FM BASHIR AND A/S HOOK DISCUSS HAMAS TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003080 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2018 TAGS: PREL KISL KWBG IS JO SUBJECT: FM BASHIR AND A/S HOOK DISCUSS HAMAS TALKS, MUGHRABI GATE, LEBANON REF: AMMAN 2965 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Jordanian Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir and IO A/S Brian Hook discussed Jordanian talks with Hamas, the Mughrabi Gate issue, and other regional developments during a lunch on November 1. Addressing recent interactions with Hamas, Bashir maintained that Jordanian policy had not changed despite appearances to the contrary. On Mughrabi Gate, the FM voiced continuing concern over unilateral actions and lack of communication by ISRAEL on proposed work at the gate and pointed out that if Jordan proves unable to deal with the issue, extremist groups will likely step in to fill the void, delegitimizing the Hashemite monarchy. The FM was vague about Jordan's path in upcoming UNGA votes on Iran. End Summary. Hamas Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) Bashir complained that unilateral moves by ISRAEL were "chipping away" at the credibility of moderate forces in the Arab world. He cited the Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza and recent prisoner transfers as moves which delivered public victories to Iran's proxies in the region while undermining the ability of states like Jordan to manage events. Bashir voiced further concern that negotiations for the release of Gilad Shalit would fit this same pattern. ¶3. (C) Both the FM and Royal Court Foreign Policy Chief Jafar Hassan asserted that Jordanian policy towards Hamas remained the same on a "political level" and that the limited security talks were made public to demonstrate that Jordan was not pursuing a separate peace with Hamas behind closed doors. Hassan added that most other states in the region had been talking to Hamas for some time - Jordan was an "anomaly," and was now playing catch up. In a later aside, Hassan wondered aloud if the US stance on Hamas would change in the next administration, commenting that US policy on isolating Hamas "could unravel in January." ¶4. (C) When asked by Hook what Bashir thought of the theory that violent groups over time may become more moderate once ensconced in democratic political systems, Bashir expressed his belief that there was an "inherent problem with democratic governance among Islamist parties," especially those that subscribe to current political trends within the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Hassan opined that Hamas was never designed to compete in a democratic environment but rather seeks to control the entirety of Palestinian political life. Mughrabi Gate -------------- ¶5. (C) On Israel's plans to construct a new ascent to the Mughrabi Gate entrance to the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount (Reftels),Bashir outlined Jordan's historic role and ongoing interests in the Jerusalem holy sites. The FM noted that Jordan has maintained responsibility for administration of the Islamic foundations (Awqaf) which oversee the sites since the 1920s. He also asserted that Jordan's special role was enshrined in the Washington Declaration and the 1994 Wadi Arabah peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. (Note: The FM also argued that the US is a "guarantor" of those agreements. End Note.) Bashir painted the Mughrabi Gate issue as one that strikes at the heart of Hashemite legitimacy. Given Jordan's historical responsibilities and King Abdullah's status as a descendant of the prophet Mohammed, he is seen by the Muslim world as the protector of its interests in Jerusalem. If the King proves unable to defend those interests, the FM warned that Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda will claim that they are the only ones with the will and the power to resist Israeli actions. "If Jordan doesn't address this issue, others will," he said. ¶6. (C) Bashir outlined a series of unilateral Israeli moves surrounding the status of infrastructure upgrades, and voiced concern over the lack of bilateral communication on the issue despite numerous requests from the Jordanian side. In Jordan's view, the current Israeli plan would increase the "Jewish nature" of the area by expanding the western wall, increase the potential for undermining structural integrity through increased tunneling, and allow Israeli heavy machinery (perhaps including military vehicles) to access the site. Bashir cited the perception that "right wing Jews" were visiting the Al-Aqsa area in increasing numbers as a related development of concern. ¶7. (C) Hook explained that he had recently visited the site to ensure the best possible understanding of the issue. He AMMAN 00003080 002 OF 002 promised to continue working with all sides, including UNESCO and his counterparts in the Israeli MFA, providing updates when available. Bashir indicated that the King would likely raise the issue with the Secretary during her upcoming visit to Jordan. Iran Vote -------------- ¶8. (C) Hook pressed the FM on the upcoming UNGA no action motion on Iran. He urged Jordan to oppose the "no-action" motion in the third committee and abstain on the resolution. If Jordan was unable to do so, Hook counseled that Jordan absent itself from the proceedings as it had done last year. The FM refused to give a definitive answer on whether Jordan would either absent itself, abstain, or oppose the motion in committee this year. ¶9. (U) A/S Hook cleared this cable. Beecroft