JORDANIAN ELITES WELCOME PRESIDENT,S ENGAGEMENT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000149 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2018 TAGS: PREL KWBG JO IS SUBJECT: JORDANIAN ELITES WELCOME PRESIDENT,S ENGAGEMENT ON PALESTINE, BUT DOUBTS LINGER ON U.S. RESOLVE REF: A. AMMAN 00076 ¶B. 07 AMMAN 04764 ¶C. 07 AMMAN 04663 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: In the wake of President Bush's visit to Israel and the West Bank, Jordanian officials and observers have voiced what ranges between cautious optimism and tempered pessimism that the revitalized peace process will bear fruit this year. Officialdom has voiced the greatest hope. Doubts remain about U.S. energy levels to push for peace in the Administration's last year - especially given what many cited as Israel's apparent disinterest in sealing a deal - but our interlocutors all said the visit helped keep hope alive. Most also stressed that positive statements and symbolic acts are no substitute for tangible improvements on the ground, and that time is running out - a common theme of recent weeks (reftels). Signs of diplomatic progress in Jordan have, as is almost always the case, renewed debate on Jordan's own equities in the peace process, particularly the future of the 1.8 million Palestinian refugees here (septel) and Jordan's "special role" with the Jerusalem Muslim holy sites - a focus and discussion that may be the best evidence that many Jordanians believe something serious is afoot. End Summary and Comment. -------------- Officials Emphasize the Good, Stress Urgency -------------- ¶2. (C) The most upbeat comments on the President's visit and the chances for peace come from the most senior levels; as one moves down the official food chain, that optimism becomes more guarded. In a meeting with CODEL Price following the President's Ramallah visit, Chief of the Royal Court Bassem Awadallah related the tenor of King Abdullah's call that day with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, conveying considerably more buoyancy than the anodyne media references to the conversation. According to Awadallah the King said he had "never heard the voice of Abbas sound stronger or happier." Awadallah went on to note that "in every aspect of our lives, the Palestinian issue is there. Time is of the essence." The King is privately delighted with the impact of the President's visit and is sustained in that view in his contacts with Israeli and Palestinian counterparts (despite relentless pessimism of his influential director of general intelligence, Muhammad Dahabi). He has ensured the press has carried a steady stream of his own upbeat public comments during the President's presence in the region, including on the President's phone call to him. ¶3. (C) Meeting separately that day with the CODEL, Foreign Minister Salaheddine al-Bashir identified the peace process as the primary foreign policy focus of the GOJ, praised Annapolis as a "great success," and expressed gratitude for the Administration's continuing efforts to seize the opportunity for peace. When a Congressman asked him to place odds on the chances of peace this year, on a scale of 1-10, Bashir offered a "qualified six to seven." The Foreign Minister then turned the tables on the Representative, asking how likely it was that the President would push hard for peace. ¶4. (C) Parliament Speaker Abdulhadi al-Majali also welcomed the latest peace push, in a meeting with the Ambassador, but was more skeptical that progress was in the offing. "The intentions of the U.S. are very good, but the credibility of the Israelis is not enough to go ahead with the stated vision." In his view, Israel is just putting on a show for its foreign benefactors and cannot see that it has a national interest in the creation of a stable, Hamas-free Palestinian state. ¶5. (C) According to Majali, the U.S. (and by extension, Israel) is not giving Abbas enough tangible support that he can show to the Palestinian people. Fewer checkpoints and economic reforms would show Palestinians that Abbas has enough support to go the distance. "Everybody is waiting for what will be done on the ground." Majali judged that the President's pledge to return in May and assess progress is actually for the reason that he wants to be in Israel for the 60th anniversary of the state's founding - or so the "Jordanian street" says, according to Majali. -------------- Observers Wonder If It's Too Little, Too Late -------------- ¶6. (C) Opinions among non-government observers were less AMMAN 00000149 002 OF 002 upbeat, but even some of the perennial critics of U.S. policy were not wholly dismissive of the President's tour. Al-Quds Center for Political Studies Director Oraib Rantawi, for instance, told us that while very few are optimistic about the Annapolis process, the lack of other options is leading Palestinians and Jordanians to cling to a slim chance of success. As he saw it, the President's visit has added a modicum of momentum. Having just returned from a Dead Sea conference attended by Palestinians including some close to Abbas, in which the scenarios of complete failure and genuine success of the process were examined, Rantawi observed that "life is not best case or worst case scenarios, it's always in between." ¶7. (C) Still, Rantawi worried, we risk "repeating the problem we had at the end of Clinton's term." The latest peace push has come late in the day, and the passage of time has also meant the passage from the scene of strong leadership: while former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the late Yasir ARAFAT would have had the strength to make a deal, neither Olmert nor Abbas were strong leaders. Despite that, said Rantawi, "we still have time if there's a serious approach," if we start from the Taba understandings rather than from the "beginning," as he claimed the Israelis want. ¶8. (C) Ibrahim Badran - who in the early 1990s was Coordinator-General of Jordan's delegation to the Jordan-Israel peace talks, later was Director-General of the Department for Palestinian Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, and now advises the President of Philadelphia University on international affairs - said the real question surrounding President Bush's tour was not what happened while he was there, but what would follow. There was considerable regional skepticism about the visit because it came so late in this Administration, and that the attention given the Palestinian-Israeli issue was merely a "sweetener for the Iranian pill" (a reference to the belief that the President's main goal on the trip was to rally allies to confront an Iranian threat). ¶9. (C) However, Badran allowed, "I don't doubt the seriousness of Bush. I doubt the responsiveness of the Israelis." Badran speculated that Israel needs "not 11 months of pressure, but 11 continuous years of good effort to change." Citing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's recent comments in an interview that all of Israel's friends wanted the Jewish State to withdraw to the 1967 borders, Badran suggested that the President missed a golden opportunity to explicitly endorse Olmert's sentiment. ¶10. (C) At least one of our Palestinian-Jordanian contacts viewed the trip very favorably. Asad Abdel Rahman, an independent member of the PLO Central Committee told us he felt very good about the President's statements, in particular the reference to 1949 armistice lines. Of critical importance, he said, will be what tangible steps the Israelis take on settlements and roadblocks, to see that a climate for negotiations is created. ¶11. (C) Comment: In their conversations with us, officials and observers mirrored the mixed reception in the local media (to be reported septel): they shared their hopes that the President's visit signaled a shift in U.S. policy toward greater engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian issue peppered with their skepticism that we were in it for the long haul, and that sufficient pressure would be put on Israel to meet its commitments and reach an equitable deal with the Palestinians. End Comment. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ Hale