THE CASE FOR NON-CLOSURE OF TURKEY'S RULING PARTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001260 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: THE CASE FOR NON-CLOSURE OF TURKEY'S RULING PARTY REF: A. ANKARA 979 ¶B. ANKARA 549 ¶C. ANKARA 502 Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. There are signs that at least some in Turkey think that closure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) by the Constitutional Court -- deemed inevitable by many since the case was filed in March -- may not occur. Signals that AKP opponents see value in not closing the party are increasing, although the picture is far from clear, and the odds still favor closure. The Court's decision cannot be predicted and isn't likely to be heavily swayed by what pundits or even opposition party leaders say. But the fact of these commentaries is a reminder that AKP's closure and a ban of its leaders are not inevitable -- though they remain the most likely outcomes. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Non-Closure Talk Ebbs and Flows -------------- ¶2. (C) In mid-May, journalist and former Star TV Ankara bureau chief Nuray Basaran noted a change of mood in Ankara. Even hard-core nationalists were seeing closure as problematic. "Even people who want Tayyip Erdogan eliminated" were concluding that "the closure case saved AKP" from facing voter dissatisfaction with the economy and other issues. At that time, she asserted the military also was on board with this assessment. Shortly thereafter, two top courts issued strong statements making clear their view that AKP must be closed (refA); talk of non-closure dissipated for a time. ¶3. (C) However, in a change of tune, AKP foe Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal told Haberturk TV July 6 that a decision not to close AKP would end domestic tension. AKP would learn a lesson from the closure process, he observed, adding that democracy should prevail. Baykal's surprising comments are the latest addition to a short list of flip-floppers on the case's outcome since the indictment was filed in March. ¶4. (C) At a June 25 dinner, former ambassador to the US and current CHP MP Sukru Elekdag argued the Court would not close AKP for three reasons. One, the judges do not live in a bubble and understand the negative impact a closure ruling would have. Two, jurisprudence in Turkey has changed; the Venice Commission criteria on political parties in a democracy now have sway in Turkey, limiting the Court's leeway to ban parties. Three, the Court's June 5 headscarf decision helped set the bounds on AKP. Ultranationalist CHP MP Sevket Kose agrees that banning the party no longer has any meaning, given the headscarf decision role in setting limits on AKP. Journalist Burak Bekdil also does not believe the Court will close AKP, arguing the Court's goal, now that the headscarf amendments have been annulled and AKP duly warned against anti-secular activity, is to minimize damage to Turkey. That means avoiding international repercussions and social upheaval that might come in response to closure. Bekdil does not anticipate Erdogan's banning, although he does predict the banning of others, like former Speaker Bulent Arinc. Closure proceedings against AKP could be taken up again at any time, hanging like a sword over AKP's head, he added. ¶5. (SBU) Most contacts agree that a measure short of closure would be damaging but not fatal to AKP. Depriving the party of all or part of state funding it receives pursuant to a constitutionally-mandated formula would deduct millions from party coffers and possibly encumber title to AKP-owned facilities. Wealthy supporters and grass-roots efforts would likely buffer the loss, however. A ruling that convicts AKP of the charges but imposes financial penalties rather than a ban would nevertheless establish AKP's guilt, making a future closure case on similar grounds that much easier to argue. A Capital City All over the Map -------------- ¶6. (C) Each new development is being evaluated for its ANKARA 00001260 002 OF 002 expected effect on the Court's thinking, but the consensus expectations have blurred. While some maintain the Court's "headscarf ruling" renders a closure decision unnecessary, others see it as dooming AKP, reasoning that the Court's annulment of the constitutional amendments proves AKP violated the constitution's secularism principle. Most dramatically and confusingly, the July 1 Ergenekon detentions are viewed either as a gauntlet that virtually guarantees AKP's closure or as giving AKP bargaining power to cut a deal with state establishment forces. METU professor and keen political observer Huseyin Bagci believes the latter is possible; he speculates the meeting between Erdogan and CHOD-in-waiting General Basbug prior to the July 1 arrests may have played into such a negotiation. ¶7. (C) The Court's recently released reasoning in its January decision not to close small Kurdish federalist party Hak-Par, in which the Court emphasized freedoms of organization and expression, prompted Ebru Agduk of the National Democratic Institute to predict the Court will not close AKP. Hak-Par president Sertac Bucak, whose party is one of only two to survive a closure case since 1980, disagrees: "Logically, it should be the same result. But it is hard to have a logical conclusion" with this Court. He describes the Hak-Par result as a "revolution" for the Kurdish question and freedom in Turkey; he acknowledges the paradox of that outcome with what he predicts will be AKP's imminent closure. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON