SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY

S E C R E T ANKARA 002088

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED, AND
EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2028
TAGS: PREL TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY
APAKAN TO WASHINGTON FOR STRUCTURED DIALOGUE TALKS
Classified By: Ambassador Jim Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) MFA Under Secretary Apakan's December 8-9 visit will
be the fifth iteration of the "Shared Vision and Structured
Dialogue" agreed upon by Secretary Rice and then-FM Gul in
July 2006. Knowing it will take some time for the new
administration to have its new team in place, U/S Apakan
pressed for these talks to ensure Turkey and the U.S. remain
on the same page on a host of issues of mutual importance.
Apakan has indicated he hopes to discuss:

- Turkey-Armenia negotiations on normalization of
relations
- Caucasus/Russia
- Iraq
- Iran
- Middle East
- Afghanistan-Pakistan relations
- Cyprus/EU accession
- Energy

Armenia
--------------


2. (S/NF) President Gul's visit to Armenia in September for
the World Cup qualifier soccer match was a bold step and
signaled the GOT's strong interest in normalizing ties with
Armenia. Discussions on possible establishment of diplomatic
relations, opening the common border, and taking additional
steps to normalize relations have become public, though
details remain closely held. Thus far, the GOT initiative
has been met with general approval in Turkish media. That
said, as noted in other channels, the process remains very
fragile and we want to continue to encourage it without
allowing it to become seen as subject to U.S. "pressure" by
either side.

Russia/Caucasus
--------------


3. (S/NF) Russia's August invasion of Georgia has changed the
regional dynamic and threatened core Turkish interests in
stability in the Caucasus and Turkey's energy supplies
(Russia supplies 67 percent of Turkey's natural gas).
Although cautious in its response to the Russian invasion,
Turkey agreed to all our official requests for support
(including the transit of U.S. naval vessels through the
Turkish Straits and our request -- later withdrawn ) to
allow U.S. ISR assets to overfly Turkey en route to the
eastern Black Sea). Turkey fears a revived Cold War
confrontation with Russia, but recognizes that Russian action
against Georgia aims to reassert Russian dominance in the
former USSR.


4. (C) At the same time, Turkey blames Saakashvili for
provoking the crisis and endangering Turkey's vital interests
without prior consultation. Fears about wider instability in
the Caucasus, and vulnerability on energy and trade access to
Central Asia, have led Ankara to search for political means
for defusing the crisis through a Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform (CSCP). President Gul is planning to
visit Moscow December 26-28 to discuss CSCP and other aspects
of Turkey-Russia relations. We should encourage Turkey to
maintain solidarity at NATO to send a clear signal to Russia
that it must respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. We
should also convey USG interest in continuing our close
consultation on development of the CSCP, which poses various
problems from a U.S. point of view.

Iraq/PKK
--------------


5. (S/NF) Our intelligence cooperation against the PKK )
which CHOD Basbug publicly described as "perfect" -- is
continuing at a high tempo. Real-time intelligence provided
by the U.S. to TGS by the Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell
(CIF-C) has allowed Turkey to plan over 200 cross-border
operations since December 2007, nearly 100 of them since the
October 4 PKK attack on a Turkish military outpost that
resulted in the deaths of 17 security forces. Analysts are
convinced that these operations have changed the way the PKK
operates in northern Iraq by denying the PKK its traditional
safe haven. More importantly, our cooperation has gained for
the USG a new level of visibility into Turkish actions in
northern Iraq and has allowed us to shape Turkey's
cross-border operations. The intelligence cooperation will
require some effort to maintain, especially as we move toward
an Agreed Framework with Iraq.


6. (C) Not only has the intelligence sharing relationship

provided us insight on Turkish military actions, but it has
helped to unlock new and productive Turkish-Iraq and
Turkish-KRG dialogue. President Talabani came to Ankara in
March, PM Erdogan visited Baghdad in July (the first by a
Turkish PM since 1990) to sign a strategic cooperation
agreement with PM Maliki, and GOT Special Envoy for Iraq
Ozcelik was given a green light to meet with KRG President
Massoud Barzani twice in October, the second meeting taking
place in Erbil.


7. (C) Frustration with KRG inactivity against the PKK
remains intense, but the nascent dialogue has helped to ease
public criticism of Barzani and raised hopes that Iraqi/KRG
actions might help further undermine the PKK's base of
operations in northern Iraq. Iraqi and Turkish Ministers of
Interior met in Baghdad November 19, along with Amb. Crocker
and others from MNF-I. They agreed to coordinate
intelligence sharing and operational planning to counter the
PKK presence in northern Iraq, the details remain under
discussion. You should express our support for this
engagement and encourage the GOT to build on these gains. It
would also be useful to ask about Turkey's broader strategy
to end the PKK's decades-long battle with the Turkish state.
Senior GOT political and military leaders have admitted that
defeating the PKK will require more than military action.
While PM Erdogan has announced some measures to help improve
economic conditions in Turkey's Southeast, the political and
cultural aspects of a comprehensive strategy are sorely
lacking.


8. (C) The Turks' current, Iraq-wide pre-occupations are:

-- rising Iranian influence and what they see as Maliki
pandering to it;
-- Iraqi Kurd overreach, especially as concerns Kirkuk (hence
the Turks' jockeying last August on the provincial election
law);
-- the future of U.S. forces post-SFA/SOFA and after January
20; and
-- getting U.S. support for developing Iraqi gas and
exporting it northward to Turkey and European markets beyond.


9. (S) Our use of Incirlik AIR Base for AIR Cargo Hub
operations has been essential to resupply coalition forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The MOU governing Cargo Hub as well as
Habur Gate GLOC and Retrograde operations are set to expire
December 31. Work is underway with both the GOT and GOI to
put in place the documents the GOT says it needs to extend
the agreement, but the extension has not happened yet.

Iran
--------------


10. (C) The Turks are wobbly on Iran. Gul and, to a lesser
extent, Babacan and Erdogan, have taken a reasonably firm
line since mid-2006 that Turkey does not want a nuclear armed
Iran. The Turks have asked Iran to accept the P5 plus 1
proposal, and be constructive on regional issues. However,
GOT officials have emphasized the high cost of failure for
Turkey if the international diplomatic process with Iran
breaks down, with a risk of a nuclear armed Iran or another
military conflict on its borders. Ankara has tacked between
involvement in the diplomatic process (it offered to be a
venue for talks as it was in April 2007) and mediation, which
it wants to avoid, despite PM Erdogan offers to act as a
"facilitator" between Tehran and the Obama Administration
once in office.


11. (C) Turkey has continued a softer line on Iran than is
warranted by the facts. Turkey's statement on Iran at the
November 27 IAEA Board of Governors meeting was somewhat
soft. Turkey allowed Ahmadinejad to visit August 14-15.
Talks with Iran on natural gas investment and cooperation
continue, though the initiative has not to date brought about
a deal. Apakan is firm enough on all these topics and will
seek to reassure you that Turkey only wants to maintain good
neighborly relations while keeping its options open on
diversifying sources of natural gas. You should review the
game plan for the coming months, reiterate the need for
Turkey to stay in sync with the P5 1 (particularly as it
takes its seat on the UN Security Council in January),and
caution the Turks against substantive energy cooperation with
Iran.

Middle East
--------------


12. (C) Turkey has hosted four rounds of Syria-Israel talks.
They say all sides remain serious, though a fifth round has
been postponed because of PM Olmert's resignation. Erdogan

actively worked for the Lebanese presidency compromise in May
and has remained engaged to support Siniora, hosting him on a
visit to Ankara in early November. Erdogan also remains in
regular contact with Damascus. You should encourage Turkey's
work in the region and ask that they continue to keep us
briefed. They will want to hear your views on what may
become of the Annapolis process. Apakan may also seek your
counsel on how to move forward with an OSCE type of approach
in the Middle East, something he broached with you in
September.

Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------


13. (C) Turkey is hosting a trilateral summit with
Afghanistan and Pakistan December 5-6 in Istanbul. The GOT
is concerned about the downward slide in Afghanistan, often
complains that too little is being done to win hearts and
minds there, and has worked steadily to nudge Dostum into
retirement. Dostum agreed recently to come to Turkey for
"medical treatment" (i.e. an alcohol abuse program) and may
remain for awhile.


14. (C) The Turks have commanded ISAF twice and have some 750
troops as well as an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
(OMLT) there now (with caveats),lead a PRT in Wardak, and
have pledged $200m in aid. Turkey supports the proposed
expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA),wants to
strengthen the ANA to fight its own war, believes a train and
equip model would work in Afghanistan, but has not committed
to contributing toward a trust fund to support ANA
sustainment. Senior GOT officials have signaled an interest
in doing more on training Afghan units, including in
Afghanistan, but have not offered specifics. We are urging
GOT military leaders to do more to contribute directly to
NATO's efforts during the ongoing High Level Defense Group
meetings here in Ankara. Specifically, Turkey can help by
providing an additional maneuver battalion, helicopters in
the south, additional OMLTs, and reducing caveats limiting
the use of its forces.

Cyprus
--------------


15. (C) The Turks continue to give TRNC "President" Talat
space to maneuver in negotiating a comprehensive settlement
with Christofias. However, most Turks remain skeptical about
prospects for striking a deal and convinced that Greek
Cypriots have no motivation to conclude a settlement that
will allow Turkish Cypriots the level of power-sharing they.
GOT officials and Cyprus watchers here believe Nicosia will
want to stretch talks out to increase EU pressure on Turkey
to open its ports to Cypriots ships and planes in the second
half of 2009.

Energy
--------------


16. (C) Turkey's energy policies are driven by insecurity
about its future energy supply, particularly of natural gas.
We need to encourage Turkey to take decisions now to
accelerate the commercial development of the Southern
Corridor. First, the world economic crisis and the prospect
of a slowing Turkish economy gives Turkey some relief from
gas consumption increases that has averaged 15 percent per
year. Second, we are working with Ankara to diversify its
energy mix away from gas, helping to identify financing for
non-gas projects and increased efficiency. Third, Turkey is
supporting the EU Commission's concept of a "Caspian
Development Corporation" to attract new gas supplies from
Turkmenistan westward to Europe. Last, President Gul is
working directly with Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov and
Azerbaijan President Aliyev to encourage the transit of
Turkmen gas across the Caspian Sea and on to Europe.

Political-Military Issues
--------------


17. (C) The following items have come up in Ambassador's
initial calls and/or the HLDG and might come up with Apakan:

-- Turkey's request for various intel platforms, attack
helicopters, and other facilitation for its cross-border and
Southeast counter-terrorist operations;
-- NATO's possible inclusion of the Greek island of Agios
Efstratios (Bozbaba in Turkish) in an alliance exercise
(Noble Archer),which the Turks argue is demilitarized and
thus "disputed."


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY