HOUSE OF SAND AND FOG: TURKEY'S NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001938 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018 TAGS: PTER PGOV PINR TU SUBJECT: HOUSE OF SAND AND FOG: TURKEY'S NEW COUNTERTERRORISM STRUCTURE REF: A. ANKARA 1905 ¶B. ANKARA 1732 Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Bureaucratic turf battles and finger pointing continue to frame Ankara's recent announcement of a new civilian structure to manage GoT efforts against the PKK in southeastern Turkey. That announcement came after extensive discussion on a new counterterrorism approach, amid mounting frustration with the current military-dominated posture. Press speculation is rampant about the new anti-terror structure, but the GoT has released few details, other than the creation of a new Undersecretariat within the Ministry of Interior, which would have a leading role. The lack of concrete facts has not slowed derisive comments from Ankara's thinktankers and pundits, most of whom are skeptical that any such body will ever be effective. Indeed, the Undersecretariat will likely to be a transition toward improved counterterrorism policy, but is unlikely to be the fully-developed counterterrorism structure Turkey needs to truly face down the PKK, and perhaps other terrorist organizations. Although theoretically a positive step, the disjointed circumstances under which the Undersecretariat is being created -- riddled with rumor and internal contradictions -- are inauspicious. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) The formation of a new counterterrorism authority has been a persistent topic in Turkish politics for some time now, but was brought to the fore by a particularly brazen PKK attack in early October at a military outpost at Aktutun. Criticism of intelligence-sharing methods flooded the press, paving the way for more open discussion -- and rampant speculation -- about how the government would restructure its security organs. The government then announced, with few details, the creation of a civilian-led Security Undersecretariat responsible for counterterrorism policy writ large, reporting directly to the Minister of Interior. ¶3. (SBU) There is general agreement, supported by statements made by Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek, that this Undersecretariat would be responsible for overall counterterrorism policy and will be directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The Undersecretary would be advised by a Board of Governors including representatives from the Turkish General Staff, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization, the National Police, and the Jandarma. In this framework, the Jandarma would be put under the full control of the Ministry of Interior and the Coast Guard under the National Police. However, on October 26, Taraf, a daily newspaper that has been on the forefront of criticizing the military, published what it alleges is a letter from the Jandarma Chief of Staff, General Mustafa Biyik, to the Ministry of Interior, in which he stressed that the Jandarma had not agreed to any restructuring, as the press had already widely claimed, and that the current disposition of the Jandrama was sufficient to safeguard Turkey from the terrorist threat. What the Undersecretariat Will and Will Not Do -------------- - ¶4. (C) While details remain scant on how the new organization will be structured and what responsibilities it will have, contacts tell us they expect the new organization to focus on these primary tasks: coordinating the GOT's "strategic messaging" to counter PKK propaganda efforts and improving intelligence sharing among entities with counterterrorism responsibilities. ¶5. (C) On "strategic messaging," counterterrorism expert Nihat Ali Ozcan said the new Undersecretariat would be tasked with developing a strategy to counter PKK propaganda, discrediting both legal and illegal PKK "front organizations" (to include DTP),and encouraging PKK members to "come down from the mountains" and reintegrate into mainstream society. retired Major General Cihangir Dumanli said strategic ANKARA 00001938 002 OF 004 messaging is essentially what the military would call psychological operations. Noting that the National Security Council (NSC) had previously been responsible for this effort, Dumanli thought plans for the new Undersecretariat to take on this responsibility is an acknowledgment that the NSC has failed to deliver. On the subject of intelligence sharing, counterterrorism expert Ihsan Bal said intelligence remains badly stove-piped throughout Turkey's security apparatus, and that the new body would better address broadening communication amongst the services. ¶6. (C) Our contacts expressed doubt that the new Undersecretariat would assume all operational responsibilities for the fight against terrorism in Turkey. While the new organization may direct police operations and be informed about military operations, it is unlikely to assume command of anti-PKK military operations. Contacts note that although the Jandarma is already under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, its operations in the southeast remain under the control of the Turkish General Staff. Retired General Dumanli said one reason for this is that the Jandarma and Ministry of Interior lack the professional staff and planners to plan and execute what are essentially military operations. Another reason noted by CT expert Bal is the need for effective command of all security forces in the Southeast and that the military is in better position to lead the effort than the Jandarma, given the size of the army presence and resources at its disposal. Ozcan also noted that there remains a military component to the PKK threat, and until that is no longer the case, it is unlikely the Jandarma will be fully integrated into the Ministry of Interior. He predicted that the transfer of full security responsibilities to civilian control would happen gradually and only when the situation allows for it: "The process will be evolutionary, not revolutionary." Skepticism Abounds -------------- ¶7. (C) Contacts have been generally skeptical of the likely effectiveness of the new CT structure under the MOI. Sadi Cayci (please protect),a retired military judge and legal advisor for an influential think tank, told us that the legal framework for civilian authorities to assume full responsibility for domestic security has existed in the books for decades and the need to coordinate civilian and military measures against the PKK has been known for almost as long as the PKK has been in existence. Noting that no amount of institutional restructuring will help address the ultimate cause of PKK violence, he criticized both the military and the political authorities for being