TURKEY: WHY INVESTORS ARE NERVOUS

UNCLAS ANKARA 001026 DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE AND EEB TREASURY FOR ROSE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN TU SUBJECT: TURKEY: WHY INVESTORS ARE NERVOUS REF: A. ANKARA 996 B. ANKARA 1014 ¶1. Summary: Both economic and financial indicators show the honeymoon is over for the Turkish economy. Expectations are negative and Turkish assets are losing value. Our investment banking contacts see more nervousness from investors, occasionally setting Turkey apart from other emerging markets. For example, Turkish equities have lost 32.3% in dollar terms since December 31, 2007, versus an increase for Brazil of 22.3% over the same period. It appears investors are taking into account the Justice and Development Party (AKP) closure case risks in an environment where global conditions are also getting worse and investor risk appetite is decreasing. GOT policies are also to blame for investors, nervousness. GOT polices are inflationary, with increasing expenditures on the fiscal side in anticipation of local elections scheduled for March 2009. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and the GOT are no longer working together to manage inflation and blame each other for poor results. The IMF stand-by agreement ended May 10, and the GOT has not yet negotiated a new arrangement, which investors would likely see as a positive sign. Investors believe the EU accession process, while slow, has resulted in positive changes in the economy and their worst-case scenario for the closure case is a future GOT policy that would end Turkey-EU talks. End Summary. Inflation is Up -------------- ¶2. Monthly inflation data released May 2 showed inflation rose by 1.7% last month, higher than the 1.4% market consensus. On an annual basis, inflation has risen to 9.7%, up from 9.2%. Producer prices rose by more than twice consensus forecasts, putting annual producer price inflation at 14.6%, up from 11.7%. Transport prices continue to spike, driven by the surge in global energy prices. Pass-through from recent Turkish Lira (TRY) weakness continued to generate considerable cost-push inflation pressure, leading to a substantial 4.5% monthly increase in producer prices. ¶3. Following a six-month period of monetary easing from September 2007 to February 2008, and a subsequent two-month period of no changes in rates, the Central Bank shifted to monetary tightening, amid inflationary concerns and unfavorable global market conditions at the May 15 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting. The MPC increased the benchmark policy interest rates by 50 basis points, which increased the overnight borrowing rate to 15.75% percent from 15.25%. In its accompanying statement announcing the rate decision, the CBRT seemed to focus on the 6.7% inflation forecast for 2009, while signaling for further rate hikes. GOT Focus is on Growth -------------- ¶4. On May 3, the GOT announced the mid-term fiscal framework, where it revised the primary surplus target down to 3.5% from 4.2% of GDP for 2008. The move was viewed by investors as fiscal loosening and showed that the GOT,s priorities have shifted to local elections and growth, while inflation management is a distant memory. This decision put the Central Bank in a difficult position at a time when the Turkish economy is suffering from globally high oil and food prices. On May 26, CBRT Governor Durmus Yilmaz bluntly said the GOT is loosening its fiscal policy and, in the monthly inflation report released at the end of May, warned the GOT on the need to maintain discipline. The Finance and Treasury Ministers claimed that decreasing the primary surplus target does not signal fiscal loosening, since these funds will go to finance the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP). The GAP was announced by the Prime Minister on May 27 and is detailed in Reftel A. The Central Bank did not buy this argument even though the GOT claimed that the intention was to use the additional fiscal resources solely to promote employment and growth. In May, the Central Bank revised its inflation forecasts upward through 2010, projecting year-end inflation at 9.3% in 2008, 6.7% in 2009, and 4.9% for 2010. This official shift in inflation expectation caused local bond rates to increase to 20% with the expectation of future rate hikes. Deficit is Rising; Unemployment is Up -------------- ¶5. Economic market indicators also continued to deteriorate. The current account deficit expectation increased to $44.9 billion, up from $43.1 billion. The March current account deficit was $4.2 billion versus the market expectation of $3.7 billion. For the January to March 2008 period, the deficit jumped to $12.04 billion. Net FDI, which is a major source of income for Turkey and bellwether for investors, decreased 50.5% from same period in 2007, ending the quarter at $4.04 billion. Meanwhile, unemployment continued to increase, reaching 11.6% in the first quarter of 2008. Investors Explain their Jitters -------------- ¶6. We met in Istanbul with some leading investors on May 27 and 28. All noted they did not expect a crisis, but said the honeymoon was over, and current global market conditions suggest the GOT should be extremely cautious. Investors feel insecure both with GOT economic policies and the AKP closure case. All our contacts agreed that the second AKP administration is very different from the first, with less