KING'S DECENTRALIZATION PLAN HAS MANY CRITICS, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003353 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV ECON KDEM KPAL JO SUBJECT: KING'S DECENTRALIZATION PLAN HAS MANY CRITICS, BUT COULD ADVANCE ELECTORAL REFORM REF: A. AMMAN 3002 ¶B. AMMAN 2672 ¶C. AMMAN 2383 AMMAN 00003353 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The King is pushing the Jordanian government to revive an ambitious decentralization plan. While the plan's stated goal is to respond more effectively to local concerns, the King may also be pushing the plan for some of its political side-effects, including changes in Jordan's electoral law. New regional boundaries would likely require changes in electoral procedures and districting. Critics of the plan are plentiful, arguing that decentralization will empower Palestinian-origin Jordanians at the expense of East Bankers. Others point out that the plan actually runs counter to the goal of a smaller, more efficient Jordanian government. The political impact of decentralization threatens the power base of the tribal establishment, and as such it is likely to sink to the bottom of the government's agenda despite royal backing. End Summary. A (Not So) Simple Plan -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During his annual speech from the throne on October 5, the King urged the government to reconsider a four-year-old draft law which would create new regional authorities to devolve responsibility for government services to the local level. Decentralization is largely a foreign concept in Jordan, which has a long tradition of strong central authority. Currently, local authorities have few statutory powers -- provincial governors are Interior Ministry appointees with almost no reach beyond the security arena, and elected local governments (a recent phenomenon) depend largely on the Ministry of Municipal Affairs (Ref B). In 2004, an Interior Ministry commission led a year-long effort to draft a decentralization law, which was discussed in the cabinet but never introduced in parliament. That draft now serves as the starting point for governmental work and societal debate on how to fulfill the King's request. Elements of the plan have been floated in the media recently, but key parts of it are still ambiguous. ¶3. (SBU) The decentralization plan envisions three new regional authorities, each composed of four governorates in the north, central, and southern parts of Jordan. The �A;general commissioners of these new regional authorities would be appointed by the Prime Minister and have minister-level status in the government. The regional commissioners would be given broad powers to control a mini-executive branch within their region, guiding education, HEALTH care, and other services in coordination with the national ministries. They would control the operations of government hospitals, grant business licenses, implement agricultural laws, approve or deny requests for public meetings, issue traffic regulations, and grant tenders for public works projects. The general commissioners would work with a regional council composed of ten elected and four members appointed by the Prime Minister, at least ONE of which would be a woman. Note: An organizational chart of how USAID believes the decentralization plan would function is available on Intellipedia-S, under "Jordanian Decentralization Plan (2008)". End Note. ¶4. (C) Several parts of the plan remain vague. The power of the regional councils and their working relationship with the regional commissioners is unclear. While the decentralization plan would further reduce the status of governors (who currently deal mainly with regional law enforcement issues) by bringing them under the authority of the regional commissioners, it remains uncertain whether governors would be appointed by the regional commissioners under the new plan or remain as appointees of the Interior Ministry. ONE controversial proposal would allow regional commissioners to issue identity documents, including passports. Another unresolved issue is the status of Amman. Contacts who were on the commission say that there was significant debate about whether the capital should have its own district (with the risk that it would be controlled by its overwhelmingly Palestinian-origin population) or be included in the central region, in which it would be balanced by neighboring districts replete with East Bankers. A proposal currently being floated in the media is to create the northern and southern regions first, and then assess their functionality before deciding whether to include Amman in the central district. Potential Impacts AMMAN 00003353 002.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The plan will require significant amendments to existing legislation. For the most part, these amendments would simply transfer authority over administrative decisions from the MOI to the regional commissioners. Changes in budgetary authority, on the other hand, will require more fundamental changes. The draft envisions a system of independent budgets for the regional authorities, funded by tax revenues and fees which are currently collected by the central government. ¶6. (SBU) Decentralization may call into question the status of recent programs and reforms designed to promote economic growth. Giving regions the authority to grant business licenses could undermine efforts by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Jordan Investment Board to streamline and better regulate Jordan's business and investment climates. Devolving power to regional authorities may also require revisiting the special status of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone and other industrial estates, which currently exercise some of the revenue and governance authority that regional authorities would take on (Ref C). It is currently unclear how these quasi-independent bodies would be incorporated into the plan. The cause of public sector reform, a long standing project of the GOJ and international financial institutions, could also take a hit as the regional authorities add additional staff to the rolls of government employees. ¶7. (C) Perhaps the most significant alteration required by the draft decentralization plan would be changes in Jordan's electoral law to allow for the election of regional council members. The current plan calls would use the existing electoral law to elect regional councils. Yet under the proposed decentralization, existing electoral districts (especially those for Bedouin areas) would be split between two regions, making that aspect of the plan unworkable. The possibility of a parallel system for regional elections has pro-establishment politicians concerned that the broader framework of the electoral law would also be declared open for change, which they oppose. Tribal contacts are concerned that decentralization allow back-door attempts to do away with the current electoral system which empowers East Bankers at the expense of urban Palestinians. Lower house speaker Abdulhadi Al-Majali warned in recent weeks that the decentralization law could open the door to electoral reform measures that he opposes (Ref A). Reaction Largely Unfavorable Among East Bank Establishment -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) Reaction to the proposed decentralization plan in both media and political circles has been largely unfavorable, with critics developing conspiracy theories in an effort to torpedo the proposal. Some critics allege that decentralization is the first salvo in a bid to dismantle tribal structure of the Jordanian state. Al-Arab Al-Yawm columnist Fahd Al-Kitan wrote that "anyone who reads the proposed draft will really be terrified, because it undermines the foundations of the Jordanian state and jeopardizes the country's future and unity." This sentiment hints at a conspiracy theory circulating around Amman that a fourth region -- the West Bank -- will be added sometime in the future, realizing the ultimate fear of the "Jordan is Palestine" option. ¶9. (C) The most vocal critic of the plan is the person who has the most to lose from decentralization -- Interior Minister Eid Al-Fayez. According to media reports, Fayez and his staff are drawing up an alternative plan which would empower existing governors with the powers currently designated for regional authorities. This, it is argued, would bring all of the benefits of decentralization without the added costs and complicated bureaucracy associated with new regional authorities. Perhaps more important from Fayez's perspective, however, is that his alternative plan would keep power in the hands of governors that he appoints directly, even expanding their purview into the territory of other ministries. Salt Governor Sameh Al-Majali echoed this party line, telling poloff that the proposed decentralization plan is "impractical" and would merely compound the frustration average Jordanians feel with inefficient delivery of services. ¶10. (C) Former Interior Minister Samir Habashneh, a primary author of the 2004 draft law, still supports the concept of devolving power away from Amman but thinks that the practicalities of regional authorities are unworkable. Beyond the argument that the plan would create new layers of bureaucracy, Habashneh is concerned that new regional authorities will lead to the emergence of new regional AMMAN 00003353 003.2 OF 003 identities within Jordan, pitting East Banker tribes against one another for government services. MP and former Amman Mayor Mamdouh Al-Abbadi, who worked on the 2004 version of the law with Habashneh, asserted that the Dahabi government is dragging its feet in the hopes that the King will lose interest and the plan will "die slowly" as it did before. "They're against it, but they can't come out and say they're against it, because the King wants it," Abbadi said. ¶11. (C) In contrast to the majority of our contacts, Irbid MP Asor Al-Shorman reacted favorably to the current decentralization plan. He criticized the alternative MOI plan, arguing that the fundamental goal of decentralization was to improve the quality of government services -- something governors would be ill-equipped to deliver, given their historical inability to exercise real authority within the provinces beyond the security arena. Shorman further argued that the smaller governorates would lose influence under the MOI plan, as resources would naturally flow to areas with larger populations and political clout. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) While the primary goal of decentralization is to increase the quality of government services, it also has the potential to spark positive reforms in Jordan's political system. Devolving power away from the central government (and the Ministry of Interior in particular) would go a long way towards diluting the power of security-oriented supporters of the status quo within Jordan's government by reducing the size and powers of the bureaucracy they command. Resulting changes in the electoral law could prove to be an opportunity to lobby for wider changes in the structure and mechanics of the current flawed system. Members of parliament could even be freed from their all-consuming passion for delivering services to their constituents. Still, it is unclear whether or not the King is reviving the concept of decentralization as a back door for the implementation of reform or merely as a way to promote efficiency and good governance. ¶13. (C) The plan is not without its flaws. The draft law as written would significantly expand the already bloated public sector and create blurred lines of authority in many areas which may work against the goal of responsive government. The plan also ignores the lack of competent mid-level managers to take on new administrative responsibilities outside of the capital. Contacts are worried that funding regional authorities through local tax collection will only reinforce or exacerbate existing economic inequalities. While MOI's alternative plan is self-serving, it has the advantage of simplifying the organizational chart and offers significant cost savings over the commission's law. As in so many questions of public policy in Jordan, the debate over decentralization will likely come down to the ability of reform-minded elements in the royal court and certain ministries to overcome the bureaucratic and persuasive power of security-oriented conservatives. Media fear-mongering and conspiracy theories already circulating about the plan are indicators that conservatives are willing to pull out all of the stops to halt the plan's progress. Beecroft