TURKEY/ENR: TURKEY WANTS TO KEEP DOOR OPEN ON

S E C R E T ANKARA 002188 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, ISN/NESS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018 TAGS: KNNP ENRG ETTC MNUC PARM TRGY TU SUBJECT: TURKEY/ENR: TURKEY WANTS TO KEEP DOOR OPEN ON DEVELOPING INDIGENOUS ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY REF: A. STATE 132033 ¶B. ANKARA 2168 ¶C. ANKARA 1119 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) This is an action request. Please see para. 5. ¶1. (C) Pol-Mil Couns met again with MFA DDG for Nonproliferation and Disarmament Ahmet Muhtar Gun on December 30 to ask for an update on Turkey's position on the draft Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) guidelines on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR)technology and equipment (Refs a and b) and pressed for Turkey's support of the guidelines ahead of the January 13 NSG meeting. Gun said the GOT would not agree to a document which would effectively foreclose the possibility for Turkey to develop its own nuclear enrichment technology in the future, should Turkey decide to pursue this option. He reiterated his proposal to insert language which would exempt countries that meet the conditions described in paragraph 6 from the restrictions outlined in paragraph 7 (ref b). He offered to work closely with the US to develop language that will address Turkey's concerns; Turkey is open to any suggestions from the US on a possible compromise to allow Turkey to support the guidelines. ¶2. (S) Gun alleged that Turkey's position on the draft ENR guidelines has nothing to do with nuclear weapons, alleging that Turkey already has nuclear weapons stationed on its soil. He said paragraph 10 in the draft ENR guidelines contains a "safety net clause" that calls for the termination of nuclear cooperation by a supplier country in the event that a recipient country is suspected of diverting nuclear technology to a weapons program. Furthermore, Turkey understands its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and will in no way violate these obligations. ¶3. (C) We stressed that the goal of the draft guidelines and the NSG itself is to prevent nuclear proliferation, a goal U.S. and Turkey share; What Gun was proposing runs counter to this goal. If an exception is allowed for the transfer of enrichment technical know-how, it is not only Turkey that will seek this: other countries in the region and more broadly will also seek to acquire and develop enrichment technology, which will exacerbate the threat of nuclear proliferation. ¶4. (C) Elaborating Turkey's position further, Gun said that developing nuclear technology for Turkey is not a theoretical issue: Turkey has huge energy needs and must be able to develop alternatives that will lessen its dependence on other countries for energy. Nuclear energy offers such an alternative and Gun expressed hope that with the 123 Agreement in place, the U.S., as a NATO ally, would help Turkey develop this capability. When asked about reports that Russia may be offering to build a nuclear enrichment facility in Turkey as part of its bid to build a nuclear power plant, Gun said he was unaware of them, but expressed doubts that the Russians will be willing to share the technology and allow Turkey to develop indigenous enrichment capabilities (Note: Although the GOT has not formally acknowledged this, a well-placed source working for the Ministry of Energy told us on December 29 that the Russians have confirmed their willingness to make this offer. End Note). ¶5. (C) Comment and Action Request: Turkey has consistently declined to forego what it views as an inherent right for countries to pursue nuclear enrichment for peaceful purposes. This was explicitly cited as the reason for the GOT decision not to participate in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (Ref C). We do not believe Turkey's interest in acquiring enrichment technology signals any new intent to pursue its own nuclear weapons capability, but rather reflects a long-term goal to lessen its energy dependence and a common Turkish tendency to resent any slights to its "sovereign rights." We would welcome Washington guidance on responding to Turkey's concerns as outlined by Gun, and suggest that without further consultations with Turkey on the draft guidelines, the GOT will not be able to support the ad ref text at the January 13 NSG meeting. End Comment and Action Request. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey