LAND DEALS GENERATE A DEBATE ABOUT TRANSPARENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 001455 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV ECON KCOR AE JO SUBJECT: LAND DEALS GENERATE A DEBATE ABOUT TRANSPARENCY REF: A. AMMAN 4575 ¶B. AMMAN 1385 ¶C. AMMAN 1392 ¶D. AMMAN 1030 AMMAN 00001455 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Three recent land deals by the state to foreign investors have raised questions among the public about transparency in Jordan. The alleged sale of the King Hussein Medical Center (and an adjoining military complex), the cancellation of a deal to construct a casino on the Dead Sea, and the sale of Aqaba's commercial port were all conducted behind closed doors. Details of these deals are slowly leaking into the public sphere, and as they do they are raising the hackles of the press and members of parliament, who have called for public inquiries into the substance of the transactions. While there is no evidence to suggest corruption or criminal wrongdoing, the government's statements have been contradictory and occasionally misleading, fueling speculation. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) has used the deals to cast aspersions on the government's integrity, while the Anti-Corruption Commission has remained silent. The issue has become a general proxy for discontent with the economic situation, and the government will have to come up with a clear public relations strategy quickly. End Summary. The King Hussein Medical Center and Armed Forces HQ -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On April 15, Agence France Press reported that the King Hussein Medical Center (KHMC),a large complex in West Amman, was slated to be sold to investors from the UAE for two billion dollars. Perhaps more significantly, the story reported that the sale included an adjacent parcel on which the new armed forces headquarters, a massive complex, is nearing completion after two and a half years of construction work. The AFP report noted that after the "gradual" sale of the land, the medical center and planned military headquarters would be relocated, existing structures would be razed, and office buildings would be constructed on the site. ¶3. (SBU) The district in which the KHMC and armed forces headquarters are located is undergoing a construction boom, and has gone from an area characterized by quiet country homes into a bustling commercial artery in the space of just a few years. Large infrastructure projects have made the area more accessible, and as a result local real estate prices have skyrocketed. ¶4. (C) Days before the story broke in the media, Prince Feisal (Special Advisor to Jordan's Chief of Defense) broached the subject with the DATT during a routine meeting, indicating that the price of the land had appreciated to the point that it made financial sense for the government to sell the complex at a huge profit and re-build a new HQ elsewhere. He asserted that moving the complex to Eastern Amman would help to provide stimulus to local real estate prices and provide jobs in a poorer area of town. Note: Although USG assistance money was slated to help the Jordanian military build command and control bunkers in the new headquarters building, that portion of the project has not yet begun. No USG assistance has been expended on the land that is being sold. End Note. ¶5. (U) In the government's initial response to the AFP piece, on April 17, State Minister for Media and Communications Nasser Judeh categorically denied that the KHMC was being sold, calling the reports "rumors." Judeh instead focused on a new company, linked to Jordan's Social Security Corporation, which would be established "to attract investments in the real estate sector." He added that any property deals would be announced "in a transparent manner." Yet radio reports which appeared on April 27 declared that the King Hussein Medical Center would be "moved" to a new location on the road to Amman's airport, suggesting that a deal had in fact been reached. ¶6. (U) In response to the media stories, PM Dahabi organized a closed-door meeting with MPs on May 8 to discuss the issue of government land sales. Press reports indicate that the meeting was tumultuous, with accusations thrown at Dahabi from a number of prominent, nominally opposition MPs such as Abdulkarim Al-Dughmi and former PM Abdulrauf Al-Rawabdeh. Al-Jazeera later reported that some MPs demanded the resignation of the government. A statement released by Dahabi after that meeting announced that the government had received offers on the land, but that no decision to sell had yet been made. AMMAN 00001455 002.2 OF 005 The Ready-Made Villain: Bassem Awadallah -------------- ¶7. (C) Chief of the Royal Court Bassem Awadallah has long been a lightning rod for complaints about Jordan's economic reform program, with East Banker Jordanian elites frequently questioning the sources and methods for Awadallah's sudden wealth (in fact gained during a lucrative stint out of public office in 2005),often adding loyalty questions due to his Palestinian origins. Perhaps predictably, Awadallah is being linked to the KHMC deal, even though there is no evidence to suggest a connection. MP Mahmoud Kharabsheh, a former GID colonel whose position on parliament's legal committee would likely put him on any investigatory panel, pointed the finger directly at Awadallah. "This case shows that if you want to buy anything in Jordan, all you have to do is go to BassemCo," he said. Kharabsheh