unwilling to take bold steps to undermine support for the PKK within the ethnic Kurdish community in Turkey. He argued that both the government and the military have made noises about non-military measures to counter support for the PKK, but no one is willing to talk about specific measures (Kurdish language and cultural rights, more targeted economic support for impoverished regions, partial or even general amnesty for PKK members). Even though the political and military leaders know what needs to be done to undercut support for the PKK, they fear the likely backlash from nationalists who view conciliatory steps toward the ethnic Kurdish community as "selling out" Turkish national interests. ¶8. (C) CT expert Ozcan shared Cayci's skepticism. Recalling the numerous attempts to develop a coordinator or coordinating institution to counter the PKK in the past, Ozcan said what matters ultimately is whether the GOT is willing to introduce effective political and economic policies to reduce support for the PKK. Ozcan viewed it as unlikely that the GOT would take any meaningful measures to address concerns expressed by the ethnic Kurdish community before the March 2009 municipal elections. ¶9. (C) Lale Sariibrahimoglu, a writer for Jane's Weekly and Today's Zaman, pointed out that just as the need for ANKARA 00001938 003 OF 004 coordinating intelligence has been known for years, so too has the need to professionalize the military and make it fully responsible to civilian authorities. Long a requirement for EU accession, all mention of measures to reach these ends have, in the past, been vague and open-ended, inviting politicians to let progress on such points slip. Sariibrahimoglu argued that the fundamental change of subordinating the military to civilian control would be inimical to the military's interests. Professionalization, by lifting mandatory conscription into the army for all Turkish males, would restrict the military's capability to reach into society, and, thereby, would limit its role in indoctrinating the masses with such Ataturkist ideals as secularism, unity, and respect for the military authorities. While acknowledging that the military has pushed for a greater civilian role in counterterrorism efforts, she is skeptical of the military's intentions. She viewed the "Biyik Letter" published by Taraf as an indication that the broad sentiment in the military as a whole may be against closer cooperation with civilian authorities and resistant to civilian control. If the military isn't curbed, but a new counterterrorism structure does emerge, the new Undersecretariat would serve mainly as a way for the TGS to exert its influence over other security organs, such as the police and coast guard, according to Sariibrahimoglu. ¶10. (C) Contacts are equally skeptical that the Undersecretariat will be able to assume quickly the functions with which it will be charged. Ihsan Bal is skeptical that stove-piping will be quickly solved, as mutual suspicion between the military and the Turkish National Police (TNP) remains deep. While there's recognition on the political level and among the civilian and military leadership that intelligence sharing must be improved, breaking down institutional rivalries and mistrust among these entities will remain difficult, Bal predicted. Sariibrahimoglu agreed that the various security organs would have trouble working together due to long-standing mutual mistrust. According to Sariibrahimoglu, the military believes the TNP is packed with Islamist sympathizers. She noted that similar allegations of political parties stacking the police with their own sympathizers have been made against previous governments. ¶11. (C) However, other observers, including Ozcan, tell us that the press is overplaying divisions between civilian and government authorities. Ozcan, who has access to top civilian and military leadership, emphasized to us that PM Erdogan and TGS Chief Basbug are "of the same mind" on the need for a comprehensive, coordinated approach to defeating the PKK. As evidence of this, he pointed to the October 23 National Security Council statement, which offered support for the military's tough stance against the media and for pressing forward with a greater civilian role in the counterterrorism effort. Economic Crisis Likely to Diminish GOT Flexibility -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Regardless of the new institutional structure, CT expert Bal noted that the ongoing global economic crisis will affect Turkey and will weaken the GOT's ability to implement effective measures to reduce PKK support. Specifically, if the GOT budget is thrown out of balance, there will be less money in government coffers to devote to economic development projects in the Southeast, which is essential for creating employment opportunities. Furthermore, the drop in the availability of private credit will mean the areas with the highest investment risk will see investment dollars dry up fastest: In Turkey this means the credit crunch will disproportionately impact the Southeast. He also noted that a downturn in the overall economic situation in Turkey will lead to greater unemployment, especially in the Southeast. This may boost PKK recruitment and undermine government efforts to call on the PKK to lay down its arms. Comment -------------- ANKARA 00001938 004 OF 004 ¶13. (C) Ozcan's comment that the project will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary seems to ring true: the Undersecretariat will likely to be a transition toward improved counterterrorism policy, but is unlikely to be the fully-developed counterterrorism structure Turkey needs to truly face down the PKK. While a Security Undersecretariat is theoretically a positive step in Turkey's struggle with the PKK and perhaps other terrorist organizations, the disjointed circumstances under which it is being created -- riddled with rumor and internal contradictions -- are inauspicious. From the outside, the activity seems rushed and not well coordinated. It is possible that, in the end, the Undersecretariat will far surpass the low expectations of political and military observers, but so far the apparent inner-workings of the issue are not reassuring. Neither the government nor military seem focused on bringing about substantive change. Instead, squabbling over protocol and turf, exacerbated by simmering tensions between the AKP and the military, appear to be distracting from reform. Along with the potential of souring economic conditions, the government already is entering political campaign mode, which may prevent AKP leaders from focusing on successfully developing the new Undersecretariat to the level of detail that would be necessary to ensure its success. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON