U.S.-JORDAN POLITICAL DIALOGUE FOCUSES ON REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003167 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV KDEM JO SUBJECT: U.S.-JORDAN POLITICAL DIALOGUE FOCUSES ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND DOMESTIC REFORM REF: A. AMMAN 3116 ¶B. AMMAN 2740 (NOTAL) ¶C. AMMAN 391 Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Jordanian Foreign Ministry hosted senior department officials and Embassy Amman for the kick-off of a strategic policy dialogue on November 17. The dialogue is an offshoot of the assistance Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in September with the GOJ, outlining further cooperation in a variety of areas, including a strategic discussion on democratic reform. The Jordanian FM outlined significant regional and domestic challenges to future reform but also noted significant progress on the blueprint provided by the 2006 National Agenda. The FM emphasized the need to keep reform efforts "homegrown," yet welcomed the dialogue initiative and took the lead in discussing next steps. The group agreed the next session of the dialogue should take place in May 2009, with a separate economic dialogue possibly taking place in Washington before the end of the year. A detailed read-out of the POLITICAL dialogue session will follow septel. End Summary. Background -------------- ¶2. (C) The Secretary and FM Bashir signed an MOU on assistance on September 22 in New York. The agreement laid out a five year non-binding commitment of economic support funds ($360 million) and foreign military funds ($300 million). In turn, a side letter spelled out the joint intent to expand cooperation in the POLITICAL and economic arenas. A side letter to the agreement draws on the 2006 Jordanian "National Agenda" reform plan, identifying areas of mutual cooperation to be discussed in separate economic and political bilateral dialogues (Ref A). ¶3. (C) The November 17 meeting represented the POLITICAL side of the dialogue process. S/P Director Dr. David Gordon, DRL A/S David Kramer, NEA DAS David Hale, and Ambassador Beecroft engaged with Foreign Minister Dr. Salaheddin Al-Bashir and senior MFA staff at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry and the minister's residence. Challenges -------------- ¶4. (C) FM Bashir laid out the regional challenges Jordan faces and linked them to domestic politics within the kingdom. Chief among those concerns is the Middle East peace process, which would ostensibly affect the future of Jordan's large Palestinian population (Ref C). Bashir asserted that the peace process must remain on track, cautioning that progress achieved so far had not yet resulted in a written draft agreement. Regionally, the FM noted concerns of growing Iranian and Islamist influence in the region, especially in Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement would go far to undercut the influence of Iran and Islamists, who use the Palestinian issue to win supporters, Bashir asserted. Strengthening the POLITICAL capital of moderate Arab states like Jordan will remain central to containing the influence of radical regimes in the region and tamping down domestic extremists, Bashir maintained. ¶5. (C) The FM frequently brought up the demographic challenges Jordan is facing, pointing out the concomitant lack of physical and human resources to provide for a growing population. While Jordan has been relatively sheltered from the global financial crisis, high levels of growth needed just to maintain the status quo may be unattainable in the current fiscal environment. When Jordan is forced to focus on economic issues, reform of the POLITICAL system becomes a luxury. Homegrown Reform and the National Agenda -------------- ¶6. (C) The FM outlined areas of significant domestic reform, while hinting several times at the POLITICAL cost of backing such change. Describing himself as the "last Minister standing" who participated in the development of the National Agenda, the FM asserted that progress as a result of the agenda includes anti-corruption measures, improvement on women's rights, a renewed focus on trafficking in persons, and labor reform. In a wide-ranging conversation by Bashir and other MFA officials, they portrayed these reforms as first steps but said the road ahead is full of thorny issues, for example electoral and public sector reform and honor AMMAN 00003167 002 OF 002 killings. ¶7. (C) Bashir and his colleagues repeatedly underscored the importance of keeping reform efforts "homegrown," thereby avoiding the impression that reform is being imposed from outside. The FM agreed that the GOJ needs to secure buy-in for reform efforts beyond westernized elites, adding that cultural issues must be addressed in tandem with POLITICAL reform initiatives. Emphasizing that true reform will only come with changes in Jordan's culture of entitlements and political patronage, Bashir posited that public sector reform will ultimately provide for the space necessary for true progress on the POLITICAL scene. He emphasized that such reforms cannot and should not happen overnight; they must be eased into the public mind and the government's budget. Next Steps -------------- ¶8. (C) Interlocutors on both sides agreed that the POLITICAL dialogue should continue, with meetings every six months at locations to be determined. (Note: In discussing the economic dialogue, the U.S. team advocated for sessions that would alternate between Jordan and Washington, given the benefits of Jordanians meeting with technical experts at other Washington-based institutions such as the IMF. End note.) Both sides agreed that there were no conditionalities attached to the POLITICAL dialogue. Saying that the relationship needed to "break out of the offensive/defensive dialectic," the FM suggested the two sides remain in regular contact. The next session would focus more tightly on reform areas identified in the MOU side letter such as women's rights, religious freedom, and governance reform. U.S. interlocutors suggested that it would be useful at the next session to include participants from other ministries involved in implementing reforms, such as the Interior Ministry. There was also discussion, but no agreement, about a role for civil society. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The first meeting of the dialogue was a chance for the two sides to test the waters. As the day progressed, formality and cautiousness gave way to a back and forth that started to touch on the specifics of reform in Jordan. By taking the issues of assistance and conditionality off the table, the FM and his colleagues were able to talk about some constraints to reform in Jordan's conservative top-down culture. During the next session, it will be important to prioritize the domestic issues where we would like to see movement and be prepared with the benefits of such efforts while being realistic as to the costs. Eventually, it will also be necessary to expand the process so it is not dependent on a single minister and ministry. ¶10. (U) A/S Kramer, S/P Director Gordon, and DAS Hale have not cleared this cable. A detailed version will be sent septel. Beecroft