believes that as in previous (unspecified) land deals involving high-level officials, any culprits (read: Awadallah) will face zero scrutiny from prosecutors or government anti-corruption watchdogs. "The government only interferes in political issues, not with economic corruption," he said. The problem is self-censorship - Kharabsheh argues that prosecutors will not go out on a limb and target such a high-level official because he is "under the King's protection." ¶8. (C) Awadallah's name also surfaced in PM Dahabi's meeting with MPs. After that meeting, parliament speaker Abdulhadi Al-Majali denounced the remarks of MP Nariman Rousan (Irbid - elected through the quota for women),who allegedly fingered Awadallah in the land deals. According to an Al-Jazeera report, Rousan implied that Awadallah was an Israeli agent. "I do not think that Rousan's role in monitoring the performance of other estates allows her to make any such libelous statement. This is a wrong and unacceptable practice that requires evidence," Majali said. Note: To Awadallah's private annoyance, the Prime Minister issued only a mild defense of him. End Note. ¶9. (U) Awadallah does have his defenders in the press. The May 10 edition of daily Al-Ghad included an indictment of "conservative politicians" by commentator Mohammed Abu Rumman, who pointed out that Awadallah's detractors have no alternative vision for Jordan. Rather than descend into the politics of personal destruction, Abu Rumman suggests that MPs should instead be thinking about how to bring Jordan out of the economic doldrums. The Dead Sea Casino Deal -------------- ¶10. (U) A separate real estate deal under public scrutiny involves land on the Dead Sea. Back on September 10, 2007, the government of Ma'arouf Al-Bakhit signed a deal with the Oasis real estate company to construct a casino and other developments on the shores of the Dead Sea. Oasis won the tender after competing with two other firms, Astria and Empire. Note: Nothing has come out in the press about the ownership of any of these companies. End Note. The Oasis bid promised two million dinars (2.8 million dollars) in licensing fees, to be paid in two tranches to the Jordanian treasury, plus one million dinars (1.4 million dollars) in licensing fees every year afterward for the life of the contract. In addition, Jordan would receive a percentage of the casino's profits on a sliding scale, ranging from fifteen percent to thirty-five percent. The Astria and Empire bids included no lump sum payments, and much smaller percentages of casino profits - a minimum of ten percent and a maximum of twenty-five. ¶11. (U) According to press reports, the Minister of Tourism at the time, Osama Dabbas, secured unanimous approval for the deal from the Jordan Tourism Board (which includes the Secretaries General of the Ministries of Tourism and Planning),despite the fact that gambling is illegal in Jordan. Only two months after the deal was finalized, however, the government began to look at ways to annul the deal. Bakhit (by this time a lame duck Prime Minister), issued an order to Dabbas to halt any movement on the project until further notice. According to media reports, the government's backpedaling resulted from unspecified accusations against an unnamed Palestinian businessman allegedly linked to the project. Purportedly, when the government was informed about other unfulfilled contracts linked to the same businessman, questions were raised about the viability of the entire enterprise. ¶12. (U) According to the contract, the government would have to pay USD 1.4 billion to cancel the deal outright. Faced with this enormous penalty, according to media reports, the new Dahabi government has apparently offered alternative AMMAN 00001455 003.2 OF 005 compensation in the form of a plan that would give the casino investors the ability to develop the project minus the casino, land elsewhere in Jordan to compensate for the lack of a casino, and the rights to develop a casino at the Dead Sea should the gambling ban be lifted in the future. Yet there is still some question as to whether the deal has conclusively been quashed or merely frozen as part of the government's attempt to avoid a financial hit. Neither Bakhit nor Dabbas have made statements to the media on the issue. ¶13. (SBU) Furious at the hastiness of the deal and the fact that it left the government open to a substantial financial penalty, MPs in parliament's legal committee threatened to open a formal investigation. The public airing of the scandal prompted PM Dahabi to call a closed-door meeting with members of the legal committee and Speaker of Parliament Abdulhadi Al-Majali on April 14. Adbulkarim Al-Dughmi, the head of the legal committee, appeared before the press after the meeting and said that "the government assured us that it does not suspect any legal misconduct," but did not rule out the possibility of an ad hoc parliamentary commission to investigate the matter further. Ahmed Safadi, head of the parliament's tourism committee, also promised to investigate. The Sale of Aqaba Port -------------- ¶14. (U) On April 20, the government announced the sale of the land on which Aqaba's commercial port sits to the Emirates-based Al-Ma'abar firm for five hundred million dollars. The port, which is located on prime beachfront property near the center of Aqaba, has long been slated to be moved to a new industrial area south of town, opening up a new space for development in the heart of the city. ¶15. (SBU) In 2005, the Aqaba