TURKEY -- A FINE MESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001223 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: TURKEY -- A FINE MESS REF: ANKARA 1217 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (c) Summary: The next four weeks in Turkey will likely be as dramatic as any in over a decade. This time frame will probably see a ruling by the Constitutional Court on the AKP closure case, an indictment in the alleged Ergenekon plot by retired military and other Kemalists to overthrow the government, and increasingly visible politicking by AKP elements disenchanted with PM Erdogan's maladroit leadership. The first two strands are difficult to predict, but the last could be a mechanism for dealing with, or emerging from, the present crisis by political means . End Summary. ¶2. (c) A confluence of inter-related events is pushing Turkey and Turkish society toward decisive crunch points in the coming several weeks. The outcomes are highly uncertain, but it is now obvious that five-plus years of stable AKP governance are over. A vicious struggle for power is now out in the open. On one side are allegations of AKP activities that threaten Turkey,s secular nature, if not democracy itself. One the other side are allegations of plotting by retired senior generals and other Kemalists to foment unrest and overthrow the government. Heady stuff, but also reflective of an over-the-top, take-no-prisoners struggle on both sides of Turkey's ideological divide. ¶3. (c) At the moment, Ergenekon appears to be the driver of events. An indictment may be handed down shortly. Indeed, if it does not come soon, the image of political disorder will worsen. Press leaks by police and possibly others point to charges under Articles 312, 313 and 314 of the Turkish penal code that relate to the attempted overthrow of the government, provoking rebellion against the government, and formation of an armed gang for such purposes. It is likely that several of the retired generals arrested are guilty of at least teahouse ruminations on how to unhinge and bring down the AKP government. Whether and to what extent this translated into concrete plans and the dedication of real assets to carry them out remains to be seen. And what exactly a prominent Cumhuriyet journalist and the head of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce have to do with such planning is less certain, thought their hostility toward the government is widely known. But dramatic, "Midnight Express"-style arrests of these figures are being criticized by many and not just the government's opponents. ¶4. (c) Leaving aside Ergenekon's legal viability, politically it accomplishes several things for the government. It declares that just as a prosecutor and other Kemalists have collected dirt on the AKP, so another prosecutor and police elements probably allied with the government have dirt on Kemalists. It says the AKP has no intention of going down without a fight. And it almost defies the Constitutional Court to delay ruling on the closure case until the autumn as many here expected as recently as a month ago. Court vice chair (and virulent AKP opponent) Osman Paksut said late last week that the court may rule within the next 4-5 weeks -- i.e., by early August when the court has traditionally taken a summer holiday. In that connection we are reliably informed that three court judges have reserved and paid for 10-14 days vacations in Russia beginning o/a August 4. ¶5. (c) Regarding the substance of the closure case, most still expect the AKP will be closed and its leaders -- especially PM Erdogan -- will be banned. Perhaps reflecting wishful thinking that disaster might be averted, however, some here have noted other wisps in the wind. -- Court vice chair Paksut told reporters that he recognized that the court's decision could provoke public hostility, leading some to speculate that he was foreshadowing a ruling other than closure, such as a financial sanction on the AKP. -- CHP heavyweight and former Turkish ambassador to the US Sukru Elekdag speculated along such lines to a visiting private American last week. Elekdag opined that the court will likely slap the AKP on the wrist with a fine rather than close it because the justices understand the negative impact a closure ruling would have. -- A court ruling released last week to reject a closure suit against an ethnic Kurdish party stressed that in a democracy political parties should not generally be closed unless they are a serious threat to a democratic society. (The ruling was 6-5 in favor of closure, but 7 votes are required to convict.) -- Even CHP leader Deniz Baykal was quoted over the weekend as saying that domestic tensions will be defused if the court ANKARA 00001223 002 OF 002 rules against closure. ¶6. (c) Finally, there is increasing swirling among potential political opponents to Erdogan. One sign of this is continued sniping among the Erdogan and Gul wings of the party, each blaming the other leader for the origins of the party's current woes. One senior MP and former protg of the late President Ozal, Vahit Erdem, has been critical of Erdogan for weeks and seems poised to bolt the party. Its most prominent Alevi, Reha Camuroglu, did last week. Even if this defection had more to do with a disappointed Alevi agenda than high politics concerns, it bodes ill for AKP unity. Former Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener, a sitting member of the AKP's executive board, over the weekend called for early general elections and said Turkey needs a new, centrist political party. Such political machinations may be even harder to predict than the Constitutional Court's decision or the fate of the Ergenekon case, but may help Turkey to find a political way out of the current mess. ¶7. (c) Relations between Erdogan and Gul appear good, but herding the cats will require their solid unity and more of their time. AKP's pledge to keep parliament in session until the Court rules is primarily designed to keep control over party deputies and prevent defections. Rumors that the Court may find a way to permanently ban Erdogan from politics add to an already anxious party group. Grass-roots support for AKP and Erdogan remains strong; while that remains true, many AKPers will hesitate to switch to a new horse. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON