FM BASHIR DISCUSSES IRAQ, IRAN, LEBANON WITH S/I

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001233 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018 TAGS: PREL IR IZ JO LE TU SUBJECT: FM BASHIR DISCUSSES IRAQ, IRAN, LEBANON WITH S/I SATTERFIELD Classified By: Ambassador David M. Hale for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 17 discussion with Foreign Minister Salah Bashir, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq (S/I) Ambassador David Satterfield urged Jordan to return an ambassador to Baghdad in order to gain a clearer understanding of political developments. In response to Bashir's skepticism about the Maliki government's intentions, Satterfield stressed that recent positive events and actions by Maliki warranted stronger support from Iraq's neighbors. Bashir promised to follow up with a paper outlining what measures Maliki could take to secure an invitation from the GOJ to visit Amman; Satterfied pressed for Jordan to also articulate what steps it could take to support the GOI and overcome mutual mistrust. On Lebanon, Bashir noted the imperative to strengthen PM Siniora and urged an Israeli withdrawal from Sheba'a farms. End summary. Iraq: Jordan "Needs To Be Convinced" -------------- ¶2. (C) Bashir began by noting that all of Iraq's neighbors have to deal with issues emanating from the situation there, especially Iranian influence, but Jordan also faces the special challenge of hosting displaced Iraqis. He said that the GOI must improve its conduct generally and address these key issues, including with Saudi Arabia, if it is to strengthen its regional standing. Satterfield noted continued Iranian efforts to demonstrate that it is the strategic power in the region, and stressed the need to confront the Iranian challenge to regime and U.S. interests in security and stability. Satterfield reviewed recent developments, including GOI moves in Basra against the Jaysh al-Mahdi, which had strengthened Maliki's position internally as a national - vice sectarian/partisan - leader, and made clear he is not an Iranian puppet. Noting that the U.S. presence in Iraq allows us to see the evolution of potential dynamics firsthand, Satterfield urged Arab diplomatic representation, rather than leaving the playing field to Iran. ¶3. (C) A clearly skeptical Bashir said that Jordan needs "to be convinced;" the GOI must change its posture and take a more open approach toward dialogue. He cited a forward-leaning GOI interest in investment in Syria that was "not based on objective criteria" when compared with GOI language on investing in Jordan. Saying that "we're both hosting Iraqis," Bashir asserted that the only explanation for the difference in attitude towards Syria was the Iranian connection. ¶4. (C) Satterfield stressed that Arab decision-making should reflect positive movements on the ground - in terms of the GOI's independence from Iran, its challenge to militias, and its efforts at reconciliation - which need support. In response to a question from Ambassador Hale as to whether Jordan could invite Maliki to Amman, Bashir offered to provide a paper on Jordanian expectations from the GOI in the event of such a visit. Satterfield pointed out that the GOI, too, would have requests of the Jordanians, to which Bashir asked rhetorically, "are we not doing enough?" Satterfield pushed for Jordan to return an ambassador to Baghdad and assured the Jordanians of support from the USG in addressing the questions of location and security for an Embassy. ¶5. (C) Bashir asked why Maliki would value the presence of Arab ambassadors in Baghdad. Satterfield replied that such a presence would send a message to the entire Shia community and, more broadly, all Iraqis, that Iraq's neighbors accepted the legitimacy of the post-Saddam reality. Satterfield underscored again that Arab diplomatic representation would allow for direct insight into political developments, rather than relying on secondhand information. SOFA and Strategic Framework -------------- ¶6. (S) Bashir inquired about the progress of negotiations regarding the longer-term USG-GOI relationship and expressed concern about the prospect of a rapid U.S. pullout from Iraq. Satterfield limned the distinctions between a Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement, noting that the latter would extend the relationship beyond simply military and security issues, and would be worked with representatives of all five key Iraqi political leaders. Kurds -------------- ¶7. (C) Bashir asked for an update on Kurdish issues, and the situation between Turkey and the PKK. Satterfield described the need for a comprehensive solution to the PKK; while AMMAN 00001233 002 OF 002 military action is an essential element, the GOT needed to take a social, economic, and political approach as well. Bashir asked whether a referendum on Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution would be forthcoming. Satterfield responded the Kurds had accepted that the time is not right for such a step, which would be seen as unilateral and a potential trigger for violence. Satterfield noted the important role being planed by UNAMI in this regard. Neighbors Process and GCC 2 -------------- ¶8. (C) Bashir asked about USG goals for the upcoming Iraq Neighbors Conference in Kuwait and the GCC 2 meeting in Bahrain. Satterfield anticipated that, in Kuwait, Maliki would seek to send a message to Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, by: recounting the steps recently taken on reconciliation and against militias; stating the GOI's intentions on next steps (elections, hydrocarbons law),and stating what Iraq needs in support. The Bahrain meeting would discuss Iraq, but also have a broader scope. Iraq is an important element in the search for regional stability; military cooperation, confronting Iran and other radical challenges, and advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process were all on the agenda. Israeli-Palestinian Peace Not Advancing -------------- ¶9. (C) On peace negotiations, Bashir stated that the optimism generated by the November Annapolis meeting had not led to improvements on the ground, and declared flatly that the negotiations were producing nothing regarding roadmap implementation or final status. Lebanon -------------- ¶10. (C) Bashir noted that there was no forward motion on the Arab League Initiative in Lebanon. Citing the interconnectedness of regional issues and the potential impact of events in Lebanon, Bashir said that the key question was how to support PM Siniora, and asserted that an Israeli withdrawal from Sheba'a Farms would make a difference. Satterfield questioned whether Syria would be prepared to formally cede the area to Lebanon, and predicted that, even if Sheba'a was "resolved," Hizballah would simply find another excuse to continue its rejectionist approach and maintain its status as "state within a state." ¶11. (U) Ambassador Satterfield has cleared this cable. HALE