Development Corporation (ADC) sent out a tender for moving the entire port and re-development of the land for tourism and residential use. No bids were received, and the ADC in turn considered splitting up the tender to make it more manageable. American consulting firm Bearing Point estimated the value of the port in 2005 to be between 240 and 280 million dollars. ¶16. (C) Imad Fakhouri, the head of the ADC, implied in a recent meeting with USAID officers that the King and Prime Minister Dahabi (himself the former head of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority) negotiated a deal in principle directly with Al-Ma'abar. The money was to be paid up front, and at a rate double the estimated value of the land. The proceeds of the sale, according to Fakhouri, were then used to pay down Jordan's debt to the Paris Club - a point confirmed to the Ambassador by Royal Court Chief Awadallah. ¶17. (C) One remaining hitch is the relocation of the existing port, which was not part of the deal. The UAE investors now own the land, but have to wait for the ADC to float a new tender to relocate the port facilities before they can re-develop it as a tourist area. According to the contract, this move must happen within five years. USAID contacts within ADC estimate that the cost of moving the port will easily top one billion dollars. ¶18. (C) Another hitherto undisclosed, and potentially problematic, part of the deal involves the portside slum of Shalalah. Rumor has it that either part or all of this neighborhood has been sold as part of the port and will eventually be razed for touristic development. ASEZA has long had plans to move the residents of Shalalah to a low income area north of town. Yet those plans may be thwarted by the fact that many in the area are undocumented laborers and Palestinian refugees originally from Gaza who cannot legally own property. If Shalalah is part of the deal, the issue of providing alternative housing for its residents is likely to become a political football. ¶19. (C) While the sale and relocation of the port were long anticipated, the suddenness and scale of the deal has caught many policymakers and even ADC officials by surprise. Even Fakhouri was unaware of the King and PM's actions until they were essentially complete. The lack of a renewed public tender for the land caused no small amount of grumbling behind the scenes, and even some limited public commentary, despite the fact of the original 2005 tender. Senator and former PM Taher Al-Masri criticized the deal in an April 15 interview, saying, "the problem is the lack of transparency. The government must explain the circumstances of these investments, which happen in the dark." Clear As Mud -------------- AMMAN 00001455 004.2 OF 005 ¶20. (SBU) Government statements and media reports of these blockbuster land deals are often at odds. Even after deals have reportedly been finalized, different voices within the government simultaneously deny that land is being sold and feed rumors that deals are on the table or already concluded. On April 28, London-based newspaper Al-Hayat featured an interview with PM Nader Dahabi in which he indicated that the Jordanian government has received "tempting offers" from foreign investors for KHMC, Aqaba port, land on the Dead Sea, and even the large Sports City compound in central Amman. Dahabi told the reporter that "if a facility is sold, a better, larger, and more modern one will be built in its place." Yet the next day, Minister for Communications Nasser Judeh appeared on Al-Jazeera and said that all of the deals were just "rumors". ¶21. (SBU) Those "rumors" have spread like wildfire in the absence of a coherent public relations strategy to explain the land deals to the Jordanian public. The PM's meetings with key members of parliament may have allayed some fears among the ruling elite, but they are fanning speculation in the media. Talking to Al-Jazeera, MP Bassem Hadadin wondered why the government simply failed to announce the details of the deals "before the rumors reached their height." Hadadin added that "the PM is not extending assistance to the deputies to help them play their role" in calming public furor over the deals. A Hook for the IAF -------------- ¶22. (SBU) The Islamic Action Front (IAF) has used the recent slate of real estate deals to bolster its claim to represent average Jordanians through an increasingly caustic set of public statements pillorying the government for selling national assets. "These projects are not designed to benefit the poor, but only wealthy and influential Jordanians," said IAF Secretary-General Zaki Beni-Irshaid in an April 30 interview with Al-Jazeera. "People's patience has limits, and I think that in the coming days there will be an explosion, a very big explosion, and nobody can predict its repercussions and results." Beni-Irshaid also accused the government of hiding the sale of land by using front companies set up specifically to unload high-profile public properties. In a May 8 press statement, the IAF further alleged that the Social Security Corporation was used as a "tool of deception and corruption" and a "means to deceive the Jordanian people" to sell the land at a discount price to foreigners. ¶23. (SBU) Newly elected leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Hamam Saeed took time in his first press interview on May 7 to address the casino deal in particular. Said called the deal "suspicious" and said that the focus of the government should be on helping the poor rather than "those whom they call strategic investors". The Higher Coordination Committee of the Opposition Parties, a group of small parties which often acts as a proxy for the IAF, also issued a statement condemning the Dead Sea casino deal and demanded an official inquiry. ¶24. (SBU) The IAF may be testing the waters for expanded action on the issue of land sales. On May 7, the IAF announced the formation of a "front of political forces, civil society organizations, and tribal forces" which would work again future land deals, and sent a letter to the PM stating that "selling public land is illegal, unacceptable, and unjustified." An expanded statement posted on the IAF website on May 8 declared that all recent land sales were "null and void" and that the "property should be returned to its previous status." Possible Role for the ACC -------------- ¶25. (C) Jordan's Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is charged with fostering more transparency in Jordan's political culture and prosecuting wrongdoing. In meetings with Poloff, ACC head Adel Shakhanbeh has repeatedly stressed that the commission is charged with challenging the closed-door mentality of Jordan's governments. Yet despite the eruption of a public debate on transparency regarding these land sales, the ACC is standing on the sidelines. It has issued no public statements about the opening of an investigation, nor commented on parliament's apparent intent to do so. In a meeting with Poloff, ACC head Adel Shakhanbeh sidestepped any responsibility for investigating recent deals or addressing the public outcry surrounding them. "We respect public opinion and its role," Shakhanbeh noted, but stopped short of addressing the lack of transparency in the deals. He made it clear that the ACC had no role to play in shaping the public debate surrounding corruption in these high-profile cases. AMMAN 00001455 005.2 OF 005 When asked about the public confusion surrounding the Dead Sea Casino and KHMC cases, Shakhanbeh asserted that "the government wouldn't deny anything without a reason." Ripple Effects -------------- ¶26. (C) Members of Jordan's Executive Privatization Commission, charged with the sale of state-owned enterprises, are starting to wonder how the spate of land deals (which they are not connected with) will ultimately impact their work. Dina Dabbas, the commission's Secretary-General, believes that the lack of transparency on the land deals will ultimately give further grist to anti-privatization forces in Jordan's government and parliament. "We were touched negatively by these deals," Dabbas says. "Some people in Jordan were talking about the problems of privatization from the start." The fear is that the public and some in Jordan's political elite will conflate privatization and direct land sales, with the lack of transparency in the latter negatively coloring the former. While she hoped that the public debate over land sales would fuel price speculation and result in an advantageous deal, Dabbas said that "once the sales are done, they should be out in the public." Comment -------------- ¶27. (C) Among Jordan's political class, perception is reality, and a lack of real facts never gets in the way of accusatory conclusions. So far, there is no indication that anything criminal or even untoward occurred in the spate of recent land deals. It is entirely possible (and in the case of the Aqaba Port, even likely) that the amount of money the government received in these deals was the highest price it could reasonably expect. Yet the lack of transparency which marked these transactions leaves the government in an awkward position. Not accustomed to airing the details of behind-the-scenes deals in public, the government has allowed the terms of the debate to be set by others, and now faces the challenge of explaining how it was acting in Jordan's best interest to very skeptical average Jordanians and the political opposition. ¶28. (C) Among the traditionally pastoral East Bankers who constitute the Jordanian "establishment," land is not an abstract asset, but a tangible and essential element of Jordanian identity. It is precisely this establishment that is most opposed to the government's economic reform program in general, and to West Banker Bassem Awadallah in particular. The IAF, for its part, facing its own political struggles (Ref B),has latched onto this as a hot-button issue and a proxy for widespread popular discontent with the economic situation. In the absence of clarity and detail about the process behind and benefits to Jordanians of these deals, Jordan's political classes will continue to speculate about who at the top was involved, with the clear implication that the well-connected are reaping ill-gotten gains through the sales of Jordan's land. While the Anti-Corruption Commission sits on its hands, parliament looks set to act, potentially dragging out and further politicizing the issue in a way that cannot be dealt with behind closed doors. In an environment in which inflation is hitting the lower and middle classes hard (Ref C),while the benefits of economic reform have yet to trickle down, Jordan's government is vulnerable on this issue. So far the government has shown remarkable success in maintaining its popularity despite significant economic stress (Ref D),but its ability to satisfy the public and parliament's demands for accountability on the land deals will be a key test of its skill in handling the political manifestations of this year's economic upheavals. HALE