JORDAN'S ISLAMISTS BEGIN INTERNAL ELECTIONS; HAWKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 000693 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM JO SUBJECT: JORDAN'S ISLAMISTS BEGIN INTERNAL ELECTIONS; HAWKS AND DOVES DUEL OVER THE MOVEMENT'S FUTURE REF: A. AMMAN 612 ¶B. AMMAN 605 ¶C. AMMAN 535 ¶D. AMMAN 347 ¶E. AMMAN 189 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has begun to conduct internal elections for its Shura Council, the MB's highest leadership body. The vote for the 50-member council lasts from late February until mid-March. The election pits "hawks" against "doves" from within the MB, though their policy positions are generally indistinguishable. Early results suggest that the new council will be split between hawks and doves, suggesting more of the same as the MB and its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) move forward. In the election run-up, the Islamic movement has seized on regional headlines - including Gaza, missionaries in Jordan, and Danish cartoons - to buttress their bona fides amongst the MB rank-and-file. If the final results match early reports, we can expect more internal Islamist squabbles while the public is shown the facade of a united front on the issues that attract support from all Jordanians. In the absence of a clear winner, we anticipate that the Islamic movement will continue its radical progression while losing more support among the Jordanian population at large. End summary. Shura Council Elections Begin -------------- ¶2. (C) Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has begun to conduct internal elections to reconstitute its Shura Council, which was dissolved in December after the Islamic Action Front's (IAF - the MB's political party) stunning defeat in November's parliamentary elections (ref E). The council's dissolution was acknowledgment that, in endorsing participation in the elections, it had misread the political environment. Note: Depending on the analysis, there are two ways of understanding this "misreading:" the degree of the party's political support, or the government's determination to clip the movement's wings by tilting the elections against it. End note. ¶3. (C) The MB's Shura Council is the highest leadership body within the Islamic movement in Jordan. Note: The Islamic movement in Jordan generally refers to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the Islamic Action Front. The MB and IAF have separate leadership structures, but both are beholden to the Shura Council. End note. The Shura Council is comprised of 50 total members. 33-35 members are expected to be elected from about 35 local MB branches across the country. Another 10 to 12 are expected to be elected by Jordanian MB members abroad, mostly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. An additional five Shura Council members are appointed as observers by the 45 elected members. All fifty then vote to determine the MB's leadership. The elections process began in late February, with Jordanian MB members voting for their local branch representatives on the council. The elections are expected to be completed by mid-March, 2008. At Stake: Islamism's Future in Jordan -------------- ¶4. (C) At stake in the election is the relationship between the Jordanian Islamic movement and the government and Royal Court, and the decades-old accommodation between them. That relationship has become increasingly strained in recent years, with these strains peaking after the June 2007 Hamas takeover in Gaza. Rhetoric between IAF and regime escalated dramatically in the lead-up to the July municipal and November parliamentary elections, with much focus on IAF accusations aimed at the government for alleged election improprieties. While Minister of Political Development Kamal Nasser has recently signaled to the IAF a willingness to begin a dialogue on national interests, the Front's response has thus far been silence (ref C). Also at stake for the MB are its efforts to reestablish internal unity of the movement and rebuild support in the country for the MB and the IAF (ref E). Defining Hawks and Doves -------------- ¶5. (C) Most members of the previous council are running for the new one, recapitulating the hawk-dove divisions previously reported, with IAF Secretary General Zaki Bani Irsheid the best-known hawk and MB Controller General Salim al-Falahat the best-known dove. While the two camps differ very little on policy - both are anti-U.S. and anti-Israel - their differences lie in generational attitudes and in their degree of pragmatism regarding Islamist relations with the government. Falahat's wing represents the old guard, generally believed to be more pragmatic, more willing to work with the government, more East Banker oriented, more nationalist, and more attuned to the delicate history of the relationship between the ruling structure in Jordan and the MB. Irsheid's wing is generally younger, more focused on the suffering of the Palestinians, more West Banker oriented, pro-Hamas and more ideologically Islamist. Note: Most observers draw these analytical distinctions, but GOJ officials have told us that, in considering the threat posed by the movement and its long-term intentions, they do not see a material difference in the two wings and that any distinction is cosmetic. End note. ¶6. (C) Another view, presented by freelance journalist and political analyst Jamal al-Tahat, is that the hawk-dove division is superseded by questions of external focus vs. internal focus, with the hawks attentive to external matters (such as Palestinian "resistance" and U.S. presence in Iraq) and the doves focusing on internal matters (such as political reform and strengthening the Jordanian state). In his interpretation, the Shura Council elections have taken such a tone, and that some presumed hawks and doves including Zaki Bani Irsheid (usually considered a hawk),Jamil Abu Baker, and Musa Hantash (usually considered a dove) were actually centrists looking to play the swing voter role. In his view, the Government would be more comfortable with an MB dominated by external-looking hawks protesting for Palestinian rights instead of internal-looking doves protesting against price increases and for more political reform. Results Begin to Emerge -------------- ¶7. (C) While the elections within the branches are held with a high degree of secrecy, on February 25, results of early local branch elections for the MB Shura Council began to emerge in the media. Though conventional wisdom would suggest that hawks will win handily after the resounding failure of the dove-laden candidates list fielded for the November election, preliminary results suggest a divided council, even while regional events have offered both sides the opportunity for hawkish rhetoric. Media accounts have focused on the polarization of the elections and the sharp competition between the so-called hawks, doves and centrists. Divided Council Likely -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The outcomes of the individual races have yet to suggest a clear victor. Zaki Bani Irsheid, the current Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front who is SIPDIS considered the head of the hawkish wing of the party, won membership to the Council from the local branch in Jabal Hussein in Amman, while current Senator Abdal Majid Dhunaybat, former Controller General of the MB and "dove," withdrew his nomination before the election began in the same branch. MB Deputy Controller General Jamil Abu-Bakr, considered a centrist, won from Amman. IAF Executive Bureau member Musa Hantash, considered a dove, beat out rival and former MP Ali Abu al-Sukkar, considered a hawk and possible candidate for MB Controller General. Note: Abu al-Sukkar was one of the IAF reps in the previous parliament who was brought up on sedition charges for attending the funeral tent for Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. End note. Former MP Ali al-Utum, a hawk, and MB Executive Bureau member Abdal Majid al-Qudah, a centrist, both won running unopposed from Irbid. From Zarqa (a largely Palestinian-origin area and traditionally an IAF stronghold),centrist Basim Khalid and dove Mamduh al-Muhaysin won. ¶9. (C) Current MB Controller General Salim Al-Falahat is expected to win unopposed the seat from Madaba, though IAF hawks are likely to seek to remove him from his position as Controller General, the top spot within the MB. Likewise, hawkish former MP Muhammad Abu Faris (note: also an attendee at the Zarqawi funeral tent; end note) is likely to win in an unopposed race in Suweileh, on the outskirts of Amman. An interesting race in the Tla' al-Ali neighborhood of Amman will pit current IAF Deputy Secretary General Irhail Gharaybeh, a centrist, against hawk Humam Sa'id and centrist Nimr al-Asaf. The Context: Hot-Button Issues -------------- ¶10. (C) The election has proceeded within a significant political and news-cycle context including media presentation of a "Jordanian MB versus Hamas" choice; recent bloody events in Gaza; a rerun of the Danish cartoon controversy; a furor over foreign missionaries; the controversial Arab broadcast charter; and dramatic local price rises (ref B). Each of these news items has seen a response from the Islamic movement and its leaders, who are both addressing the issues themselves, and using them in the struggle for support of MB voters in the Shura Council elections. ¶11. (C) The Islamic movement can only gain political points in Jordan by campaigning against Israeli actions in Gaza, against the Danish cartoons, against alleged missionaries, against price rises, and for freedom of expression - all points supported by the vast majority of Jordanians. Shura Council candidates have no reason not to beat their Islamist chests on these emotionally charged issues in the hopes of gaining support from the MB rank-and-file. Not only are these all winning issues for council candidates, they are also issues around which the two factions within the Islamic movement can show public unity. A sampling of the election rhetoric on these issues follows. -- Jordan MB vs. Hamas: In late February, the Jordanian print media carried stories that Jamil Abu-Bakr, current Deputy Controller General of the MB, had denied reports that the MB had asked its members residing abroad to choose between affiliation to the Jordanian MB or to Hamas. Comment: such news, if true, suggests that the "doves" within the MB recognize popular discontent with the MB and IAF's perceived closeness to Hamas (and implications, thereby, of disloyalty to Jordan in favor of the Palestinian nationalist cause). On the other hand, the news stories could also easily be planted to suggest just such an intertwining between Hamas and the MB. End comment. -- Gaza Crisis: The MB and IAF have organized several rallies in Amman against what they call the Gaza siege, referring to it as a Zionist-U.S. plan that tries to blackmail the Palestinian resistance by starving an entire population. The Islamic movement has used the situation in Gaza as a pretext for repeating its traditional calls to abrogate the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel (ref D). The escalation between Israelis and Hamas in Gaza over the February 28 to March 1 period led to a consequent escalation in MB rhetoric, with a large government-approved rally held on March 2 in central Amman, and small "spontaneous" rallies held throughout the country. This rhetorical escalation resonates with the Jordanian public, which is generally outraged over the violence in Gaza, and gives both hawks and doves the opportunity to display their Islamist bona fides to the MB grassroots voting for their Shura Council representatives. -- Cartoon Controversy: The IAF has also seized upon the re-printing of the controversial Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed to organize a government-approved demonstration in front of the Danish embassy on February 25 that demanded that Arab and Islamic countries begin an economic, cultural and political boycott of Denmark. IAF leaders called the cartoons a "racist campaign against Islam." The issue has wide popular resonance, as evidenced by the Jordanian parliament's February 18 statement strongly condemning the reprinting of the cartoons. -- "Brother" Christians vs. Missionaries: On the sensitive issue of missionaries and the intra-Christian debate on the issue (ref A),the IAF released a statement on February 21 calling on the GOJ to revoke the licenses of "Zionist missionary organizations" in Jordan, which, in the IAF's words, try to "incite extremist differences within the unified Jordanian society." In the statement, the IAF expressed its "respect and appreciation for the brother Jordanian Christians who rushed to resist this strange phenomenon" that are caused by "pro-Zionist, suspect and extremist groups," referring to missionaries influenced from the outside of Jordan. -- Muzzling the Media: The IAF also made itself heard in support of freedom of expression, criticizing the satellite and radio broadcast charter agreed upon by Arab Information Ministers on February 12 in Cairo. IAF chief Irsheid criticized on February 25 the charter as "an attempt on the part of the official Arab order to shut mouths, following the Arab media's success in threatening systematic corruption and tyranny." He questioned the document's effect on "strengthening democratic principles, political pluralism and freedom in media," while "Arab societies strive for more freedom of expression." Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) While the internal workings of the Shura Council elections are opaque for outsiders, initial results point to a divided council, resembling the previous one. If these preliminary results are indicative - final results are expected mid-March - we can expect continued internal MB and IAF struggles between the hawks and doves. The Islamic movement will try to keep these conflicts hidden, but they will emerge in leaked accounts to the media, despite the leaders of the movement displaying public unity behind the bread-and-butter causes outlined above. This continuing division within Islamist ranks suggests that although the Shura Council will be hawkish on policy to gain support of the membership, the two wings' focus on internal divisions -- and on building internal constituencies regarding the movement's relationship with the government and political course -- will divert the MB from its core mission of recapturing and increasing its support outside of its traditional power bases in the Palestinian refugee camps and in the Palestinian-origin population centers of the big cities (to be reported septel). Given a divided Shura Council, it is likely the Islamic movement in Jordan will remain rhetorically hawkish on policy while continuing to participate in the political process and institutions, but may well find itself continuing to lose political support among the wider Jordanian society (ref E). Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ RUBINSTEIN