TURKEY: NNSA DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR TOBEY PROPOSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001845 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, ISN; DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FOR TOBEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018 TAGS: ETTC KNNP ENRG EXBS TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: NNSA DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR TOBEY PROPOSES CLOSER COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR SECURITY REF: A. ANKARA 1724 ¶B. STATE 106280 ¶C. ANKARA 1721 Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In October 20-21 meetings with GOT officials, NNSA Deputy Administrator Tobey stressed NNSA,s desire to enhance bilateral engagement on nuclear nonproliferation, proposed possible areas of cooperation, and underscored NNSA,s willingness to assist Turkey with the development of indigenous nuclear portal monitors. Even as Turkey refines its indigenous capability, Tobey suggested developing a pilot project using equipment available under NNSA,s Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program to ensure Turkey has the ability to detect the most dangerous types of nuclear material crossing its borders. GOT interlocutors emphasized Turkey,s priority is to develop indigenous capabilities to detect nuclear material, noted with interest NNSA,s willingness to support this endeavor, and agreed to study Tobey,s proposal and provide a response following a GOT interagency review. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) During separate meetings October 20-21 with Turkish Atomic Energy Council (TAEK),the MFA, Turkish Customs, and the Turkish National Police, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Deputy Administrator William Tobey emphasized NNSA,s desire to deepen engagement with Turkey following the approval of the 123 Agreement in June 2008. He briefed interlocutors about NNSA,s scope of work and highlighted opportunities to deepen cooperation in SLD, security of radiological materials, and consultations on the development of a civilian nuclear infrastructure with an eye toward nuclear security. Second Line of Defense -------------- ¶3. (C) Tobey stressed to TAEK Vice President Ediz Tanker the threat of nuclear smuggling in the region is real, and the US and Turkey share an interest in ensuring Turkey is able to detect dangerous nuclear material (e.g. plutonium, HEU) crossing its borders. Tobey said the US wants to provide Turkey, a close ally, with the same type of equipment that the US uses to protect its own borders. He stated NNSA is prepared to fund the deployment of between 250 to 300 portal monitors at some 40 border crossings, if Turkey is interested. ¶4. (C) Tanker expressed appreciation for the approval of the 123 agreement and emphasized Turkey,s desire to develop its own nuclear detection capability as a matter of priority. He said TAEK is leading the development of this capability and has deployed new nuclear detection monitors to almost all land borders, replacing older equipment previously provided by the US. When asked whether the TAEK-developed monitors are capable of detecting neutron radiation, Tanker demurred, stating he was not sure. Tobey expressed understanding for Turkey,s desire to develop indigenous capabilities, and described NNSA,s experience assisting other countries, including China, Russia and Ukraine, in developing indigenous technology capable of detecting special nuclear material. Noting it is difficult to know whether the monitors are capable of detecting special nuclear material without testing it against appropriate sources, Tobey proposed the following activities as possible next steps in advancing bilateral cooperation: -- Invite Turkish experts to Los Alamos National Laboratory (or another facility) to observe how the US tests nuclear detection equipment. Turkish representatives could even bring the equipment they are developing to be tested against neutron emitting sources to confirm whether their equipment meets international standards. -- Hold expert consultations on Turkey,s efforts to develop an indigenous capability to design and produce detection equipment. US experts could offer advice based on their experience in supporting other countries' efforts to develop indigenous capabilities. -- Even as Turkey continues work on an indigenous capability, develop a pilot project, in consultation with relevant GOT institutions, which would allow GOT officials to see the SLD equipment in action and evaluate its effectiveness. ¶5. (C) Tobey shared with MFA and TAEK a draft declaration of principles that NNSA uses in other countries as a document that could help frame future NNSA cooperation with GOT entities. He asked the MFA and TAEK to review the document and provide feedback. Other Possibilities for Cooperation -------------- ¶6. (C) Tobey proposed additional areas for bilateral cooperation, including sending NNSA experts to Turkey to consult on the design and implementation of a civilian nuclear infrastructure that meets international standards for nuclear security. Tanker said this may be appropriate once there is greater clarity on the fate of Turkey,s nuclear power plant tender (ref b). Tobey also suggested having US experts share their experience in enhancing security measures for radiological sources with appropriate Turkish officials. This exchange could be combined with site visits in which US experts might offer their assessment and possible security improvements. Tanker acknowledged that some sites in which radiological sources may be present, such as hospitals, do not have good security in place, and said TAEK will consider this offer (Note: At the time of the meeting, TAEK had not received ref c. paper which the embassy had transmitted to TAEK via the MFA on October 6. Embassy will transmit the paper directly to TAEK. End Note). MFA Reaction -------------- ¶7. (C) MFA Deputy Director General Ahmet Gun expressed satisfaction regarding the approval of the 123 Agreement, and said a major &political and psychological barrier8 has been lifted and that the MFA now has the necessary legal and political basis for &full cooperation with the US on nonproliferation issues." He offered four points in response to Tobey,s presentation: -- Turkey desires better intelligence sharing regarding nonproliferation threats and activities of concern in the region; -- Turkey wants to see more emphasis on strengthening export controls at the point of origin (Gun reiterated his complaint that Turkey frequently is asked to take action to disrupt sensitive shipments after they have left the borders of EU states); -- The GOT,s strategy is to reinforce its own capabilities and accept foreign assistance on a case-by-case basis; and -- Gun also provided a nonconfrontational, but stark assessment that Turkey would continue to have little interest in participating in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism because of the inclusion of Cyprus. ¶8. (C) Gun noted with interest NNSA,s offer to support Turkey,s indigenous production of nuclear portal monitors. Tobey confirmed NNSA's willingness to: support Turkey's effort in developing indigenous equipment; test the equipment; and fund the equipment for deployment in Turkey, and potentially in third countries if they meet international standards. Gun said the GOT interagency export control working group which he chairs will conduct an internal needs assessment, and will evaluate the range of proposals presented by Tobey and at the EXBS and Nonproliferation Seminar (ref c.) in light of Turkey,s requirements. Gun pledged to provide the US with a response as soon as this evaluation process has been completed. Enforcement Agencies Welcome Further Collaboration -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) During separate meetings with Tobey, Turkish National Police Director for Criminal Laboratories Seyit Demirci and Turkish Customs Enforcement Deputy Director General Mehmet Guzel both expressed appreciation for training and equipment the SLD Program had provided in the past. Both welcomed further cooperation with NNSA in general and the SLD Program in particular, but stressed that broader cooperation with SLD will require TAEK,s buy-in. ¶10. (U) Deputy Administrator Tobey has cleared this cable. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON