S/I SATTERFIELD CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ/PKK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000132 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/I E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV ECON TU IZ IR KU SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ/PKK REF: ANKARA 107 ANKARA 00000132 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In discussions with FM Babacan, MFA U/S Apakan, MFA Deputy U/S Sinirlioglu, Iraq Coordinator Celikkol, Presidency foreign affairs advisor Turkoglu, and D/CHOD Gen. Saygun January 18, S/I Satterfield noted progress made in Iraq on security and the economy, but characterized gains as fragile and underscored the need for progress on political reconciliation. Turkish officials emphasized their desire to consult with us on Iraq, including the long-term strategic partnership discussions soon to be underway. They touched on Kirkuk and Turkey's plans in southern Iraq. They expressed appreciation for U.S. support against the PKK. FM Babacan noted Turkey's comprehensive approach to the PKK issue that includes military as well as political, economic, and social/cultural tools used in a well coordinated manner to "disincentivize those who might consider going to the mountains to fight." END SUMMARY SATTERFIELD BRIEFS ON IRAQ AND PKK -------------- ¶2. (C) Satterfield described the progressively improving security situation in Iraq achieved by more troops, better utilization of those troops, better equipped and trained Iraqi security forces, the transformation of al-Anbar in ways that reduced al-Qaeda's ability to operate, and the splintering and diminution of Jaysh al Mahdi as a threat to Coalition forces. On the economic front, the government had improved its expenditure performance, paying out some 65%-80% of its capital budget in 2007, compared to just 15% in 2006. Even when violence has hindered local officials' ability to provide services, those officials were prepared to move forward quickly with well thought-out spending priorities when violence ebbed, and much more money has flowed to the provinces. ¶3. (C) Satterfield called 2008 a critical year for Iraq and cautioned that these gains are fragile and not irreversible. Iraq requires more effective governance and a political process that can bring about national reconciliation in order to continue to progress. We have emphasized compromise and collaboration. Deba'athification legislation had been passed and, while far from perfect, it was a compromise and a start. 
 Next must come a hydrocarbons law, a provincial powers law, a provincial election law, and then local elections, which we are urging be on an open list basis. Iraqi leaders need to strike the best deal on federalism for Iraq today, recognizing that it will evolve as Iraq changes and matures. We had urged PM Maliki to govern as a national coalition leader and not try to rule on his own. Similarly, we had cautioned KRG President Barzani on the mixed messages he has been sending about the Kurds' intentions. Entering into unilateral oil contracts outside a national framework threatens national unity and will prove self-defeating. ¶4. (C) On the Article 140 process, Satterfield emphasized consensus. He doubted Kirkuk will be resolved and a referendum held by mid-year, but stressed the importance of an ongoing process in which progress towards consensus can occur. UN Secretary General Special Representative de Mistura is on the right track. Satterfield encouraged the Turks to engage with de Mistura and the UN. ¶5. (C) Satterfield briefly described our anticipated negotiations with the Iraqis on a long-term strategic partnership agreement that will govern bilateral relations and the future status of forces in Iraq. We will include all the key players and relevant Iraqi ministries in these negotiations so that once consensus is reached it will be broadly supported. ANKARA 00000132 002.2 OF 004 ¶6. (C) Regarding the PKK, Satterfield expressed U.S. appreciation that increased intelligence sharing and cooperation against the PKK in northern Iraq are making an impact. He emphasized the need for kinetic action to be complemented by political, economic, and social/cultural steps that will lead to a final, comprehensive solution to the PKK issue. The U.S. agrees that Massoud Barzani and the KRG should do more to counter the PKK and we are urging them to do so. He encouraged GOT officials to consider how they can better engage with Iraqi Kurds and deal with KDP and PUK leaders directly to facilitate cooperation against and more effectively counter the PKK. Satterfield suggested reviving the trilateral (U.S.-TU-IZ) process and closing the Makhmour refugee camp. FM BABACAN: ENGAGING IRAQI KURDS; PKK ISSUE -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Babacan said that Turkey's goal is peace and stability in Iraq. It regards U.S. success in Iraq as Turkey's success, and our failure there Turkey's failure too. Babacan emphasized his interest in close cooperation and consultation with us on Iraq matters. Despite problems with the PKK in northern Iraq, Turkey has always maintained ties with Baghdad, one of the only countries never to have closed its embassy there. Remarks by KRG President Massoud Barzani and KRG disinterest in, if not support for, the PKK make it difficult for Turkey to engage openly with him and other KRG officials, though private channels do exist. Nevertheless, Turkey has enjoyed good relations with Iraqi Kurds in the past and will do so again. ¶8. (C) GOT officials believe a comprehensive solution to the PKK problem is required, according to Babacan. This means using military, as well as economic, social/cultural, and other tools. "We need to use these tools in a well-coordinated manner to remove this issue as a long-term threat." ¶9. (C) Babacan indicated Iraqi President Talabani has an "open invitation" to visit Turkey, although specific dates must be worked out. Passage of hydrocarbons legislation and a consensus solution on Kirkuk are critical issues. Until there is agreement on such issues, the potential for violence will remain high. Babacan said President Gul had pressed UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon to play a greater role on Kirkuk during his recent visit to the U.S. MFA U/S APAKAN: ENGAGING THE UN; INCREASING TU-IZ ECONOMIC COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Apakan said Turkey has invited SRSG de Mistura to visit Ankara to consult on Article 140 and other issues and hopes he will be able to come soon. Apakan referred to Turkey's idea of establishing a separate Kirkuk region with a multi-ethnic administration and provided a copy of an earlier Turkish paper fleshing this out (scanned and e-mailed to EUR/SE, NEA/I, and Embassy Baghdad). He noted the upcoming visit of Iraqi Turkmen members of the Kirkuk Provincial Council to Ankara the week of January 21. GOT officials will try to convince the Turkmen to return to Provincial Council deliberations they have been boycotting for the past year. Amb. Satterfield said he would ask Embassy Baghdad and PRT Kirkuk to provide points on how we have approached the issues. ¶11. (C) Apakan said Turkey wants to increase economic cooperation with Iraq. It has proposed a new bilateral trade agreement but the Iraqis have yet to respond. Satterfield asked that Ankara provide a text and promised to follow up with GOI officials. Apakan also noted work underway to open a consulate in Basra and establish an economic free trade and industrial zone near the Kuwait border. He also expressed interest in re-establishing the rail connection between ANKARA 00000132 003.2 OF 004 Turkey and Iraq. Satterfield suggested the Turks send a team to Baghdad to discuss these and other economic cooperation issues with U.S. embassy personnel. CELIKKOL: ENGAGING GOI AND ITS NEIGHBORS -------------- ¶12. (C) Celikkol said he hopes to visit Kuwait in early February to discuss Turkey's plans in Basra and the upcoming Iraq Neighbors meetings. Turkey is ready to attend a core Iraq Neighbors meeting in Baghdad at the end of February, but Arab leaders remain reluctant. The GOT will support an expanded neighbors ministerial to be held in Kuwait at a time convenient for us. The Turks would like to hold a meeting of the neighbors energy working group soon. They are waiting for the Iraqis. Celikkol noted Turkey continues to reach out to the Iraqis to provide assistance, pointing to the upcoming political party training course in which 60 members of the Iraqi Islamic Party will soon be participating. The Iraqi Interior Minister expressed interest in the Turkish offer of police training but there has been no progress in bringing the plan to fruition. Satterfield offered to take that up with the Iraqis and to forward information on the President's talks with Kuwait about economic cooperation with and assistance to Iraq. TURKOGLU/SINIRLIOGLU: IRAN AND GULF SECURITY -------------- ¶13. (C) Meetings with Amb. Turkoglu and Sinirlioglu focused primarily on President Gul's visit to Syria (reftel). Turkoglu noted Iranian President Ahmadinejad hopes to visit Turkey before elections this spring in Iran, but he has advised against offering a visit before the election to avoid it being used as propaganda in the campaign. Sinirlioglu raised the issue of security of the Gulf states and its importance to Turkey. He noted the Saudis see Turkey as a natural counterbalance to Iran in the region, a role the Turks are willing to play. Gul plans to visit Qatar February 6-7, and the Turkish navy will likely send a couple of warships to make a public display of Turkey's interest in Gulf security. Sinirlioglu said Turkey recognizes the threat Iran poses but said Turks must live with the Iranians as neighbors. The GOT understands U.S. concerns about Turkey-Iran energy cooperation projects but he emphasized the projects are long-term efforts to boost the security of energy supplies for Turkey as well as western Europe and are not meant to bolster the current regime. GENERAL SAYGUN: GREATER TU-IZ MIL-MIL COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) D/CHOD Gen. Saygun told Satterfield that the Turkish military and public appreciate U.S. intelligence support to the fight against the PKK. He stressed that Turkish forces are only targeting the PKK and seek to avoid collateral damage. Turkey,s aim is to destroy PKK command and control and logistics structures, not kill large numbers of people. Saygun, too, assured Satterfield that the Turkish government is committed to undertaking political, economic and social measures necessary to eliminate support for the PKK, noting the December Turkish National Security Council statement to this effect. Efforts in these areas are already underway and will continue. Much had already been done to improve the economic situation in southeast Turkey. Saygun said some 21 PKK operatives had surrendered to Turkish authorities over the past week, but cautioned that a wider amnesty would be a politically delicate issue. He warned that a political party could quickly find itself marginalized by advocating a broad amnesty. ¶15. (C) Satterfield encouraged Saygun to follow up his January 15 meeting with Iraqi D/CHOD Abadi with more intensive contacts with Iraqi security officials at all ANKARA 00000132 004.2 OF 004 levels, including the KRG where a blunt and direct dialogue is necessary. Saygun stated the Turkish military will not talk to Massoud Barzani or any other KRG political figure, including Nechirvan Barzani, in view of Massoud Barzani,s continued negative statements and perceived KRG support for the PKK. Government contacts are possible, he said. Satterfield told Saygun that we are clearly calling on Barzani to take more effective steps against the PKK. ¶16. (C) Saygun said he found Gen Abadi a reasonable interlocutor. They shared a similar view on pre-notifying Turkish operations against the PKK and the risk of leaks. At the same time, Turkey is prepared to improve its relations with the Iraqi military and Saygun had invited an Iraqi military delegation to Ankara to discuss areas for security cooperation. Such cooperation could occur bilaterally or via NTM-I. Saygun noted that Turkey could support Iraq in the maintenance and repair of its U.S.-origin military equipment. ¶17. (C) On the Makhmour refugee camp, Satterfield reported that SRSG de Mistura is willing to engage the UN bureaucracy to break the impasse over shutting down the camp. Ambassador Wilson urged Saygun to encourage the government to renew its efforts with the UNHCR to find a way forward on Makhmour. (U) Amb. Satterfield did not have an opportunity to clear this message. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON