IRAQIS IN JORDAN: ECONOMIC CRISIS, DROP BY DROP

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 000639 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR NEA, S/I, PRM, AND AMBASSADOR FOLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018 TAGS: PREF PREL EAID SOCI JO IZ SUBJECT: IRAQIS IN JORDAN: ECONOMIC CRISIS, DROP BY DROP REF: A. AMMAN 563 ¶B. AMMAN 532 ¶C. AMMAN 486 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: NGOs and Iraqis increasingly describe the deteriorating economic circumstances of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and their continued reluctance to seek essential services. While the Jordanian government remains responsive to our requests to ensure the provision of services, the measures taken thus far on residency issues - perceived by Jordanians as major leaps, but by Iraqis and their benefactors as half-steps at best - are insufficient to halt growing destitution or to provide the refugees sufficient legal status to support themselves and feel fully comfortable accessing services. Creative thinking is needed to stop the gradual diminution of Iraqi resources, but we can predict that a policy change by the GOJ will require guarantees from the international community in general - and the U.S. in particular - of substantial additional assistance. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Large flows of Iraqis into Jordan effectively stopped by mid-2007. Estimates of the population are still widely debated, but the actual number is no longer an issue of primary concern when it comes to service provision. The GOJ-Fafo negotiated figure of 480,000 Iraqis in Jordan is universally seen as inflated, but UNHCR's 52,000 registrants, its provision of services to another 20,000 on top of that figure, and the GOJ's own figure of 140,000 legally resident Iraqis suggest that, at a minimum, there are several hundred thousand Iraqis in Jordan. Many, unfortunately, are becoming increasingly destitute, despite international and Jordanian efforts to meet their basic needs. ¶3. (SBU) There are several reasons for the increasing economic distress. Global inflationary trends and the removal of oil subsidies squeeze Iraqi budgets; Amman was recently tagged as the most expensive city in the Middle East by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The latest (post-Samarra mosque bombing) - and some say, poorest - arrivals may well have expected to need asylum for only several months. Instead, after two years or more, they now find themselves with depleted savings, largely dependent on remittances and handouts. According to the Fafo survey, 22 percent of Iraqi households work but much of that labor is technically illegal, and many Iraqis tell emboffs and NGOs that while willing and eager to work, in the absence of formal residency they are afraid to violate the law for fear of deportation. This lack of status and increasing desperation often means that those that do work receive below-market compensation and are exploited by employers. ¶4. (C) We have had great successes in working with the GOJ, and providing it the resources to allow Iraqis access to schools and medical services. Finding a solution to the increasing destitution - and consequent inability to buy sufficient foodstuffs, pay rent and utilities, or even muster the money to arrange children's transportation to their (free) schooling - finds us at a new level of difficulty. NGOs - primarily with UNHCR funding - will expand cash assistance programs this year. The largest provider, CARE, currently distributes cash monthly to 1,600 families and hopes to expand soon to 2,500. Nonetheless, they are concerned that cash distribution will generate dependency and humiliation, when many Iraqis are able and willing to work. NGOs such as Save the Children see the "vulnerability curve" shifting, and worry whether this dwindling of resources will lead to increasing desperation. There is also concern that Jordanians, suffering themselves from significant inflation and unemployment, will grow ever more resentful of the Iraqi community and its benefits. ¶5. (SBU) Experience has shown that perception is reality amongst the Iraqi population in Jordan, and rumors can easily trump truth in this risk-averse community. Iraqis fear detention and deportation despite GOJ commitments to non-refoulement and the lack of any evidence of substantial deportations. Iraqis tell NGOs and UNHCR that they are still hesitant to access public social services - primarily education and health - for fear of coming to the attention of Jordanian authorities. This fear is so prevalent that NGOs continue to report that some Iraqis with whom they interact rarely leave their apartments (as infrequently as once per week). The most recent GOJ offer to waive overstay fines for departing Iraqis and halve fees for those who remain in Jordan (ref A) is seen by Iraqis as either a prelude to future deportation or an impossible financial hurdle to overcome. Even Iraqis who have the funds - only a small fraction - question the benefits extended to them by a three or six month residency regime, and ask, "what will happen to us in six months?" ¶6. (C) Some senior Jordanian leaders have repeatedly told the Ambassador that they are grappling for a workable solution to the question of status. Continued security concerns - as evidenced by the November 2005 bombing of three Amman hotels by Iraqi terrorists - figure prominently in this calculation. Jordanian officials are divided, but the upper hand is held by those who reject any step that may give Iraqis the kind of semi-permanent status here gained by Palestinians - thereby further diluting Jordanian society. Jordan's experience in dealing with waves of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967, who have yet to (and may never) return, has an immeasurable psychological impact that makes it hard to find solutions to this latest problem. The difficulties of hosting a large, increasingly impoverished refugee population are aggravated by pressures on Jordanian living standards as well, due to the inflationary environment and already high unemployment among Jordanians. ¶7. (C) During UNHCR High Commissioner Guterres' recent tour of the region, he outlined the continued needs of displaced Iraqis and called for additional support to UNHCR (ref B). The HC acknowledged the GOJ's hospitality and improved GOJ-UNHCR relations, and linked these promising developments to the international community's ability to commit substantial resources to the GOJ to help them shoulder the burden. Note: From 2006 to 2007, UNHCR's expanded its services in Jordan by a factor of 45, increasing from 1,500 to 70,000 beneficiaries. End note. The GOJ, for its part, understands the clear humanitarian implications of the current predicament, and its leadership is determined not to allow a humanitarian crisis on its soil. What we and the NGO community see, however, is not the prospect of a sudden flashpoint, but simply the slow-motion development of just such a crisis, but one largely invisible. ¶8. (C) We need to look for ways to combine creative thinking on the question of status, e.g., by offering models that, without suggesting that the Iraqi presence is permanent, provide a platform for work and improved livelihoods. Such suggestions should be accompanied by additional guarantees of financial assistance to help the GOJ justify to its people such a bold step. Some focus on preparing for the (eventual) return to Iraq of the refugees could also help the GOJ recognize the benefits of an enhanced residency/registration regime and overcome its reflexive aversion to the topic. A serious, visible effort by the Government of Iraq to plan for returns, whatever the timeline, would send an important signal that the population is not here indefinitely. It will also support the argument - which we believe the GOJ will find compelling - that Jordan will benefit from making registration easier, because it will allow the GOI and international agencies to find and communicate with Iraqis in Jordan to plan for their return. ¶9. (C) Post welcomes input from the Department on models that we could share with the GOJ to stimulate their thinking. The King's imminent visit to the United States offers an opportunity to encourage receptivity on the part of the GOJ to new ideas in this sphere, and to reiterate our commitment to providing Jordan with the resources it needs to meet the challenges ahead. HALE