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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
08ANKARA217 2008-02-07 12:07:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: TURKEY FEARS IMPACT OF DOSTUM ARREST;

Tags:   PREL PGOV AF TU 
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P 071207Z FEB 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5150
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000217 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SE, SCA/FO, SCA/A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF TU
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TURKEY FEARS IMPACT OF DOSTUM ARREST;
HIKMET CETIN "READY" TO SERVE AS UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

REF: A. KABUL 303


B. STATE 9757

Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 b, d



1. (C) MFA U/S Apakan called Ambassador February 5 to relay
concerns about Uzbek strongman Abdul Rashid Dostum. Apakan
said he had information that Afghan police might soon arrest
Dostum (ref A). The GOT believed his arrest would be
counterproductive; every effort should be made to use him on
behalf of Afghan unity, given his history of fighting the
Taliban. He has made mistakes, but pushing him away will be
harmful to stability in the north. Apakan added that if
Turkey was misinformed about Dostum or misunderstood the
situation, it was prepared to take matters up with him to
correct things. The Turkish Charge was instructed to convey
Ankara's concerns to the Afghan authorities. Separately, the
Turks are cautioning Dostum to lay low and keep quiet.



2. (C) We followed up with MFA South Asia Head of Department
Devrim Ozturk on February 7, describing Dostum's recent
behavior as counterproductive and stressing the potential for
damage to the Karzai government's ability to establish rule
of law in Afghanistan. Turkey had earlier provided
assurances to us that Dostum would restrain himself, support
the Karzai government, and begin to recede into the
background of Junbesh politics. The February 2 incident was
evidence that Dostum has not tempered his behavior, and his
party congress has not yet taken place.



3. (C) With MFA's senior South Asia officials accompanying
FM Babacan to India this week, Ozturk was only prepared to
reiterate the standard GOT line: Dostum has his faults, but
is a uniting figure, essential to security in the north. If
he is arrested, it would upset "balances" and there would be
demonstrations, as were already occurring in the north when
the GOT heard of Dostum's impending arrest. That apparently
urgent situation -- now defused -- occasioned U/S Apakan's
call to the Ambassador. The GOT's understanding of the
sequence of events matched ours. Turkey's support for Dostum
is not unconditional and Turkey will again warn him to knock
it off. The GOT is disappointed the Junbesh Congress
continues to be delayed; Dostum says it will happen soon.
Ozturk had no information on whether Dostum might be enticed
to come to Turkey or, he mentioned, leave for Uzbekistan.

UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN:
HIKMET CETIN READY IF CALLED UPON


--------------------------





4. (C) The GOT still views former NATO Afghanistan Senior
Civilian Representative Hikmet Cetin as suitable for the UN
Afghanistan Special Representative post (ref B). The GOT is
prepared to advance him as a consensus candidate, but not
without the support of the United States and other allies,
and not without an expanded mandate. The GOT believes he is
an internationally respected figure with good Afghanistan
experience, and acceptable to Karzai. Ozturk has heard from
Turkey's UN Mission in New York that Russia might be prepared
to advance Cetin's name.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON