collapsing PKK and help accelerate the democratic process. Hurriyet's Enis Berberoglu sees the bombing as proof the PKK is threatened by AKP amnesty initiatives and constitutional reform efforts. He optimistically predicts 2008 will be the year the PKK loses its domestic support, just as it lost its external support in 2007. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey MCELDOWNEY

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