TURKEY: INFLUENTIAL THINKERS LOOK AHEAD TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002196

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: INFLUENTIAL THINKERS LOOK AHEAD TO
BILATERAL RELATIONS IN 2009

Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Influential Ankara-based opinion makers told
visiting EUR/SE Deputy Director Brink that:

-- Continuation of US support for the fight against the PKK
and the prevention of an Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR)
will be the key early bell-weather for Turkish-U.S. relations
under the new U.S. administration;

-- Turkey will look to more assertive US support on its EU
bid as Brussels continues to keep Turkey at an arm's length;

-- Turkey seeks a just resolution on Cyprus, but believes the
EU should do more to pressure Cyprus to negotiate in good
faith, and that the UN must lead in brokering the end game if
it gets to that point; and

-- While moves to develop a comprehensive, civilian-led
effort to counter the PKK are welcome, there is skepticism
over the prospects of success.


2. (SBU) At a December 17 lunch hosted by DCM, EUR/SE Deputy
Director Brink engaged in a broad discussion on US-Turkey
bilateral relations with retired Ambassador Faruk Logoglu,
former ambassador to the US and MFA undersecretary, Ersel
Aydinli, Bilkent University International Relations
Department Chair and Sedat Laciner, director of the
International Strategic Research Organization, an influential
think tank. Although none represented the GOT, their
comments merit reporting as all three are influential in
Ankara's policy community.

Preventing AGR and Continuing Anti-PKK Cooperation Key


3. (C) Turkish interlocutors said Ankara will be looking at
two issues as early indicators of the new administration's
approach to the bilateral relationship: the Armenian Genocide
Resolution (AGR) and intelligence sharing against the PKK.
Although there was initial elation over the election of
President-elect Obama, there is now growing concern that the
new administration will support or not
oppose passage of an Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) in
Congress. Logoglu and Aydinli predicted that passage on an
AGR would destroy the rapprochement between Turkey and
Armenia, and all three warned of the devastating impact AGR
passage would have on Turkey-US bilateral relations. DCM
Silliman and Brink argued that a positive step by Turkey with
regard to Armenia, such as agreement on the normalization of
relations, could be the best way to minimize the chances of
passage of an AGR as it would be something concrete that
could be lost. When asked whether the political climate
would allow Turkey to initiate steps to improve bilateral
relations in the near future, including re-opening the border
with Armenia,
Logoglu said he had advised the GOT against this move,
believing it would be better to wait until after April 2009
before deciding whether to take this key step.


4. (C) Logoglu highlighted the importance of an early signal
from the new Administration to maintain the
intelligence sharing cooperation against the PKK. Aydinli
and Laciner argued that, if possible, the support should be
increased so that the public can see the tangible results of
our cooperation. All three noted that there appears to be a
gap between the military and senior government officials,
clear appreciation for the cooperation and public awareness
of exactly what the intelligence sharing is producing.
Aydinli and Logoglu both suggested that it would be useful to
let the Turkish public know more about what this intelligence
sharing cooperation entails to generate greater public
support for the US in Turkey. (Comment: As well-informed as
these contacts are about U.S.-Turkey relations, none of them
appeared to have any idea about the extent of the
intelligence sharing operation. End Comment). DCM Silliman
and Brink suggested that the U.S. was doing this because it
was the right thing to do but it was surprising that there
was very little public knowledge of the extent of the
intelligence sharing and, more importantly, the positive
impact it was having on the fight against the PKK.

Help Us on the EU


5. (C) Logoglu flagged US support for Turkey,s EU accession
as another priority for the bilateral relationship. Logoglu
bemoaned the EU's ongoing effort to keep Turkey at a
distance, which in turn is further souring already waning
Turkish public enthusiasm about the EU. Logoglu noted that

in such an atmosphere, it is even more critical that the US
does what it can to encourage the EU to be more
forward-leaning toward Turkey on the question of membership.
Aydinli acknowledged that Turkey has a lot
more it can and should do to give the EU a more favorable
impression of Turkey,s accession efforts, and that Turkey
must "do its homework" and not give Turkey,s "opponents" in
the EU an excuse to "do nothing." Having said that, Aydinli
concurred with Logoglu's assessment that sustained US support
for Turkey,s EU accession will remain critical. DCM
Silliman said that U.S. support for Turkey,s EU accession
had been a long-standing U.S. policy and there was every
expectation that this position would not change under a new
administration.

Cyprus: UN Must Lead, EU Should Do More


6. (C) Turkish interlocutors were in agreement that the
negotiations concerning the future of Cyprus was at a
critical stage, but that the prospects for success were dim.
According to Logoglu, GOT has been careful in giving TRNC
"President" Talat maximum negotiating flexibility. Logoglu
stressed that the UN (and not the US, UK or any other party)
must take the lead in pushing for a final settlement as it
remains the most credible institution for Turkey on the
question of Cyprus. Recalling that the Turkish Cypriots "did
everything they were asked by the international community"
during the 2004 referendum,
Logoglu emphasized the need for the EU to fulfill its promise
of ending the north's economic isolation to help convince the
Turkish public that a new Cyprus settlement deserves
Turkey,s support. Logoglu said that the European tendency
to hide behind the Cypriots in explaining its inability to do
more for the Turkish Cypriots are unacceptable, stating that
the EU has a responsibility to do more to push Cyprus to
negotiate in good faith. When asked whether the GOT is
prepared to bring about a solution, Logoglu said that GOT
expended significant political capital supporting the Annan
plan and feel that it had little to show for its efforts.
While there is willingness within the GOT to push for a final
settlement, if one is within reach, he thought it unlikely
that the GOT would take the initiative at this point.

Mixed Reaction to Civ-Mil Cooperation to Counter PKK Threat


7. (C) Turkish interlocutors gave mixed reviews of GOT and
Turkish military coordination to combat the PKK. Aydinli
viewed it as significant that the top civilian and military
leadership are in frequent contact to improve civil-military
coordination in the fight against the PKK and that, for the
first time, senior military leadership has acknowledged the
need for civilian authorities to take the lead in the fight
against the PKK. While recognizing that these developments
are not sufficient for policy success, he is encouraged that
there is greater acknowledgment that civilian leadership is
needed to defeat the PKK.


8. (C) Ambassador Logoglu was more skeptical. Noting that
the new security undersecretariat will fall under the
Ministry of Interior, Logoglu predicted that the new
organization is doomed to fail as it will not be in position
to orchestrate the full spectrum of non-military measures
(including political and economic steps) needed to defeat the
PKK. The organization would have had a better chance for
success had it been placed within the Prime Ministry, Logoglu
opined. He also argued for a robust internal debate in
Parliament, to include the passage of an action plan to
address the Kurdish problem, as a way to move the issue out
of the security services and into the public domain where it
could be addressed in a more comprehensive (and successful)
way.


9. (C) ISRO's Sedat Laciner was even more pessimistic about
the prospects of the new security undersecretariat. Despite
the headlines suggesting close GOT-military cooperation
against the PKK, Laciner said the military is actively
undermining efforts to "civilianize" the counter-terrorism
agenda. Even as the GOT is working to stand up the new
undersecretariat, the military is already opposing steps for
greater civilian control over the security apparatus, making
clear that the military will not answer to this new
organization in areas that the military views as within its
purview. DCM Silliman and Brink expressed support for a
comprehensive approach to addressing the Kurdish issue which
requires a solution that incorporates the economic and
political aspects of the problem.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey