Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08AMMAN1856
2008-06-23 05:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

CHECKS AND BALANCES IN JORDAN, PART 1 - THE

Tags:  PGOV KDEM JO 
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VZCZCXRO0668
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #1856/01 1750558
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 230558Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2919
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 001856 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM JO
SUBJECT: CHECKS AND BALANCES IN JORDAN, PART 1 - THE
LEGISLATIVE SAUSAGE FACTORY

REF: A. AMMAN 580

B. AMMAN 1533

AMMAN 00001856 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador David Hale
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 001856 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV KDEM JO SUBJECT: CHECKS AND BALANCES IN JORDAN, PART 1 - THE LEGISLATIVE SAUSAGE FACTORY REF: A. AMMAN 580 ¶B. AMMAN 1533 AMMAN 00001856 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) This cable is part one of a series which will examine the peculiar system of internal checks and balances that serves as an accountability mechanism for Jordan's government. The first part looks at the Legislative Bureau, where all of Jordan's laws and regulations are written. The second cable will examine the impact of provisional laws. Part three will focus on the powers and position of parliament. ¶2. (C) Summary: Jordan's parliament does not have the power to create legislation. The Legislative Bureau, part of the Prime Ministry, is responsible for creating all of Jordan's laws and regulations. The Legislative Bureau's internal procedures incorporate a wide variety of voices, including those of the general public, into the formation of laws. Even so, in the end only the government has the ability to change the law at every step in the procedure. Members of parliament are excluded from the process of writing laws altogether, on the assumption that they have the power to amend any statutes that are introduced in the legislature. In the absence of a Constitutional Court, the Legislative Bureau has taken upon itself the task of reconciling Jordan's laws with judicial precedents and existing statutes. End Summary. The Powers That Aren't -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Jordanian members of parliament do not have the power to write legislation. According to Article Ninety-Five of Jordan's constitution, ten members of the lower or upper house can propose the idea for a law. If the majority of both houses agree, the idea is then submitted to the government for drafting. While the constitution does not go into detail about which part of the government will then coordinate the drafting of laws, in practice that authority has always been vested in the Legislative Bureau of the Prime Ministry. The bureau is responsible for overseeing the creation of all of Jordan's laws, as well as all of the regulations that implement those laws. The staff of the Legislative Bureau writes many, but not all, laws and regulations on their own. The relevant government body - whether a ministry, its subordinate agency, or an independent gove
rnment agency - also drafts laws and regulations that must pass through the legal scrutiny of the Legislative Bureau before being passed on to the Cabinet for approval, and in the case of laws, then to the parliament. Note: Regulations only need Cabinet approval. End Note. This makes it a powerful office - one that writes the rules of the game for all areas of public life in Jordan. I'm Just A Bill Here On Capitol Hill -------------- ¶4. (SBU) During a call on Mohammed Al-Alawneh, the director of the Legislative Bureau, POLOFF was given an extensive description of how laws are drafted, along with the internal controls that are intertwined in the process. The Legislative Bureau officially begins its work upon receiving instructions from the Prime Minister to start drafting a law. Depending on the subject and the requester of the law (the parliament, the government, the King),the bureau will receive either detailed instructions on the character of the product or virtually no guidance. Regardless of the level of specifics, the Prime Ministry will always attach a justification for the law and the purpose it is intended to serve. ¶5. (SBU) Staff of the bureau then consult with the various ministries and departments of the government, gathering basic information about their expectations of the law and how it will impact their work. After sorting through this first round of feedback, the staff construct a first draft of the law. They then reconvene their contacts in the ministries in a plenary session which they refer to as the "first reading." The legal departments of the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Parliamentary Affairs are invited to the first reading of every law, regardless of its relevance to their operations. This first reading is a critical stage in the law's formation. It is the primary forum for interagency disputes to be resolved, and it is a chance for lower-level functionaries to shape the structures that they will be later asked to put into force. ¶6. (SBU) Once the law comes out of the first reading, it is sent to the legislative bureau's legal staff. The lawyers AMMAN 00001856 002.2 OF 003 pore over the minute details of the statute, and review case law in order to spot any potential conflicts with existing laws or judicial precedents. They do this with the help of a database, which helps to pinpoint any potential conflicts of law. This major undertaking requires the keen eyes of the Legislative Bureau's staff, which is known for its competence and broad knowledge of Jordan's legal framework. The law then proceeds up the chain of command to the head of the Legislative Bureau. He reviews it with an eye for content (i.e., is this the law that was originally envisioned?) and potential legal challenges. As a former judge, Chief of the High Court of Justice, and Minister of Justice with over forty-five years of judicial experience, Alawneh has an encyclopedic knowledge of the law and is therefore well placed to make such decisions. ¶7. (SBU) Once the law passes through Alawneh's office, it is posted as a draft statute on the legislative bureau's website (http://www.lob.gov.jo/). There is an electronic form on the site where the public can submit comments and suggestions. Note: While the website is a potentially useful tool which is utilized by the public, it is not always up-to-date and is not broadly publicized (Ref B). End Note. Once the comment period is over, the staff of the bureau sift through the comments and follow up on the ones that point to potential problems or areas of concern. If a substantive change is made in the draft law as a result of a comment, the bureau will often send a thank you letter to the person who submitted the suggestion. ¶8. (SBU) Once all of the relevant public comments are incorporated into the law, the working-level committee which originally created and reviewed the law reconvenes for a second reading. The second reading is another chance to hash out any interagency conflicts that may still remain, and to discuss any amendments that came out of Alawneh's review or the public comment period. Lower level functionaries are often joined during the second reading by more senior lawyers and officials. Seeing a more polished version of the draft law allows them to brief the senior leadership in their ministries about the content of the law and any remaining interagency developments. ¶9. (SBU) After receiving another pro-forma ratification from the head of the legislative bureau, the law then proceeds to the cabinet for a third reading. The cabinet irons out any remaining issues, and discusses the strategy for selling the law in parliament and the court of public opinion. They decide when the law should be introduced, and prioritize it on the collective agenda of the government. It is then submitted to parliament for approval. Executive Privilege -------------- ¶10. (C) Throughout the process of drafting laws which the legislative bureau supervises, suggestions and commentary can only be provided by non-executive branch personnel during the public comment period. Alawneh bristled at the idea of lobbying by outside groups, and categorically ruled out what he termed as "interference" in the drafting process by members of parliament - even if they came up with the idea of the law in the first place. In his eyes, everyone has a chance to influence the character and content of Jordan's laws, but they must wait their turn to do so. Alawneh believes that by restricting the ability of outsiders to influence different stages in the legislative process, the system prevents influence-peddling and helps to ensure an internally consistent set of laws. ¶11. (C) Since Jordan has no Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice has effectively rejected that role, the Legislative Bureau has essentially taken on the function of constitutional review itself (Ref A). Much of the time and effort that goes into drafting legislation comes in the process of reviewing laws for potential conflicts with the constitution. Alawneh believes (perhaps naively) that no Jordanian government would purposely submit an unconstitutional statute or one whose constitutionality could be questioned to the parliament for consideration. He posits that the bureau's vetting process is comprehensive enough to weed out any unconstitutional provisions, and notes that the parliamentary process is yet another chance for objectionable material to be cut out or amended. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The process for drafting laws in Jordan is opaque to outsiders, but it is not altogether unaccountable. Parliament can reject draft laws. A stumbling block for AMMAN 00001856 003.2 OF 003 improving Jordan's democratic credentials is the extent to which the Executive Branch controls the rules of the game. It is true that the Executive maintains tight control over every step of the process, yet there are places and times for input from a variety of actors in the process of drafting laws, and their suggestions are certainly taken into account. Nobody in Jordan is currently advocating for a parliament which drafts its own laws - even members of parliament themselves recognize that lack of capacity and public trust would doom such an effort. Nor is there a hunger for expanded lobbying or public input into the legislative process - most Jordanians and civil society organizations do not even take advantage of the current mechanisms that are available to them. Jordanians are likely to stick with what they currently have - a system that satisfies a limited demand for accountability. However, if Jordanian leaders are going to deliver meaningful political reforms, giving the elected branch of government the power and capacity to draft legislation will be essential. Visit Embassy Amman's Classified Website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Hale

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