focus on the economy and more focus on populist measures and attracting votes. Conflicting policy measures, delayed economic and EU reforms, little progress on privatization, and the growing tension between the CBRT and the GOT caused a credibility slippage. Investors have lost much confidence in the economic team of Deputy Prime Minister Nazim Ekren, Treasury Minister Mehmet Simsek, and Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan. Investors note they are not influential on key policies, and the Prime Minister continues to make all key decisions, which creates a serious bottleneck and delays. The future of GOT-IMF relations remains unclear. Investors see little GOT support for the Central Bank's efforts to fight inflation, and the GOT has clearly chosen growth over inflation by expanding its fiscal policy. The CBRT cannot exercise control over oil and food prices, but the bank hiked up its policy rates to control the prices in its domain. Market rates jump from 17-18% to over 20%. JP Morgan Chief Economist Yarkin Cebeci says lack of policy coordination between the CBRT and GOT makes investors nervous, because the conflict signals the GOT has lost its focus on economic issues. Cebeci also noted the AKP closure case was just starting to be priced in by investors. Cebeci pointed out that in his recent road show to the U.S., he noticed a loss in appetite by U.S. investors for Turkish assets. ¶7. Kubilay Cinemre, Head of Merrill Lynch in Istanbul, told us that high oil and commodity prices constitute a big risk for the Turkish economy given a high current account deficit (6.2% of GDP) and rising inflation. Under the current global environment, political risks are seen as a major cause for higher risk premiums. Cinemre says the continued capital inflows are a result of still popular "carry trade" (leveraged capital investment: borrowing cheaply in Japan and investing for high yields in Turkey and other emerging markets). Cinemre and other investment bankers agree the AKP closure case had some impact on pricing of Turkish assets and increased the risk premium for Turkey. They noted, however, that the global economic situation and the GOT,s recent economic policies had a played a larger role in the pricing. Murat Gulkan from Deutsche Securities pointed out the AKP closure case was announced the same day as the Bear Stearns meltdown news broke, giving the AKP news much less press coverage than anticipated. Both Cinemre and Gulkan said that any signal for economic slowdown in Europe resulting from the global recession (EU is Turkey's major export partner) would also be perceived negatively and seen as another threat to Turkey's already high current account deficit. Speakers at the TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association) banking conference on May 28 agreed that Turkey has made much progress since the crisis of 2001. One bright spot remains in the banking sector, where restructuring and reforms have kept the capital adequacy ratio over 16%, keeping the sector highly liquid. ¶8. Comment: Investors see higher risks in Turkey and are demanding higher risk premiums to invest in Turkish assets. They are also concerned the AKP closure case and the future direction of Turkey's economic polices without the AKP. A slow but steady rise in unemployment is ominous for the GOT and the AKP,s political prospects. Seven to eight hundred thousand people join the labor force each year and job creation MUST be a continuing priority for the GOT. The labor participation rate is going down because some people give up and stop looking for work. Private sector investment essentially stopped at the beginning of 2008 and productivity is not rising. Zafer Ali Yavan, TUSIAD Ankara representative, told the Ambassador that large companies invested heavily from 2004-2007, increasing capacity sufficient to last until 2009. If investment does not pick up in 2009, unemployment is likely to spike. One positive aspect of lower growth may be less energy consumption, and the GOT needs to develop a game plan to operate in the new high-cost environment. If inflation passes through to the rest of the economy, CBRT will be forced to hike its rates, which will attract more carry trade. ¶9. There will also be large Treasury debt rollovers in July and August. While we do not expect the GOT to have problems getting access to funds, we do expect that borrowing from both domestic and foreign markets will be more expensive. Although no one has a definitive number, total corporate sector foreign-denominated debt is estimated to be $100 billion. Investors expect a further Turkish Lira depreciation if the AKP is closed down and Erdogan is banned from politics. Any rapid currency depreciation may constitute a credit risk for the banking sector and create a default risk for the corporate sector, which is likely to stem growth. A further rapid depreciation in the Turkish Lira would also have a pass through affect over inflation, causing inflation to get worse. A precautionary stand-by agreement with the IMF is seen as a safety measure by investors, but the GOT has still not given any clue about its intent to negotiate a new standby arrangement. Most investors concede that the process of Turkey's EU accession, and resulting change in many laws, has been good for business and believe the worst-case scenario would come from an end to Turkey-EU talks. End comment. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON