TURKEY: NUCLEAR SUPPLIER GROUP EXCEPTION FOR INDIA

UNCLAS ANKARA 001459 SIPDIS EUR/SE, ISN/RA, ISN/NESS, SCA/RA, SCA/PPD DOE FOR DOE/NNSA SCHEINMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC AORC ENRG IN TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: NUCLEAR SUPPLIER GROUP EXCEPTION FOR INDIA DEMARCHE DELIVERED REF: STATE 85948 ¶1. (SBU) We delivered reftel demarche on August 12 to MFA Department Head for Nonproliferation and Disarmament Affairs Bora Kerimoglu. Kerimoglu expressed appreciation for the information provided and our offer to respond to any questions the GOT might have on the issue, and pledged to convey the U.S. position to his superiors. He said GOT's position with respect to the August 21-22 Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) plenary is still under discussion, and declined to provide an official GOT position on the question of an exemption for India. Kerimoglu did offer his personal assessment that the GOT would be positively inclined to supporting the India exemption draft text, and certainly would not block consensus if one emerges at the plenary. ¶2. (SBU) Kerimoglu asked two questions in response to the demarche. First, he asked whether the U.S. is concerned that granting an NSG exception to India might upset the strategic balance between India and Pakistan. He mentioned that a representative from the Pakistan embassy had been to his office and had voiced strong opposition to any sort of exception for India that would allow it to access sensitive, dual-use technology. According to Kerimoglu, Pakistan is concerned that granting India access to dual-use technology in its civilian nuclear program will eventually help bolster India's nuclear weapons program. We noted that we fully appreciate the strategic balance between India and Pakistan, and that we had considered this issue carefully before proceeding with the bilateral U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. We emphasized that bringing India into an international nonproliferation regime would increase transparency in India's civilian nuclear program, which should help assuage the concerns of its neighbors. Furthermore, the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol currently being negotiated will help ensure that sensitive technology will not be diverted to its weapons program. ¶3. (SBU) Second, Kerimoglu asked whether the U.S. believes Iran would point to an exception for India as more evidence of the West's double-standard on the nuclear issue. We stressed that it would not be appropriate to compare India with Iran, an NPT violator, and noted that Iran continues to defy the will of the IAEA and the UNSC despite the generous offer made by the P5 plus 1. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey SILLIMAN