Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA2181
2008-12-30 10:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
TURKEY/GEORGIAN SEPARATIST REGIONS: ANKARA CANNOT
how-toVZCZCXRO6740 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHAK #2181 3651001 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 301001Z DEC 08 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8324 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0356 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0363 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0492 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0651 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1003 RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002181
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/GEORGIAN SEPARATIST REGIONS: ANKARA CANNOT
PROMISE CONVERGENCE WITH U.S. STRATEGY
REF: A. SECSTATE 134559
B. ANKARA 1062
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002181
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/GEORGIAN SEPARATIST REGIONS: ANKARA CANNOT
PROMISE CONVERGENCE WITH U.S. STRATEGY
REF: A. SECSTATE 134559
B. ANKARA 1062
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Ambassador delivered ref A points to MFA Deputy U/S
for Eastern Europe and South Caucasus Unal Cevikoz December
29, underscoring the importance of collective support for
Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Cevikoz
promised to analyze the U.S. strategy on Georgia's separatist
regions carefully and to convey our points to FM Babacan and
PM Erdogan. He said Turkey wants, "to the best of its
ability," to converge with U.S. policy on Georgia's
separatist regions, but that GOT implementation of similar
measures would have serious consequences for the government,
due to the strong influence of Turkish Circassian lobbies.
"This will be more difficult for us than for any other state
you are demarching." He noted the difficulty, in particular,
of enforcing any travel ban on Abkhaz political leaders. He
reminded the Ambassador that Abkhaz "FM" Shamba visited
Turkey in June 2008 (ref B) and that Circassian diaspora
groups are pushing the government hard to permit a visit to
Turkey by "President" Bagapsh. If Turkey was to implement
some of these sanctions it would likely have to do so
"tacitly."
2. (C) Cevikoz offered three immediate personal observations
on the U.S. strategy. First, he opined that travel bans are
not appropriate for "community leaders." Such bans --
similar to those implemented against leaders of de jure
states, like Lukashenko in Belarus -- would effectively
convey a political status on these individuals under
international law. Second, he noted that proposals to offer
incentives to help facilitate a rapprochement between Georgia
and the separatist regions failed before August 7; Tbilisi
was uninterested completely in what the Abkhaz and South
Ossetians wanted. Third, sanctions could push the two
regions even closer to Moscow. The separatists would prefer
to suffer rather than gravitate back toward a Georgia
punishing them through Western sanctions. Turkey, he
reminded, has been interested in launching a ferry between
Trabzon and Sukhumi to facilitate direct contact between
Abkhazia and the West, which Turkey believes can help promote
Abkhaz reintegration with Georgia. If something like this
does not happen soon, Cevikoz said, the separatist regions
will end up joining the Russian Federation.
3. (C) Ambassador stressed the need to sharpen the choice for
separatist leaders, but underlined our intent to implement
these measures flexibly, calibrating them to actions by the
de facto leaders, and to design an incentives package that
would promote negotiations and contacts between the
separatists and Tbilisi toward the goal of reintegration. He
promised to keep the GOT apprised of specific steps by the
U.S. to implement these proposed measures. Cevikoz added his
appreciation for our intent to keep in mind the Geneva
process as we implement any sanctions, but cautioned that
sanctions could cause that process to breakdown.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/GEORGIAN SEPARATIST REGIONS: ANKARA CANNOT
PROMISE CONVERGENCE WITH U.S. STRATEGY
REF: A. SECSTATE 134559
B. ANKARA 1062
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Ambassador delivered ref A points to MFA Deputy U/S
for Eastern Europe and South Caucasus Unal Cevikoz December
29, underscoring the importance of collective support for
Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Cevikoz
promised to analyze the U.S. strategy on Georgia's separatist
regions carefully and to convey our points to FM Babacan and
PM Erdogan. He said Turkey wants, "to the best of its
ability," to converge with U.S. policy on Georgia's
separatist regions, but that GOT implementation of similar
measures would have serious consequences for the government,
due to the strong influence of Turkish Circassian lobbies.
"This will be more difficult for us than for any other state
you are demarching." He noted the difficulty, in particular,
of enforcing any travel ban on Abkhaz political leaders. He
reminded the Ambassador that Abkhaz "FM" Shamba visited
Turkey in June 2008 (ref B) and that Circassian diaspora
groups are pushing the government hard to permit a visit to
Turkey by "President" Bagapsh. If Turkey was to implement
some of these sanctions it would likely have to do so
"tacitly."
2. (C) Cevikoz offered three immediate personal observations
on the U.S. strategy. First, he opined that travel bans are
not appropriate for "community leaders." Such bans --
similar to those implemented against leaders of de jure
states, like Lukashenko in Belarus -- would effectively
convey a political status on these individuals under
international law. Second, he noted that proposals to offer
incentives to help facilitate a rapprochement between Georgia
and the separatist regions failed before August 7; Tbilisi
was uninterested completely in what the Abkhaz and South
Ossetians wanted. Third, sanctions could push the two
regions even closer to Moscow. The separatists would prefer
to suffer rather than gravitate back toward a Georgia
punishing them through Western sanctions. Turkey, he
reminded, has been interested in launching a ferry between
Trabzon and Sukhumi to facilitate direct contact between
Abkhazia and the West, which Turkey believes can help promote
Abkhaz reintegration with Georgia. If something like this
does not happen soon, Cevikoz said, the separatist regions
will end up joining the Russian Federation.
3. (C) Ambassador stressed the need to sharpen the choice for
separatist leaders, but underlined our intent to implement
these measures flexibly, calibrating them to actions by the
de facto leaders, and to design an incentives package that
would promote negotiations and contacts between the
separatists and Tbilisi toward the goal of reintegration. He
promised to keep the GOT apprised of specific steps by the
U.S. to implement these proposed measures. Cevikoz added his
appreciation for our intent to keep in mind the Geneva
process as we implement any sanctions, but cautioned that
sanctions could cause that process to breakdown.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey