TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HEAD REMAINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001924 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PRA, ISN, DOE/NNSA FOR TOBEY, BIENIAWSKI AND DESCHLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018 TAGS: PREL KNNP ENRG EXBS TU SUBJECT: TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HEAD REMAINS SUSPICIOUS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION REF: A. STATE 106280 (BIENIAWSKI LETTER) ¶B. STATE 114915 (TOBEY LETTER) Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor A. Godfrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) During a November 4 meeting with a team from the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Safety Administration (DOE/NNSA) to discuss the repatriation of US-origin highly enriched uranium (septel),Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK) President Okay Cakiroglu expressed annoyance with the proposal to work with Turkey on securing radiological sources (ref a). Seizing on the word "assessment" in the non-paper outlining possibilities for potential cooperation, Cakiroglu characterized the offer to conduct "joint assessments" of facilities with radiological sources as an attempt to "inspect" Turkish sites. He said this would not be appropriate or acceptable for Turkey, emphasizing that Turkey was a founding member of the IAEA and a responsible member of the international community in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. He noted that our bilateral cooperation must be based on the principles of equality and partnership, and would welcome an exchange of information among experts. ¶2. (C) Turning to suggestions for further collaboration on radiation detection monitors, Cakiroglu dismissed the need for dual-channel (gamma and neutron) radiation detection equipment, arguing that neutron radiation would be easy to mask. He claimed that any element releasing neutron radiation would also give off gamma signatures, but acknowledged that plutonium might be a possible exception. He also said he's seen recent reports of US radiation monitoring equipment being faulty, but did not provide details. Cakiroglu also asked whether the USG was deploying portal monitors on the Iraqi side of the Turkey-Iraq border, and suggested that the USG might want to do so as there had been instances when Turkish authorities intercepted radiological scrap originating from Iraq. ¶3. (C) Cakiroglu confirmed that his letter of resignation has been rejected by Minister of Energy Guler and, as a result, he will stay on as head of TAEK for the foreseeable future. ¶4. (C) Comment: Given his negative disposition toward cooperation in securing radiological sources and toward the Second Line of Defense program, we recommend that DOE/NNSA consider inviting Cakiroglu himself to lead a team of experts to the U.S. to: discuss USG experience with developing nuclear detection equipment and working with third countries to enhance their indigenous equipment; exchange threat analysis concerning nuclear smuggling; discuss the importance of having dual-channel detection capabilities at the border; and to test Turkish equipment at U.S. facilities (if Turkey is interested). Such a visit might also be helpful in better explaining our goals in working with Turkey on securing radiological sources. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON