JORDANIAN OFFICIALS SEEK STRONG ARAB, U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 001430 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL JO LE SUBJECT: JORDANIAN OFFICIALS SEEK STRONG ARAB, U.S. RESPONSE TO HIZBALLAH, BUT DOUBT ARABS CAN HANDLE IT REF: A. HALE-FELTMAN EMAILS 5/10/2008 ¶B. STATE 49259 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Senior Jordanian officials aired their views of the Lebanon crisis in separate May 10 meetings with Ambassador (Ref A). Both Prime Minister Nader Dahabi and Foreign Minister Salaheddin al-Bashir urged the U.S. to take a more active role and appeared to lack confidence that the Arab states would have the wherewithal to address the situation. Bashir noted that Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora had raised with him the idea of forming an Arab peacekeeping force. Dahabi said he expected Jordan would take part in any such force, were it formed, though Jordan could not be at the forefront. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met May 10 with FM Bashir, who was about to leave for an emergency meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo. He said Jordan is concerned that the U.S. response to developments in Lebanon has not been more forceful, while the Iranians "triumph" in the Gaza Strip and now West Beirut. Bashir clearly was not confident that the Arabs would have the capacity to deal with the crisis. The moderate Arabs had "zilch," and a lack of visible progress on the peace process was putting friends of the U.S. in the worst possible situation. Ambassador responded that it should be clear from our statements and the facts on the ground that this was a very serious situation which we are treating as such. In particular, we needed to focus on reinforcing state institutions, especially the government of Prime Minister Siniora and the Lebanese Armed Forces. Ambassador urged a forceful and immediate Arab response. Bashir asked if things were "lined up" for a UN Chapter 7 resolution. Ambassador said he was not aware one way or another, but that given the Arab desire to try first, UNSC action was not yet a focus of attention. ¶3. (C) Bashir said Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora had called him earlier saying he sought an Arab peacekeeping force, though Bashir speculated Siniora might play this idea down until the FM's gathering in Cairo. Bashir said no decision regarding Jordanian participation in this hypothetical force had been taken, but that any such force would have to be substantial to succeed. Ambassador welcomed the strong statements Jordan had been making since Friday morning, supporting Lebanon's central government. Ambassador and Bashir agreed to stay in touch and exchange ideas. ¶4. (C) PM Dahabi similarly was somewhat skeptical that the Arabs could competently respond to either the recent escalation or the larger crisis, and did not see the leadership role needed from the Saudis and Egyptians. He perceived a link between the moderate Arabs' weakness at the Damascus Arab League summit and current events. He urged a more active USG role, arguing that a compromise is needed that gets all non-state weapons and militias off the streets in exchange for a climbdown by the government on the communications network, at least as a temporary fix. Note: This conversation occurred before Lebanese PM Siniora's national address. End note. Dahabi believed Jordan would join an Arab multinational force, but could not be in the forefront given hostile Jordan/Hizballah relations, arguing that the bulk of such a force would have to come from the periphery, such as North Africa and Yemen. (FM Bashir noted that his son, one of the evacuated Jordanian students from AUB, was hassled by Hizballah militiamen when they saw his Jordanian passport. Only when he told them he was "really Palestinian" did they let him go.) ¶5. (SBU) In a May 11 COB telecon between Ambassador and Royal Court Chief Bassem Awadallah, Awadallah indicated he had no information from the ongoing Arab ministerial in Cairo. He then boarded a plane for Saudi Arabia, in part to consult the Saudi leadership on the crisis. HALE