SECURITY UPDATE: AQIM NOT GETTING STRONGER IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000449 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2028 TAGS: ASEC PTER AG SUBJECT: SECURITY UPDATE: AQIM NOT GETTING STRONGER IN ALGERIA BUT STILL VERY PRESENT Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to information collected from press reporting, the number of terrorist attacks remained approximately the same in March 2008 compared to previous months but there appear to have been fewer casualties. The majority of these March attacks have been attributed to Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) despite fewer official claims of responsibility from them than in previous months. One significant incident was a successful attack that took complete control of the town of Tizi Rachid in Tizi Ouzou province for several hours on the night of February 29. The violence in Algeria for the past three months has remained mostly localized in the mountains east of Algiers; we are watching carefully to see if it spreads again elsewhere. Perhaps the most significant recent incident was one that did not take place, when a would-be suicide bomber was neutralized in the western city of Oran on March 29. In April, there were several terrorist attacks that appear to have targeted a Chinese company building a major highway project east of Algiers. The Danish embassy also closed temporarily due to security concerns, prompting an unfriendly Algerian government response. ¶2. (C) March also saw diminished AQIM rhetoric and fewer communique website postings. The AQIM unofficial website (www.dlalseuf.co.cc/vb) was active in January and February but less active in March. Members that have normally posted daily AQIM messages and updates have now cut back to several postings a week, but AQIM media committee communiques and videos continue to be posted quickly. Urgent calls for donation of funds and kidnapping for ransom suggest serious money problems. If AQIM gets a big ransom for the two Austrian hostages it is holding, that would help the terrorist group significantly. Overall, we judge that AQIM is not getting any stronger in Algeria, but they retain a capacity -- albeit limited -- to strike. END SUMMARY. FEWER ATTACKS, LESS VIOLENCE -------------- ¶3. (U) According to press reports, March 2008 saw the number of terrorist attacks basically the same in Algeria but with fewer casualties compared to the monthly totals for the months of January and February of this year. In March there were 19 attacks targeting military and security personnel, killing 17 soldiers and wounding 36, according to press sources. January and February 2008, in contrast, saw 26 attacks (9 in January and 17 in February) on military and security personnel resulting in 43 security personnel killed and 107 wounded. Terrorist attacks for the past three months stayed focused primarily on Algerian military and security personnel. Tactics involved in the attacks remained the same, mostly using improvised explosives devices (IEDs) and traditional ambushes. Most attacks in early 2008 were again in the provinces of Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdes, Batna and Bouira (in the mountainous Kabylie region). A few incidents occurred in neighboring provinces such as Jijel, Tebessa and Biskra, and we are watching closely to see if attacks increase in these provinces in the coming months. The eastern city of Constantine is also starting to show signs of an increase in attacks. SOS CALLS FOR FUNDS -------------- ¶4. (C) AQIM appears to have resource problems that are hindering its operational capacity. On March 4, El-Ekhlass jihadi website (www.ekhlass.ws) and dilalseuf (www.dlalseuf.co.cc/vb) posted a message from blogger Phoenixshadow about AQIM's urgent need of funds. Phoenixshadow admitted that by posting the message he was exposing his identity and putting fellow jihadis in harm's way, but he was willing to take that risk due to the seriousness of the situation and the jihadis' urgent need for funds. Phoenixshadow emphasized that donating funds for jihad was as important as the physical jihad itself. He added that they did not seek equipment such as "uzis", "night vision goggles" or "GPS" systems. Instead, he claimed, the funds would be used for medicine for jihadis who were wounded, hungry and cold. Phoenixshadow urged donors to contact another jihadi named "Khanzadar al-Jihad," who would ALGIERS 00000449 002 OF 003 provide them with necessary information to send funds without being detected by the government. SMALL TOWN FALLS, BRIEFLY -------------- ¶5. (U) On March 2, the Algerian press buzzed with a story about a group of terrorists dressed in military and security uniforms and armed with AK-47s who had seized control for several hours of the town of Tizi Rachid (Tizi Ouzou province). The attack came in the middle of the night February 29. According to the press, the police did not try to intervene. Press reports state that the terrorists blew up the Agricultural and Rural Development bank and the local post office, seizing a total of about 1500 USD. One civilian was wounded and one security officer was killed in the assault. (Comment: this incident reminds of the kinds of assaults we saw in Algeria frequently 1994 - 1996. End Comment.) ORAN ATTACK THWARTED -------------- ¶6. (S) A would-be suicide bomber wearing an explosives-laden belt was killed by Algerian security forces in the western Algerian city of Oran on March 29. Mohamed MAHDJOUB was a 24-year-old AQIM associate from the eastern city of Relizane who allegedly traveled to Oran on the morning of March 29. Newspaper reports speculated that MAHDJOUB intended to target either the Sheraton or Royal Hotel in Oran, but security forces have indicated that he was targeting military or police installations. At the time of his death, MAHDJOUB was wearing an explosive belt containing approximately 3.5 kilograms of TNT that police were able to defuse. In addition to being the second time we have seen use of the Al Qaeda tactic of an explosive belt, this attack would have been significant for the fact that it took place in Oran, Algeria's second largest city and one that has been relatively incident-free in terms of terrorist attacks. KIDNAPPING: EVOLUTION IN TACTICS OR DESPERATE FOR MONEY? