SCENESETTER FOR USG-GOT UNGA MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001669

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028
TAGS: PREL TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR USG-GOT UNGA MEETINGS

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkish officials will be highly visible in
New York for this year,s UN General Assembly as their
years-long effort to secure election to a UN Security Council
seat representing the Western European and Others group comes
to a climax. U.S. officials will want to engage the Turks on
a wide range of topics including Russia/Georgia, Iraq,
terrorism, Iran, energy, the Middle East, and Cyprus.
U.S.-Turkish relations have improved in the past year as we
expanded intel sharing on PKK terrorists in northern Iraq,
making a more productive and cooperative dialogue on the
range of other issues possible. END SUMMARY

UN Security Council Seat
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2. (C) In its bid for a non-permanent 2009/2010 Western
European and Others group UN Security Council seat, Turkey
has embarked on a charm campaign. It has wooed potential
votes by hosting a series of regional cooperation summits
with African, Caribbean, and Pacific Island nations as well
as publicizing its humanitarian outreach to Africa and
contributions to UN peacekeeping.

Caucasus - Georgia
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3. (C) Russia,s invasion of Georgia reminded Turks they are
NATO,s front line in the Caucasus against their top trading
partner -- Russia, on which they depend for 65 percent or
more of their natural gas. Turkey is deeply concerned about
the prospects for more instability or revived East-West
confrontation. Despite misgivings, Turkey approved all our
Black Sea ship transit requests and rebuffed Moscow's
complaints. The Turks realize that their hesitancy to
confront Russia directly and their uncoordinated proposal of
a &Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform8 (CSCP)
earned some ire in Washington, but have worked hard to repair
the damage and reassure us of the primacy of U.S.-Turkish
relations and NATO in meetings with U/S Burns and CJCS
Mullen.

Turkey-Armenia Relations
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4. (C) President Gul,s historic September 6 visit to
Yerevan, Turkey,s inclusion of Armenia in its proposed
Caucasus platform, and the GOT,s ongoing efforts at
rapprochement are clear signs of Turkey,s seriousness about
reversing decades of Turkish-Armenian bad blood and promoting
regional stability. GOT efforts should receive enthusiastic
U.S. support.

PKK/Iraq
--------------


5. (C) Real-time U.S. intelligence provided to the Turkish
military has fueled over 100 coordinated cross-border strikes
against the PKK in northern Iraq since November. A number of
Turkish officials have suggested that the PKK may be near the
breaking point, although PKK attacks ) including bombings in
Istanbul, Izmir, and Mersin ) continue.


6. (C) Ties with Iraq continue to develop. Erdogan visited
Baghdad July 10 -- the first Turkish PM in Iraq since 1990 --
and agreed to engage on a host of bilateral political,
economic, and security issues. Turks held their first public
contacts with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials
in May. GOT officials remain concerned about the stability
and unity Iraq and fear a precipitous withdrawal of U.S.
troops. The Turks are interested in Iraqi gas development
and are frustrated by lack of progress on an Iraqi
hydrocarbons law. They are wary on Kirkuk, but support UNAMI
efforts to broker a provincial election law.

Iran
--------------


7. (C) Iran,s intransigence on the nuclear issue complicates
Turkish efforts to develop relations with its energy-rich
neighbor. During President Ahmadinejad's August 14-15 visit
to Istanbul and FM Babacan's five meetings with Iranian FM
Mottaki since June, the Turks have pressed Iran to accept the
P5/1 offer. President Gul told U/S Burns that the Iranians
are &out of touch with reality.8 While Turkey wants to
negotiate a gas investment deal, GOT officials tell us that
Iran is unwilling to produce a commercially viable deal. We
should advise the Turks of our next steps on the nuclear
issue, seek their continued help and discourage energy deals
that would be both unreliable for Turkey and unhelpful to
UNSC diplomacy on the issue.

Middle East
--------------


8. (C) Turkey has hosted four rounds of Syria-Israel talks.
They say all sides are serious, though PM Olmert,s
resignation and Syrian reluctance to move too far down this
path before U.S. elections argues against significant
progress in the short-term. Erdogan actively worked for the
Lebanese presidency compromise in May and has remained
engaged to support Siniora, reportedly speaking with him last
week. We should encourage Turkey,s work in the region and
ask that they continue to keep us briefed.

Energy
--------------


9. (C) Turkey wishes to be a transit hub for gas and oil to
Europe and world markets, but faces a challenge meeting its
increasing domestic energy needs. Russia currently provides
at least 65% of Turkey's gas, Iran almost 20%, and Ankara is
looking to Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Turkmenistan to help meet
future energy needs and diversify its import dependence.
Turkey must find a compromise solution with Azerbaijan that
leaves enough gas to support new pipeline infrastructure to
Europe. The U.S. can help Turkey meet its energy needs by
supporting non-gas electricity projects and energy
conservation.

Cyprus
--------------


10. (C) The first comprehensive talks to reunify Cyprus since
the Annan Plan's failure in 2004 began September 3 under UN
sponsorship. Difficult issues and red lines abound, but
initial signs are good, and GOT officials are reasonably
optimistic that this process could have legs. The Turks have
said little publicly and appear to be giving Turkish Cypriot
leader Talat room to work. It would be helpful for the GOT
to continue publicly to embrace the UN-led talks and to
affirm support for the kind of Turkish troop withdrawals
envisioned in Annan if a suitable overall package is
negotiated.

Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------


11. (C) Turkey is very engaged in NATO efforts in
Afghanistan, but has misgivings. Former Deputy Chief of
Defense Gen. Saygun complained in July that NATO needs a new
strategy on Afghanistan, more emphasis on training and
equipping, and a substitute livelihood for drugs. Turkey has
800 troops in ISAF and a lead role in the Wardak PRT, has
pledged an additional $100m in economic aid and two OMLTs,
and supports the Afghan National ARMY (ANA),but has not
budged on additional forces for ISAF or taking on combat
roles. Turks are very concerned about recent developments in
Pakistan. We should review with GOT officials the results of
recent discussions in Washington, Kabul and elsewhere about
Afghan strategy and Pakistan. We should urge more support
now for the ANA, help to the Afghans as they consolidate
control over greater Kabul security, and additional forces
for ISAF.

Domestic Politics and Reforms
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12. (C) On the domestic front, the Constitutional Court did
not ban PM Erdogan and his ruling party for &anti-secular
activities,8 but delivered a fine and a stern warning. A
consensus-oriented government agenda focused on economic
development and reforms will help discourage fears of
continued polarization, but it is unclear yet whether PM
Erdogan gets this message. It will be helpful to urge
Turkish authorities strongly to reengage on the EU reform
agenda.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON