TFGG01: TURKEY'S CAUCASUS STABILITY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001513 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/SE, EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018 TAGS: PREL AM AJ GG RU TU SUBJECT: TFGG01: TURKEY'S CAUCASUS STABILITY AND COOPERATION PLATFORM REF: A. SECSTATE 89369 ¶B. ANKARA 1478 Classified By: CDA Doug Silliman, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The GOT continues to roll out its "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" concept, with PM Erdogan visiting Baku August 20. Based on contacts with MFA officials, the concept, stemming from a 2000 proposal from then-President Demirel, is still being refined. MFA contacts have emphasized that the platform is meant to support the territorial integrity of Georgia and to contribute to normalized relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. The Russians are reportedly receptive, but Georgian support is contingent upon the withdrawal of Russian troops. Turkey also envisages the platform as a mechanism through which to advance dialogue between Ankara and Yerevan, and Yerevan and Baku. The proposed platform will not be implemented without the support of all five countries -- Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia -- and the GOT plans to brief the Armenian leadership soon. Any role Allies or other international institutions would have in the proposal is still uncertain, but officials tell us there will be one. Local Caucasus experts are skeptical of the plan's chances for success. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) CDA conveyed the substance of ref A points to MFA Deputy U/S for Americas Haydar Berk August 20, suggesting that the GOT should have consulted with the U.S. in advance of its launch, asking how it would integrate with other international efforts in the region, including the Minsk Group, Friends of Georgia, PfP, and EU neighbors policy. According to Berk, the stability and cooperation platform is not fleshed out yet, but the GOT plans to push ahead. It is still uncertain whether the platform would form under the auspices of an international organization. Berk acknowledged that Turkey should have engaged with the U.S. before floating the idea, but added that the plan had been "on the shelf" for years, and when the Georgia crisis developed, the idea jumped out as a natural response. Nevertheless, Turkey looks forward to U.S. contributions, he said. ¶3. (U) Returning from Baku August 20, where he traveled with PM advisor Davutoglu, FM Babacan and MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz to brief President Aliyev on the proposal, Erdogan said to the press, "This platform should be based on geography. It should aim at achieving peace and security in the region, including economic cooperation and energy security. This platform should be based on the principles of the OSCE. There should be a joint mechanism concerning administering and finding solutions. This platform will make stability and cooperation in the region stronger." The Turkish National Security Council (NSC) will take up the GOT's Caucasus initiative in its August 21 meeting. ¶4. (C) Outgoing MFA South Caucasus Section Head Yavuz Kul provided us some additional background August 19 on the proposed stability platform. Contrary to what Berk told us, Kul said the plan is already well-formed and, from the Turkish perspective, could be implemented quickly, conditions permitting. MFA began developing the concept some time ago based on a 2000 proposal by then-Turkish President Demirel. (Russia was opposed at that time, as was Armenia, and the proposal did not take off.) MFA had recently updated the idea, hoping to reintroduce it as a mechanism through which Turkey and Armenia could further engage. The platform, with Russian and Azerbaijani participation, would create a multilateral context in which Turkey and Armenia could more easily take the necessary steps to normalize their relationship, such as formally recognizing and opening the border. ROLLING OUT THE STABILITY PLATFORM -------------- ¶5. (C) The Georgian crisis led Turkey to quickly introduce the plan. PM Erdogan discussed it with President Medvedev and PM Putin in Moscow August 13 and with President Saakashvili August 14 (ref B); Cevikoz told us August 15 the Russians were interested in the proposal, and that Turkey and Russia had agreed their MFAs would consult on its details. ¶6. (C) Kul said President Gul could discuss the proposal with ANKARA 00001513 002 OF 002 Armenian President Sargsyan in Yerevan, if Gul accepts the invitation to attend the September 6 World Cup qualifier, which Kul implied was a strong possibility. (The Turkish NSC will discuss the invitation in its August 21 meeting.) Erdogan remarked August 20, "There will be talks with Armenia concerning the platform. This week our FM will talk to the Russian FM and following that meeting we will decide how the meeting with Armenia will take place." The GOT is convinced Armenia will support the stability platform proposal. Baku will be more skeptical, but Erdogan can persuade Aliyev, Kul believes. NO IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL -------------- ¶7. (C) President Saakashvili, according to Cevikoz and Kul, was open to the Turkish proposal, but underscored that Tbilisi could not support any regional initiative until Russian troops withdraw from Georgia, a position reemphasized to us by Georgian CDA Irakli Koplatadze in a separate meeting August 19. Koplatadze indicated GOG apprehension, noting Georgia's discomfort with President Gul's remarks in an August 16 "Guardian" interview, in which Gul envisioned a "new multipolar world emerging from the wreckage of war," and that "the conflict in Georgia showed that the United States could no longer shape global politics on its own, and should begin sharing power with other countries." ¶8. (C) Kul stressed that Turkey is supporting Georgia's territorial integrity through the proposal, which cannot and will not be implemented until Russia withdraws from Georgia. Turkey believes the platform, by creating a mechanism for dialogue between Tbilisi and Moscow, could contribute to normalized relations between the two. UNCERTAIN ROLE FOR ALLIES -------------- ¶9. (C) The proposed platform, according to Kul, would be composed of the five founding states, with subsidiary bodies formed to address technical issues. The platform could provide a mechanism for engaging non-state actors, e.g., de facto governments in breakaway territories, but such engagement could only occur with the consent of member states. The GOT does not wish to include Iran in the organization, Kul noted. Asked about observership, Kul said no details have been developed, but he sought to assure us that Allies will have a role. He further emphasized that Turkey recognizes the importance of the Georgian crisis to NATO and will continue to fulfill all its NATO obligations, but Turkey needs to take advantage of its geographic position and its balanced, good relations with both Moscow and Tbilisi. EXPERTS CRITICAL -------------- ¶10. (C) TOBB University International Relations Department Professor and Caucasus expert Mitat Celikpala described as absurd the GOT advancing such an initiative at a time when the whole region is in conflict and Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations. The proposal is meant to show the public that Turkey has a plan for dealing with instability on its border, he surmised. Celikpala noted how, as a result of Turkey's failed policy of closing the border with and isolating Armenia, Turkey found itself "stuck with Georgia" for its energy and transportation lifelines, while not contributing at all to democratic development or conflict resolution in the region. The Caucasus stability platform is not a credible solution, he said. It is more evidence of the government's agenda for developing a regional policy independent of the United States and NATO. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey SILLIMAN