AN IRAN VIGNETTE; DUAL EXISTENCES IN DAILY LIFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002058 SIPDIS LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY; ASHGABAT FOR INGBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE; DUBAI FOR IRPO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2023 TAGS: CVIS IR PGOV PHUM PINS PREL SCUL SOCI TU SUBJECT: AN IRAN VIGNETTE; DUAL EXISTENCES IN DAILY LIFE Classified By: A/DCM DEBLAUW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a September interview with Leila E, an official with the Iranian Ministry of Interior, she offered insights into political, social, and religious issues occurring in Iran. She described pervasive efforts by the regime to monitor and control the activities of the Iranian population. She shared insights on Iranian public opinions of the current regime, the upcoming Iranian presidential elections, US concerns over Iran's nuclear program, perceptions of the possibility of a US or Israeli strike on Iran, as well as Iran-Hezbollah relations. Overall she described a system in Iran in which the population are compelled to lead parallel lives; a public sphere where they comply with strict social codes and keep political opinions to themselves, and a private sphere behind closed doors where they complain about the regime, press back against social restrictions, and for those who are presented with the opportunity, try to leave Iran. End Summary. ¶2. (C) This cable is the first in what post hopes to be a continuing series of reports summarizing the views and insights from well-placed Iranians who have come to Embassy Ankara for visa interviews. CONOFFs met with Leila the weekend after her fiance visa interview at Embassy Ankara. Throughout our discussions with her, Leila underscored her concerns about Iranian intelligence agencies monitoring her from outside Iran. She said she was worried that Iranian authorities might not permit her to leave Iran when her administrative processing was complete for her visa. ¶3. (C) Leila holds an upper to mid level position, estimated equivalent of FS-01, at the Iranian Ministry of Interior. She has a BA in English and a Masters in regional studies and is an economic expert in the ministry. Her job primarily related to working with international organizations, and as her English is impressive, interpreting for international meetings. ¶4. (C) Leila emphasized that the Iranian regime tries to maintain tight control over all aspects of public life and conduct in Iran extending to the international organizations she works with. In fact, she did not feel comfortable naming the organizations she worked with due to fear of being exposed for meeting with CONOFFs. She indicated that one could live without harassment in Iran only if one were to publicly keep quiet. Leila's personal experiences with political activism in Iran contributed to her own dissatisfaction with life in Iran. She revealed that her prior boyfriend was an activist who suddenly vanished without a trace. Neither family nor friends have been able to ascertain his whereabouts and in her opinion the government of Iran was complicit in his disappearance. She added that the disappearance of activists in Iran is not uncommon. She further noted that when she started to get involved in some basic and innocuous women's rights activities, she received a threatening e-mail from what she believes to be a Basij related group. It was delivered to her personal e-mail account, which indicated to her that the GOI had been monitoring her computer usage. This caused her to halt her political activities. These events combined with a general dissatisfaction with the Iranian system convinced her to seek a future outside Iran. ¶5. (C) About one year after her prior boyfriend's disappearance, Leila initiated an internet relationship with an Amcit. After one year of courtship via the internet, Leila and Amcit decided to get married and for her to move to the U.S. During the interview Amcit was present and relations between them appeared affectionate. ¶6. (C) In response to CONOFF's questions on the Iranian political environment, Leila responded that although most of the population publicly supports Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, privately he is heavily criticized. She mentioned that generally, the West's focus on Iran's nuclear program actually generates domestic support for the regime. Despite the general dislike of the current regime, due to a strong sense of nationalism, Iranians galvanize behind the government when there are perceived external threats. The current regime points to US criticism of the Iranian nuclear program as another example of the US government's attempt to control Iran as a nation. Leila clarified, however, that the majority of Iranians love America, just not some of the policies of the US government. ¶7. (C) Asked specifically about Ahmadinejad's re-electability, she responded that it was in her opinion likely as there are no serious competitors, as competitors ANKARA 00002058 002 OF 003 are vetted arbitrarily and many of the most popular opposition candidates choose not to run, and their supporters choose not to participate in the voting. When asked about Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as potential political rivals, she responded that they were too old and no longer were serious players. She also indicated that there does not seem to be an end in sight to the system of velayet e faqih or "rule of the Islamic jurisprudence". ¶8. (C) When asked about fear amongst the population of a US or Israeli attack on Iran, Leila responded that Iranians currently do not believe a US attack is possible. There was a sense that the US is not in a good position to strike Iran at the moment. When asked about the strength of Iran's relations with Hezbollah, Leila responded that Hezbollah may have its own agenda but is entirely financially and militarily dependent on the support of the Iranian regime and therefore is entirely under the regime's control despite any difference in political goals. ¶9. (C) In terms of questions relating to social gender issues, Leila gave many examples of how gender inequality continues to remain a problem. For example, it is more difficult for women to get higher level jobs. She credits her position to having excellent English language skills; otherwise her position would be difficult to obtain due to her gender, a position underscored by the fact that she is the only woman in her department. She opined that although her boss loves the work she does and is concerned about her leaving; other male employees may resent her. She mentioned that in many cases sexual favors are used by women to secure higher positions in the work place. Leila said that the women in parliament are ultra conservative and are "anti women." She gave the example of the Iranian family protection acts which would have given men the ability to marry additional wives without the consent of the first wife. She noted that although the bill ultimately failed, the women parliamentarians were among the supports of the bill. ¶10. (C) Regarding interreligious relations, Leila described a system in which Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities in Iran lived in separate spheres. Christian and Jewish communities have the ability to live by their own laws and can worship freely, albeit behind closed doors. On the other hand, she acknowledged the limits to religious freedom in Iran, recounting when she tried to visit a church as a matter of pure interest but was advised by an official not to enter as there was a camera outside that was monitored by the government. When asked about Iranian Jewish support for Israel, she noted that although they may support Israel, in general the religious minority communities have to be circumspect in what they say in public. ¶11. (C) Leila related that while Iranians are allowed to believe, talk and worship as they wish in the private sphere, pubic opposition to the government is not tolerated, religious communities are kept separate from each other, and gender inequalities still persist. The system is flexible enough to allow for freedom and diversity up to a point in which it views them as becoming unmanageable, and subsequently threatening to the regime. ¶12. (C) Comment: Leila's insights reinforce the perception of a regime that feels compelled to maintain tight controls over all aspects of public life in Iran, motivated by the fear that credible domestic opposition might otherwise have political space to grow. The political result is that internal opposition to the regime appears to remain weak and disorganized, and when it is expressed, it is done so only privately. The social result, however, also has consequences for the regime, as even government employees like Leila feel compelled to break away and escape from such a system. For Iranians like Leila who do not agree with certain aspects of the Iranian system, but for whom active political opposition would be career or life threatening, they have little choice but to participate in the system until an opportunity arises to leave. In Leila's case, meeting an Amcit over the internet was not only the beginning of a new relationship, but also, she hopes, a new life free of repressive government interference. Although the relationship between Amcit and Leila appeared affectionate and genuine, there is no doubt that the feeling of oppression brought about by the Iranian regime contributed to Leila's desire to marry an Amcit and come to the US. Most Iranians, however, do not have that option. End Cable. ANKARA 00002058 003 OF 003 Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey SILLIMAN