TURKEY: SE KURDS SKEPTICAL OF ANKARA'S NEWFOUND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000266 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL TU IZ SUBJECT: TURKEY: SE KURDS SKEPTICAL OF ANKARA'S NEWFOUND INTEREST REF: ANKARA 0182 Classified By: Adana PO Eric Green for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an AmConsul Adana cable. ¶2. (C) Summary. Despite increasing hints in Ankara that the GOT is considering proposals to start addressing the root causes of the Kurdish issue, leaders in southeastern Turkey are skeptical the GOT is committed to the reforms needed for a lasting solution. They fear the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government will seek to manage the issue with continuing military operations, economic stimulus programs and an expansion of charity programs implemented by Islamic NGOs, rather than solving it by addressing long-standing Kurdish demands for increased linguistic rights and official recognition of their cultural identity. Local Kurds also point out that resolving the terrorist PKK problem must also involve an amnesty plan that goes well beyond the previous "repentance" laws promulgated by the GOT. Kurdish skepticism has been fueled by PM Erdogan's tepid response to proposals for liberalizing usage of Kurdish language and continuing judicial harassment of Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP) politicians for using Kurdish in public. Our contacts also lamented that the rising nationalist wave in Turkey has increased anti-Kurdish sentiment, exacerbating a bunker mentality and extremism in both camps. End summary. Ankara Focuses on the Kurds -------------- ¶3. (C) Renewed GOT attention to the Kurdish issue has generated activity and discussions in three spheres: security operations against the PKK, economic/social policies, and political reform (reftel). During meetings with Adana PO in Diyarbakir and Batman January 30-31, local DTP mayors and NGO and business leaders reacted cautiously to recent statements from Ankara regarding possible new initiatives on the Kurdish issue. Most dismissed the AKP leadership as uninterested in meaningful political reform, but Hashim Hashimi, a former Diyarbakir MP, told us he believes the jury is still out within the AKP over how to proceed. He thinks President Gul can act as a catalyst to push the AKP to consider bolder action than PM Erdogan appears willing to consider. Security: PKK on the Defensive -------------- ¶4. (C) None of our contacts argued that the last three months have benefited the PKK. Local reporters who have PKK contacts believe the number of PKK fighters killed by Turkish air-strikes on PKK camps in Northern Iraq may be small, but think the organization's logistics, communications and supply systems have been disrupted and many terrorists have been forced to flee from the region. They cautioned that the PKK is typically dormant during the winter and the true impact of the raids on the organization's operational effectiveness will not be clear until the spring. Yilmaz Akinci, a journalist who covers the PKK, noted that counter-terrorist operations on their own will never resolve the problem. In Diyarbakir alone, the PKK has at least 300 activists who can unleash violence on demand. ¶5. (C) Politically, the air-strikes have not provoked a serious reaction in the southeast. Salih Yildiz, an AKP official in Batman (a city with strong PKK sympathies) told us he was astonished by the muted reaction locally to the air-strikes. He mused, "Either the attacks didn't really harm the militants so people don't care, or they really are sick and tired of the PKK." While very few regional political leaders, including from the AKP, support the air-strikes, the idea that PKK violence is an impediment to progress for the Kurds is gaining more traction and local NGO leaders are increasingly willing to express this view publicly. The January 3 PKK bombing in Diyarbakir, which killed six and injured over 100 people, has further eroded sympathy for the PKK and the DTP. Economic/Social Initiatives: Bold Statesmanship or Narrow Politics? -------------- -- ¶6. (C) On economic and social development policies, the GOT has been very active in recent weeks. DPM Ekren has visited the region repeatedly and met with a range of local business and political leaders to discuss ideas such as accelerating completion of the 30-year old GAP dam and irrigation projects, providing investment incentives in selected regions/sectors and increasing support for agriculture, the mainstay of the local economy. Diyarbakir is already reaping the benefits of Turkey,s recent economic success and growing middle class: gated communities are sprouting in the suburbs, Carrefour department store recently opened its third branch in the city and a high-end mall with 150 stores is slated to open next year. ¶7. (C) The AKP is also reaching out to the urban poor through a network of charities, which many believe are linked with Islamic orders, including Turkish Hizbullah (an organization distinct from the better known Hizbullah) and the Gulenist movement, to broaden charitable activities and expand its political base. Leaders of the Batman Bar Association contended that, while Hizbullah is underground, its former members are now running legal NGOs ostensibly devoted to helping poor people and spreading the teachings of Islam. Yildiz, the Batman AKP official, acknowledged that former Hizbullah supporters were indeed spearheading new organizations, but said authorities know who these individuals are and will make sure they do not return to violence. ¶8. (C) DTP officials suspect that the AKP government intends to focus on the economic aspects of the Kurdish issue (in addition to attacking the PKK militarily) while ignoring the need for political reform. Diyarbakir mayor Osman Baydemir told us he believes the AKP is seeking to eliminate the DTP by marginalizing its MPs in Ankara and buying off voters in the region. One of Baydemir's aides characterized the AKP's tactics as typically Ottoman: they knock on your door at night, give you a kilo of meat and expect your support in exchange. PM Erdogan's declaration that he wants Diyarbakir to elect an AKP mayor in next spring's municipal elections reinforces the idea that GOT policies are driven more by short-term political calculation than a desire to produce a lasting solution. A Diyarbakir business leader, Sahismail Bedirhanoglu, whom AKP is considering as a possible Diyarbakir mayoral candidate, also expressed skepticism about AKP tactics, saying he has warned DPM Ekren and others in the party that it would be a mistake to pursue not to enact changes in cultural and language rights in addition to economic initiatives. Political Reform: Still the Short Leg of the Stool -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Local leaders told us the government's attitude toward political reform is the most important variable for gauging Ankara's sincerity; they remain skeptical, given the record so far. As an example, Diyarbakir Bar Association President Sezgin Tanrikulu told us that, during a recent meeting in Diyarbakir, he provided PM Erdogan with four concrete suggestions for expanding cultural rights that would not require any changes to existing legislation or the constitution. The local university could, for example, establish a Kurdish language and literature section within its foreign language faculty -- qualified Kurdish linguists are needed, i.a., to assist with TRT Kurdish broadcasting. Tanrikulu also recommended lifting broadcasting restrictions, allowing municipalities more flexibility in offering multilingual services and permitting education in Kurdish. The PM, according to Tanrikulu, did not appear receptive to the ideas, indicating that he saw little reason to grant Kurds additional language rights. Erdogan concluded by citing a Turkish quip that it's easy for a bachelor to promise he will get a divorce -- i.e., it's easy to be bold if you don't have responsibility. ¶10. (C) Meanwhile, prosecutions of Kurdish politicians for "language crimes" continue unabated. Baydemir said that lawsuits against him for using Kurdish continue to accumulate, most recently for speaking in Kurdish for two minutes at a party meeting and for using Kurdish (in addition to Turkish and English) in his New Year's card. These prosecutions are not solely the work of overzealous prosecutors, he said, who need approval from the Interior Minister to pursue an indictment against an elected official. Sertac Bucak, the leader of HakPar, a small Kurdish party with no association with violence, said that 18 of his party members are also being prosecuted for using Kurdish and are likely to end up serving prison sentences. Bucak himself is standing trial accused of "separatism" because he advocated the introduction of German-style federalism in Turkey. ¶11. (C) For Bedirhanoglu, the arguments over linguistic and cultural rights are important, but the litmus test of the government's sincerity will be the new AKP-drafted constitution: "The new constitution must be democratic, extend basic freedoms and recognize Turkey's diversity as a source of strength. Otherwise people will feel the AKP has squandered a huge opportunity, given its high vote and its control of key state institutions such as the presidency and the Higher Education Council (YOK)." Amnesty: A Necessary Condition -------------- ¶12. (C) In addition to political reform, our contacts insisted that an amnesty for the majority of PKK fighters is essential to achieve a comprehensive solution. They view the existing "repentance" law, which the AKP is reportedly revising, as unworkable since it requires surrendering PKKers to provide intelligence on their former comrades. Baydemir said a new plan must have at least the tacit consent of the PKK leadership. He suggested that the DTP could play a facilitative role in talks with the government. Some PKK fighters will reject any compromise, but Baydemir thought they would be in the minority and be marginalized by the community. The key, he said, is to provide a path for PKKers to pursue peaceful politics (even if some high-ranking militants are banned from politics). He noted that the DTP has some hard-core former militants working for them, some of whom spent 15 years in prison. "But now that they are in normal politics, their vision is changing." ¶13. (C) Hashimi also pointed to amnesty as the sine qua non of a solution to the Kurdish issue: "If the government thinks economic measures will solve it, they are mistaken." The government is enjoying unparalleled diplomatic success in its air-strikes against the PKK: they have U.S. support and no other country is protesting, he said. A comprehensive political initiative, including amnesty, is the logical way to leverage this opportunity. He is quietly lobbying behind the scenes and in the media to ensure that the amnesty issue remains on the agenda. For the government to succeed in offering an amnesty, he offered, it will need the media, the judiciary and the military to approve the policy. He noted that Land Forces Commander Basbug (widely expected to assume the leadership of the TGS this summer) has made constructive comments on the subject and he has heard positive signals from some within the judiciary. He claimed that his media comments resulted in visits from some military officials who objected to even discussing the idea publicly, but that he has persuaded them of the importance of the topic. ¶14. (C) Hashimi and others noted that PKK demands have become increasingly modest over time and it should be relatively easy to reach an agreement under which they would agree to give up the armed struggle. Moreover, Hashimi said, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq is a natural conduit for such a process, obviating the need for direct talks. Turkish Nationalism Poisoning the Atmosphere -------------- ¶15. (C) Many contacts were disheartened by what they see as the rise of jingoistic Turkish nationalism in recent months. Faruk Balikci, the chairman of the southeastern journalists association, said that his organization recently hosted a seminar for journalists from western Turkey to try to improve the tone of reporting on Kurdish issues. He acknowledged that it is an uphill struggle; the popular media regularly equate Kurdishness with extremism and violence. He also recounted that his son, who is at university in Gaziantep, has been subjected to discrimination and harassment - even from a professor - because he let it slip that he was a Kurd from Diyarbakir. Balikci noted that, while his son is apolitical, this is the type of atmosphere that makes it easier for the PKK to recruit. ¶16. (C) In a similar vein, Hashimi vented at length about the absurdity of the military pressing charges against a group of young conscripts who were taken hostage and later released by the PKK in November. "The commanders are putting all the blame for this failure - which was entirely their fault - on the shoulders of a Kurdish conscript from Mardin. What kind of signal does that send to the thousands of other Kurdish kids who are going off to their compulsory military service?" (The eight suspects were recently released from detention, but one is still facing a court-martial with a possible penalty of up to life in prison.) 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