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (U) Kidnapping wealthy Algerians for ransom is another old technique being used by AQIM to obtain cash. According to the Algerian press, in March an employee of an Algerian tourist company in Tizi Ouzou was kidnapped at a false checkpoint, but was later released. On April 11, according to Arabic-language daily Ennahar, the son of a wealthy Algerian businessman was kidnapped, also in Tizi Ouzou. The paper reported that terrorists contacted his parents and demanded a ransom of 40 million dinars (equivalent to 580,000 USD). The wilaya of Sidi Belabes (500 km south of Algiers) witnessed another crime that brought back memories of the 1990s civil war. A group of terrorists cut the throats of two shepherds, who happened to be brothers, stealing 60 of their cattle and booby-trapping their bodies. Stealing cattle to feed on, erecting false checkpoints to terrorize and rob civilians, and breaking into local grocery stores and cafes are all indications that AQIM is resorting to techniques used by other Algeria n terrorists in the past. ¶8. (S) The kidnapping of Algerians has proven successful as a way to obtain quick funds, but the successful kidnapping of two Austrian tourists in the Tunisian desert may indicate another evolution in AQIM tactics toward kidnapping Western targets for more than money. Although the abduction did not take place within Algeria's borders, the strong indications that the kidnappers traversed undetected across the Algerian desert and into northern Mali suggest a regionalization and cooperation of AQIM across North African and Sahel states. The kidnappers' latest demands were for the release of named Muslim prisoners by the Austrian government, the withdrawal of Austrian troops from Afghanistan and 20 million Euros. If any of these demands are met, especially the ransom payment, it could encourage AQIM to continue to target Westerners for kidnapping. APRIL STARTS WITH CLOSE CALLS FOR FOREIGN ENTITIES -------------- -------------- ALGIERS 00000449 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Newspapers reported April 15 about an attack that proved to be a close call for a Chinese company operating in eastern Algeria. Two explosions occurred in the wilaya (province) of Bouira targeting a military guard tower and a Gendarmerie patrol. The tower was part of the security forces protecting the base camp of Chinese workers building the east-west highway across northern Algeria. The Gendarmerie unit was hit as it was responding to the first explosion. Although there has not been any claim of responsibility, the attack had an AQIM modus operandi and, more important, may have been an attempt to penetrate the camp and target the actual workers. This was the second attack in April against targeting a camp of Chinese workers; a similar attempt occurred in Boumerdes a week earlier. Newspapers reported that a group of ten terrorists attempted to penetrate the camp but were pushed back by the communal guards. A successful attack against foreign workers in eastern Algeria would be a major setback for companies operating in that region. (Note: American company Brown & Root Condor is in the logistical planning stages of a project in the eastern wilaya of Skikda that will require them to have 300 - 500 Western workers on the ground. American company Raytheon is also starting a project in the eastern provinces in which large numbers of American employees will be transported daily from Algiers. End Note.) ¶10. (C) Another close call occurred April 19 outside Constantine when the security escort that had taken a Japanese business delegation to the airport was attacked late at night on its return from the airport. Constantine is a city where the Embassy supports an American Corner and where American diplomats travel frequently on official business. All diplomats and foreign businessmen traveling in Constantine are provided with police escorts. ¶11. (S) Although April 11 (the anniversary of the first AQIM suicide car bombs in Algiers) passed without incident, the Embassy developed credible information that the Danish embassy was to be attacked on the morning of April 11 by a suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED). The information prompted the Danes to issue a travel warning advising Danish citizens against traveling to Algeria. The Danish mission also chose to vacate their chancery for the remainder of April. In an April 22 meeting with RSO, the Danish embassy said they had been unsuccessful in persuading the Algerian security services to close the road in front of the chancery or, absent that, erect any kind of security barrier. The Danes told us that the Algerian Foreign Ministry's protocol office had been very unfriendly in response to the Danish concerns. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) In spite of AQIM's low profile over the past four months, we do not believe that the threat of it striking a Western target has diminished. AQIM is still capable of pulling off spectacular attacks, though apparently not every day nor even every week; the capital, for example, has been quiet for more than four months in the wake of a massively increased police presence. Despite the Algerian security's crackdown on AQIM in the eastern provinces over the past several months and the increased number of security personnel protecting the capital, the Algerian government has not crushed AQIM. It is possible that AQIM will learn the lesson from Iraq and shift operations to other major cities in response to the heavier security presence in the capital. Meanwhile, Algerian security forces are once again announcing through media campaigns the dismantling of several AQIM cells and the killing/capturing of several key AQIM leaders at once. This type of sensational journalism preceded the April 11, 2007 and December 11, 2007 attacks in Algiers. The "Lovers of the Hower" video has all of the hallmarks of a suicide recruiting advertisement, highlighting AQIM's logistical expertise, discipline and commitment to jihad (septel). FORD