RE-STARTING THE IRAN DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY

S E C R E T ANKARA 000284 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2023 TAGS: PREL MNUC UNSC TU IR SUBJECT: RE-STARTING THE IRAN DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) Ambassador raised with MFA U/S Ertugrul Apakan February 12 the need significantly to intensify our consultations with Turkey on Iran under the Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue paper on which the Secretary and then-FM Gul agreed in July 2006. He suggested that these consultations should focus on: (1) diplomacy on Iran, especially at the UN; (2) developments inside Iran -- Turkey has an Embassy there and can offer insights both on domestic issues and foreign policy; (3) technical issues, to include the overall nuclear program, nuclear weapons, ballistic missile development and the like; and (4) what our two countries think can be done with respect to the above items, both in the short-medium term, and in the long-term -- five to ten years from now. I.e., what are the defense and security implications of a potentially nuclear-armed and missile-equipped Iran and ways our countries can collaborate to deal with them. ¶2. (S) Ambassador laid out the near-term calendar of events on the Iran file, to include movement toward a third UNSC resolution, the IAEA Director General's expected report late February on his efforts to resolve past Iranian reporting discrepancies under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),and a subsequent meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. ¶3. (S) To start the dialogue, Ambassador pointed to tentative plans for UNVIE Ambassador Schulte to come to Turkey the week of March 10. Apakan seized immediately on the idea of bilateral consultations, urging they happen soonest, if possible before a third UNSC resolution. He proposed they be broad-based but low profile, to include energy and other regional issues. He suggested Turkey would be willing to share first-hand information from recent meetings with Iranian officials. Ambassador pledged to see if we could bring out someone from Washington who has the bigger picture on Iran to complement Schulte's knowledge on the nuclear file. ¶4. (S) Ambassador also raised Turkey's lack of a solid legal regime to implement existing Iran-related UNSCRs 1737 and ¶1747. In spring 2007, Apakan had assured him that the GOT was implementing 1737 and 1747 despite the absence of a Council of Ministers (COM) decree, and that draft decrees were in the works. This situation had not changed and presents two concerns: First, without a COM decree, the GOT will be on shaky legal ground should anyone challenge their actions legally. Second, it is difficult to explain to Washington why an ally who has pledged to implement UN-mandated sanctions and seeks a non-permanent seat on the Security Council has failed to put in place the necessary legal measures. Apakan had little to offer in response, but pledged to speak with the relevant GOT authorities. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON