ISLAMISTS RAMP UP ANTI-NORMALIZATION RHETORIC TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000347 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV KPAL KISL IS JO SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS RAMP UP ANTI-NORMALIZATION RHETORIC TO DISTRACT FROM INTERNAL CONFLICTS REF: A. AMMAN 189 ¶B. 07 AMMAN 4733 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: After losing two-thirds of its parliamentary representation in November's elections, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) is pulling out the stops to rebuild its base. In the past six weeks, the IAF has sought to capitalize on popular unhappiness with the situation in Gaza with a series of staged rallies, press releases, and diatribes in parliament around the theme of cutting Jordan's ties with Israel and denouncing the peace treaty between the two countries. This strategy serves to distance the party from its electorally unproductive stance in support of Hamas while cementing its anti-government credentials. It is also an attempt by different factions within the IAF to paper over the division and infighting that still rages within the party. The IAF is down, but it is not out. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Jordan's Islamic Action Front is licking its wounds after a drubbing in November's parliamentary elections. This period of introspection finds the party searching for a new political strategy (Ref A). Facing a divided party and alienation from its traditional Palestinian-origin supporters, the IAF's leadership is pursuing a classic strategy: changing the subject. Starting in December and continuing through January, the IAF leadership has rolled out a series of rallies, press releases, and diatribes in parliament designed to bring IAF supporters (and Palestinians in particular) back into the fold by addressing their common values and political beliefs. While the intonation and details may vary, the common theme of the IAF's revived rhetorical push is rejection of Jordan's peace treaty with Israel, with a dollop of anti-Americanism for good measure. These themes press well-worn emotional buttons, finding overwhelming support among the grass roots, and a significant measure of sympathy among average Jordanians of both East and West Bank origin. The IAF has also sought to capitalize on the visit of President Bush to the region and the recent escalation of tension in Gaza, both of which provide a more than adequate springboard for the IAF to pursue its contrarian approach. Go With What You Know -------------- ¶3. (SBU) During the campaign season, IAF Secretary General Zeki Bani-Irshaid was frequently absent from IAF press conferences and other public events. This fueled speculation by the press and the Amman rumor mill of splits within the party over doctrine and strategy - speculation which is borne out by the continuing intra-party sniping (ref B). Eager to paper over this very public feuding, the so-called "hawks" of the IAF (Bani-Irshaid) and "doves" of the MB (including Hamzah Mansur and the senior MB leadership) appeared together for the first time in months at a large post-Friday prayer rally on December 14 organized jointly by the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Speaking at the march, Bani-Irshaid brought up an old theme that the party faithful of all stripes could rally around: anti-normalization. With the doves at his side, Bani-Irshaid's primary message was that Jordan should cut off ties with Israel and expel the Israeli Ambassador from Amman. ¶4. (SBU) On January 16, the IAF staged a made-for-TV diatribe in parliament to highlight the party's anti-normalization stance. Speaking on behalf of the party's six member parliamentary bloc, MP Hamzah Mansur called on the government to "suspend all forms of dealings with the Zionist entity against the backdrop of its ongoing crimes against the Palestinian people" and recall the Jordanian Ambassador in Tel Aviv. In an added flourish, Mansur proposed that a memorandum be placed before the American Ambassador to protest President Bush's "confiscation of the Palestinian refugees' right to repatriation, his statements on Jerusalem, and readjustment of the 1949 armistice line." ¶5. (SBU) On January 20, the Muslim Brotherhood-linked newspaper Al-Sabil ran a story about the Higher Coordination Committee of the National Opposition Parties, a group dedicated to a common anti-normalization stance. The article highlighted IAF leadership of the bloc, and featured several statements by Bani-Irshaid castigating Jordan's small political parties for not taking a stronger position on the anti-normalization issue. "We need to consolidate action and agree on a bigger framework. I believe that the best way of thinking would be to move away from partisan coordination to a wider horizon of action," Bani-Irshaid said. ¶6. (SBU) On January 25, the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood AMMAN 00000347 002 OF 003 staged coordinated rallies in Amman, Zarqa, and Karak whose primary themes were anti-normalization and the situation in Gaza. Chanting "no Zionist embassy on Jordanian territory," more than 1,000 demonstrators marched on the Amman municipality building. Appearing on stage with Muslim Brotherhood dignitaries, Beni-Irshaid demanded in his speech to the crowd that "the government break off relations with the Zionist entity and cancel the Wadi Arabah treaty (which established the present state of relations between Jordan and Israel)." ¶7. (SBU) The IAF-sponsored rallies dovetail with separate (but likely coordinated) demonstrations by the Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Association of Professional Unions. A December 11 rally featured the head of the Anti-Normalization and Protection of the Homeland Committee. One day after the Al-Sabil article, the Association of Professional Unions organized a rally in Baqa'a, Jordan's largest Palestinian refugee camp, condemning the lack of international help for the Gaza Strip. Speaking to the demonstrators, Bar Association head Salih Al-Armuti called on the Arab League to sever its relations with Israel and for Arab countries to recall their ambassadors in response to Israel's actions in Gaza. During all of the subsequent events, union heads have appeared with IAF and Muslim Brotherhood leaders on stage. Broadening the Debate on Hamas -------------- ¶8. (C) While the general theme of the IAF's anti-normalization onslaught is solidarity with the Palestinian cause, there is also a subtle shift in the party's rhetoric on Hamas. IAF Secretary General Zeki Bani-Irshaid stated in the January 20 Al-Sabil article: "This issue is not about Hamas or Fatah. The problem lies in the imminent Zionist project and the institutions that work for it." This contrasts with the party's pre-election stance, which took more forceful stands on the specifics of internal Palestinian politics. Conventional wisdom among the media and Jordan's political elite is that this position alienated Palestinian voters and depressed turnout on election day (Ref B). ¶9. (C) The IAF now seems to be recasting its stance on the Palestinian issue by taking a broader, more general approach, focusing on the humanitarian plight of the people of Gaza and the West Bank rather than the political conflict between Hamas and Fatah. This is the common ground that Jordanians of Palestinian origin (and even many East Bankers) can easily agree upon, avoiding the complicated and divisive vagaries of politics on the other side of the river. Comment: Whether the IAF can continue this limited degree of rhetorical restraint is an open question given the triumphalist language lately being used by many regional commentators regarding Hamas following its breach of the Gaza-Egypt border. Ali Abu-Sukkar, one of the party's most visible hawks (he was one of the IAF parliamentarians brought up on sedition charges for visiting Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's funeral tent),crossed the line publicly this week when he praised "the real martyrs of Gaza," distinguishing them explicitly from the "hotel martyrs" who perished in the 2005 Al Qaeda-orchestrated bombings in Amman. The IAF's perceived tolerance for those bombings and the plotters (including Al-Zarqawi) cost them a great deal of credibility with the Jordanian public - a situation that gaffes like this only perpetuate. End comment. Separating Political and Humanitarian Support -------------- ¶10. (C) While the IAF may be seeking to play down its political stance and emphasize the humanitarian aspect in its public discussion of the Palestinian territories, it has taken the opposite stance where the Jordanian government is concerned. When talking about the Jordanian position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the IAF is now saying less about what Jordan can do on the humanitarian front, and more about what it should be doing on the political front. By taking a hard line on anti-normalization, the IAF is attempting to outflank the government politically. As the plight of Gaza residents worsens, the Jordanian government has made several public shows of support, mainly by treating wounded civilians in its hospitals. While tacitly acknowledging that the government is doing the right thing, the IAF points out that the situation demands a political response in addition to a humanitarian response. Comment: The Comeback Kids? -------------- ¶11. (C) The IAF is seeking to revive its political fortunes. Perhaps in recognition of the many causes of its defeat in November (Ref B),they are attempting to rally the faithful AMMAN 00000347 003 OF 003 around the issues they can all agree on. Most of these issues are expressed in negative terms; after all, the IAF base is anti-Israel, anti-US, and frequently anti-government, but the party has consistently been unable to articulate a vision of what it is for, beyond traditional slogans such as "Islam is the Answer". There seems to be a tacit realization within the party that a detailed stance on these issues is counter-productive, and that support for Hamas is not necessarily as productive politically as support for Palestinians in general. Focusing on the anti-normalization effort is nothing new for the IAF - it has long been part of the party's platform - but given the electoral loss and the intra-party politicking, anti-normalization is the one area on which all can agree. For now, the IAF remains on the sidelines of Jordanian politics, but it may well find traction in its anti-normalization focused efforts to redefine its political platform and rebuild its base. ¶12. (C) It would be inaccurate to view IAF rhetoric as part of a real political debate in Jordan on anti-normalization with Israel. While there is much public sympathy for the plight of Palestinians in Gaza and in the West Bank, particularly in light of recent Israeli military actions in Gaza, there is almost no meaningful discussion on cutting relations with Israel among reasonable Jordanians. Thus the anti-normalization rhetoric should be viewed in the part of the campaign rhetoric for the upcoming internal MB Shura Council elections to take place in February and March, and as part of the IAF's attempt to revitalize its ranks by scoring easy political points by calling for impossible policy prescriptions. HALE