GOJ LEADERS TALK AID, REFORM, PALESTINIANS, LEVANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003189 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG KPAL SY IS LE AE MO JO SUBJECT: GOJ LEADERS TALK AID, REFORM, PALESTINIANS, LEVANT WITH DAS HALE REF: A. AMMAN 3167 ¶B. AMMAN 3122 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) Summary: NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Hale, who was in Amman to participate in the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue (Ref A),spent November 18 in separate meetings with King Abdullah, Royal Court Chief Nasser Al-Lozi, Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir, Senate President Zeid Al-Rifai, and Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Suhair Al-Ali. Hale urged his interlocutors to develop a needs assessment for Iraqi refugees in preparation to justify continued U.S. aid on that issue. He said the present Administration will be handing its successor an intact Palestinian-Israeli peace process. End Summary. U.S. Aid to Jordan; Fallout from Global Economic Crisis -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Bashir and Ali asked whether the global economic and financial crisis, coupled with transition to a new U.S. Administration, would lead to a decrease in aid to Jordan. Bashir noted that the recent G-20 meeting had affirmed the importance of maintaining aid levels. Ali said the GOJ is "confident our partners will continue to step up to the plate, but the media is skeptical." Hale told both that Jordan in general remains in good standing but that it should keep a couple of issues in mind as it seeks to maintain strong support among American lawmakers: first, Washington wants to see more data showing that U.S. assistance for Iraqi issues has been well spent, and second, that Jordan continues to improve its human rights record. The King has been saying the right things on human rights but concrete steps have not always followed, for example in the areas of trafficking in persons. ¶3. (C) Hale urged the GOJ to make it easier for Iraqis in Jordan to earn their own income. While expressing understanding for Jordan's experience with Palestinian refugees and attendant wariness of absorbing many more refugees, he questioned why it should be so difficult to make sure Iraqis had a right to work. He suggested that offering Iraqis a protected status might make them more comfortable registering their children in school and using the health care system. ¶4. (C) Hale encouraged Jordan to develop a strategy to protect economic gains through the current global crisis, to define Jordan's goals and expectations for the next 2-5 years, and to explain how Jordan is coping with economic developments. Ali said that no formal study has been completed, but Jordan expected to take a hit on remittances from Jordanians abroad and foreign direct investment, and imports would likely drop. The Minister expressed strong interest in holding an economic dialogue with the U.S., similar to the November 17 political session, as soon as possible and before the end of the year. She predicted Jordan would be better able to quantify the projected impact of the economic crisis at the first session of the economic dialogue and asked what else the U.S. might be interested in hearing about. Ali estimated that Jordan's real growth would decline from about 6 percent to 4-4.5 percent in the first half of 2009, chronic unemployment challenges would continue, and there would be noteworthy decline in tax revenue. She assessed that improved relations with Qatar (Ref B) would mean Jordanian workers would be more likely to remain there, adding that Jordanians were facing layoffs throughout the other Gulf States where they tended to occupy middle and upper management positions. ¶5. (C) Ali urged the USAID mission to be more flexible, saying she senses micromanagement out of Washington. People on the ground know best, she argued, adding that Jordanians working on the ground know what the priorities are. Having specific sectoral allocations mandated from Washington were in neither the U.S. nor Jordan's interest. Governance and Reform -------------- ¶6. (C) Upper House President Rifai noted that MPs elected in November 2007 are more qualified than the last batch, but that the continued absence of real, organized political parties means candidates run and lose as independents and often are not around long enough to develop parliamentary professionalism. He saw PM Nader Dahabi doing a good job and cited greater harmony between the Palace and the Government. He praised the selection of Nasser Lozi to head the Royal Court given his capacity to maintain good relations with everyone and his non-confrontational nature. ¶7. (C) Speaking of the controversial Law on Associations, Rifai anticipated some minor adjustments, but overall he was dismissive of demands from the NGO sector in Jordan for greater freedom for associations. "I see no reason for it," he said of further amendments, arguing that Jordanian NGOs need to understand that "democracy without controls becomes chaos. It doesn't mean that every person does what he wants to do." "Pressure groups," he continued, are complaining about problems that are not real. If a journalist breaks a law, he must be tried, Rifai argued, noting that "people want journalists to have total immunity - that's not the way it works." That said, he allowed that a reporter should not be put on trial just "because he has expressed an opinion." Syria, Lebanon, Iran -------------- ¶8. (C) Rifai observed that even as things seemed to be settling down in Lebanon, in reality nothing fundamental had changed: Hizballah held the winning cards, and Syria was not giving up on its efforts to influence the course of politics. His main concern was the coming election where Hizballah would likely boost its strength. Some of this might come from increased power of Christian groups allied with the Shia party, particularly as Michel Aoun was gaining strong support among a divided Maronite community. Foreign Minister Bashir described the spring elections in Lebanon as "when we will know who won last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords. ¶9. (C) On Syria, Rifai said Bashar Al-Asad's regime was behaving more tactically than strategically, mainly because the Syrians "think they are winning." Bashar was just waiting for the end of the Bush Administration. Former Syrian VP (and leader of the expatriate opposition National Salvation Front) Abdel Halim Khaddam had told Rifai that the only thing that Bashar had inherited from his father, Hafez, was the acceptance that political assassination was an appropriate way to rid oneself of rivals. (Note: Rifai speculated that Hizballah operations chief Imad Mughniyah and Syrian Presidential security aide Brigadier General Muhammad Sulayman had been targeted by the regime in an effort to dispatch anyone with links to former Lebanese President Rafiq Al-Hariri's death. "If the court convenes, there won't be anyone left to testify," he concluded. End Note.) ¶10. (C) Rifai said he thought dialogue with Iran was good, but ultimately fruitless, arguing that if the U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon, military force was the only option. "Bomb Iran, or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives won't matter," he offered. And while Rifai judged a military strike would have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks. Peace Process, Palestinian Politics -------------- ¶11. (C) FM Bashir said that the November 26 Arab Foreign Ministers meet in Cairo would focus beyond the subject of Palestinian reconciliation and would express a consensus view that no Palestinian elections should be held unless they are simultaneously for President and the Legislature. The Arabs intend to use their meeting to back Mahmoud Abbas. Bashir added that he has discussed with at least two of his peers, Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed and Moroccan FM El-Tayeb Fassi-Fihri, the possibility of the three of them visiting Abbas in Ramallah as a further show of support after the November 26 meeting. (Note: Bashir said he might also meet Israeli Kadima Party leader and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni at that time. He said she had told him that she would be cautious during the election campaign about saying "good things" about the peace process. Bashir was concerned that she would be unable to form a government, even if her party won the most seats. End Note.) On Mughrabi Gate, Bashir said he had escalated the matter recently by raising Jordan's concerns directly with Livni. He said Jordan is not becoming radicalized, but urged Israel not to "push us" and said what Israel was doing to Jordan was "not right." ¶12. (C) Rifai describe Abbas as "very down and frustrated" and continuing to hint that if things continued as they were, he would quit. Abbas described himself as a failure because he could not stop settlements, the separation wall, extension of Israeli control over the territory. Neither had he secured a significant release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli custody. Rifai speculated that Israel would prefer that Hamas take over the West Bank, obviating the need to deal meaningfully with a moderate leadership. He called for greater pressure on Israel to give Abbas something to show his people. It is no longer enough to just have a peace process. There must be tangible results on the ground. DAS Hale, pointed out that the Palestinian forces trained in Jordan had impressed the Israeli security establishment and that Palestinian PM Salam Fayyad was more upbeat on economic conditions than previously. ¶13. (C) Regarding Abbas's control of Fatah, Rifai cited an urgent need to reorganize the party's leadership. If there is to be a gathering of the Fatah Sixth Party Congress, it must be held in the West Bank, allowing Abbas to better control the proceedings, Rifai asserted. Holding the conference "inside" - rather than in Amman or Cairo, for instance - would keep attendance at more manageable levels and keep out disruptive elements like Tunis-based PLO "Foreign Minister" and Fatah Central Committee bigwig Farouq Qaddumi. ¶14. (C) King Abdullah, who had just ended a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, reiterated his readiness to support efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace as well as help the Lebanese Armed Forces and moderate, anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Beecroft