Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA2196
2008-12-31 14:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: INFLUENTIAL THINKERS LOOK AHEAD TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER CY TU 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #2196/01 3661431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311431Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8359
INFO RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 5173
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002196 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: INFLUENTIAL THINKERS LOOK AHEAD TO
BILATERAL RELATIONS IN 2009

Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002196 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CY TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: INFLUENTIAL THINKERS LOOK AHEAD TO BILATERAL RELATIONS IN 2009 Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Influential Ankara-based opinion makers told visiting EUR/SE Deputy Director Brink that: -- Continuation of US support for the fight against the PKK and the prevention of an Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) will be the key early bell-weather for Turkish-U.S. relations under the new U.S. administration; -- Turkey will look to more assertive US support on its EU bid as Brussels continues to keep Turkey at an arm's length; -- Turkey seeks a just resolution on Cyprus, but believes the EU should do more to pressure Cyprus to negotiate in good faith, and that the UN must lead in brokering the end game if it gets to that point; and -- While moves to develop a comprehensive, civilian-led effort to counter the PKK are welcome, there is skepticism over the prospects of success. ¶2. (SBU) At a December 17 lunch hosted by DCM, EUR/SE Deputy Director Brink engaged in a broad discussion on US-Turkey bilateral relations with retired Ambassador Faruk Logoglu, former ambassador to the US and MFA undersecretary, Ersel Aydinli, Bilkent University International Relations Department Chair and Sedat Laciner, director of the International Strategic Research Organization, an influential think tank. Although none represented the GOT, their comments merit reporting as all three are influential in Ankara's policy community. Preventing AGR and Continuing Anti-PKK Cooperation Key ¶3. (C) Turkish interlocutors said Ankara will be looking at two issues as early indicators of the new administration's approach to the bilateral relationship: the Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) and intelligence sharing against the PKK. Although there was initial elation over the election of President-elect Obama, there is now growing concern that the new administration will support or not oppose passage of an Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) in Congress. Logoglu and Aydinli predicted that passage on an AGR would destroy the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, and all three warned of the devastating impact AGR passage would have on Turkey-US bilateral relations. DCM Silliman and Brink argued that a positive step by Turkey with regard to Armenia, such as agreement on the normalization of relations, could be the best way to min
imize the chances of passage of an AGR as it would be something concrete that could be lost. When asked whether the political climate would allow Turkey to initiate steps to improve bilateral relations in the near future, including re-opening the border with Armenia, Logoglu said he had advised the GOT against this move, believing it would be better to wait until after April 2009 before deciding whether to take this key step. ¶4. (C) Logoglu highlighted the importance of an early signal from the new Administration to maintain the intelligence sharing cooperation against the PKK. Aydinli and Laciner argued that, if possible, the support should be increased so that the public can see the tangible results of our cooperation. All three noted that there appears to be a gap between the military and senior government officials, clear appreciation for the cooperation and public awareness of exactly what the intelligence sharing is producing. Aydinli and Logoglu both suggested that it would be useful to let the Turkish public know more about what this intelligence sharing cooperation entails to generate greater public support for the US in Turkey. (Comment: As well-informed as these contacts are about U.S.-Turkey relations, none of them appeared to have any idea about the extent of the intelligence sharing operation. End Comment). DCM Silliman and Brink suggested that the U.S. was doing this because it was the right thing to do but it was surprising that there was very little public knowledge of the extent of the intelligence sharing and, more importantly, the positive impact it was having on the fight against the PKK. Help Us on the EU ¶5. (C) Logoglu flagged US support for Turkey,s EU accession as another priority for the bilateral relationship. Logoglu bemoaned the EU's ongoing effort to keep Turkey at a distance, which in turn is further souring already waning Turkish public enthusiasm about the EU. Logoglu noted that in such an atmosphere, it is even more critical that the US does what it can to encourage the EU to be more forward-leaning toward Turkey on the question of membership. Aydinli acknowledged that Turkey has a lot more it can and should do to give the EU a more favorable impression of Turkey,s accession efforts, and that Turkey must "do its homework" and not give Turkey,s "opponents" in the EU an excuse to "do nothing." Having said that, Aydinli concurred with Logoglu's assessment that sustained US support for Turkey,s EU accession will remain critical. DCM Silliman said that U.S. support for Turkey,s EU accession had been a long-standing U.S. policy and there was every expectation that this position would not change under a new administration. Cyprus: UN Must Lead, EU Should Do More ¶6. (C) Turkish interlocutors were in agreement that the negotiations concerning the future of Cyprus was at a critical stage, but that the prospects for success were dim. According to Logoglu, GOT has been careful in giving TRNC "President" Talat maximum negotiating flexibility. Logoglu stressed that the UN (and not the US, UK or any other party) must take the lead in pushing for a final settlement as it remains the most credible institution for Turkey on the question of Cyprus. Recalling that the Turkish Cypriots "did everything they were asked by the international community" during the 2004 referendum, Logoglu emphasized the need for the EU to fulfill its promise of ending the north's economic isolation to help convince the Turkish public that a new Cyprus settlement deserves Turkey,s support. Logoglu said that the European tendency to hide behind the Cypriots in explaining its inability to do more for the Turkish Cypriots are unacceptable, stating that the EU has a responsibility to do more to push Cyprus to negotiate in good faith. When asked whether the GOT is prepared to bring about a solution, Logoglu said that GOT expended significant political capital supporting the Annan plan and feel that it had little to show for its efforts. While there is willingness within the GOT to push for a final settlement, if one is within reach, he thought it unlikely that the GOT would take the initiative at this point. Mixed Reaction to Civ-Mil Cooperation to Counter PKK Threat ¶7. (C) Turkish interlocutors gave mixed reviews of GOT and Turkish military coordination to combat the PKK. Aydinli viewed it as significant that the top civilian and military leadership are in frequent contact to improve civil-military coordination in the fight against the PKK and that, for the first time, senior military leadership has acknowledged the need for civilian authorities to take the lead in the fight against the PKK. While recognizing that these developments are not sufficient for policy success, he is encouraged that there is greater acknowledgment that civilian leadership is needed to defeat the PKK. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Logoglu was more skeptical. Noting that the new security undersecretariat will fall under the Ministry of Interior, Logoglu predicted that the new organization is doomed to fail as it will not be in position to orchestrate the full spectrum of non-military measures (including political and economic steps) needed to defeat the PKK. The organization would have had a better chance for success had it been placed within the Prime Ministry, Logoglu opined. He also argued for a robust internal debate in Parliament, to include the passage of an action plan to address the Kurdish problem, as a way to move the issue out of the security services and into the public domain where it could be addressed in a more comprehensive (and successful) way. ¶9. (C) ISRO's Sedat Laciner was even more pessimistic about the prospects of the new security undersecretariat. Despite the headlines suggesting close GOT-military cooperation against the PKK, Laciner said the military is actively undermining efforts to "civilianize" the counter-terrorism agenda. Even as the GOT is working to stand up the new undersecretariat, the military is already opposing steps for greater civilian control over the security apparatus, making clear that the military will not answer to this new organization in areas that the military views as within its purview. DCM Silliman and Brink expressed support for a comprehensive approach to addressing the Kurdish issue which requires a solution that incorporates the economic and political aspects of the problem. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey

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