NEW POLISARIO AMBASSADOR IN ALGIERS HEWS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000199 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC PBTS MO WI AG SUBJECT: NEW POLISARIO AMBASSADOR IN ALGIERS HEWS TO FAMILIAR LINE REF: ALGIERS 21 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 20 meeting, new Polisario Ambassador to Algeria Ibrahim Ghali and Polisario Minister-Delegate for African Affairs Mohammed Beissat told us that it was getting more difficult for the Polisario leadership to convince the Sahrawi people to be patient and respect the Manhasset negotiation process, especially given their dismay at UN Special Envoy Peter Van Walsum's statements during a recent visit to the Polisario refugee camps at Tindouf. In the wake of the December Tifariti congress (reftel),Ghali and Beissat asserted that the Polisario intended to move ahead with plans to "reconstruct the liberated territories" on its side of the berm, and that the call to arms was still on the table, although the Polisario had no immediate plans to attack Moroccan positions. Both men also said that the Polisario was at once encouraged and saddened by the prompt U.S. recognition of an independent Kosovo, believing their Western Sahara claim to be stronger than Kosovo's. END SUMMARY. A "FRUSTRATED" VAN WALSUM VISITS THE POLISARIO -------------- - ¶2. (C) According to Beissat (who was until recently the Polisario ambassador in Algiers),a "frustrated and pessimistic" Van Walsum visited the Polisario at Tindouf recently. Beissat said Van Walsum told the Polisario to "get real" and accept that "nobody is going to help," since "the U.S. and France are friends of Morocco." Van Walsum then pressed the Polisario, according to Beissat, to enter into serious negotiations on the Moroccan plan, acknowledging that the Polisario had the right to self-determination but that this would only come to pass if the U.S. and France in particular put pressure on Morocco. Van Walsum told the Polisario he simply did not see that happening and urged the Polisario to "accept reality." Beissat said that he and the Polisario leadership were dismayed by the UN Special Envoy's message, musing that frustration like Van Walsum's was "normally characteristic of youth." He suggested that Van Walsum needed prodding to identify obstacles to progress in the negotiations and move the process forward. NEW DETERMINATION TO REBUILD THE "LIBERATED TERRITORIES" -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) As we reported in reftel, the Polisario emerged from its December 14-20 party congress at Tifariti with a new burst of energy and defiance. Beissat said that the Polisario was now determined to implement a rebuilding and reconstruction program in the "liberated territories" on its side of the berm. This program, he said, was to include schools, housing, courts and other public institutions, as well as basic infrastructure. DCM cautioned that this could be perceived as an escalation and/or a violation of the cease-fire agreement, but Beissat insisted that the Moroccans were doing the same thing on their side of the berm and the Polisario did not see the need to consult or seek permission from anyone. He pointed out that at Tifariti, the Polisario reminded itself that roughly one-quarter of the Western Sahara lay outside the berm. Beissat said the Polisario was clear on the five kilometer "no-go" zone, as well as the 15-kilometer restricted movement zone next to the berm, but that the activities it foresaw were outside that band. A RESTLESS CONSTITUENCY -------------- ¶4. (C) Ghali, a member of the Polisario negotiating team at Manhasset, is a founding member of the Polisario and former minister of defense. He stressed that negotiations should not be considered an end in and of themselves, and that it was growing harder for the negotiating team and the Polisario leadership to convince the Sahrawi people that progress was being made, since the negotiations had not yet produced any tangible results. Beissat said that the call to arms at Tifariti was serious enough that one Polisario leader even pushed to send the women and children home immediately, while the men would move directly from Tifariti to attack Morocco. DCM stressed that there was no sympathy in Washington or Europe for Polisario threats of violence. Continuing to make such threats could also have an adverse effect, he noted, creating sympathy for Morocco. An incredulous Beissat laughed, saying "Morocco already has your sympathy, if we had this sympathy it would be much easier for us to keep quiet." Ghali asked the U.S. to "help us" find something to show the Sahrawis to renew their faith in the current negotiation process. ¶5. (C) Ghali and Beissat stressed, however, that the Polisario had no immediate plans to resume violence and were committed to work towards the fourth round of negotiations at Manhasset from March 11-13. Ghali said the Polisario congress had agreed to "a period of evaluation" of the UN negotiation process before a decision would be made whether another approach was warranted, but he was vague as to how long the period would last and what another approach might resemble. If the result of the March talks at Manhasset was the same as the last round, the two officials speculated, then the Polisario might finish its "evaluation." Echoing his past comments, Beissat recited that the cease-fire agreement with Morocco included plans for a referendum; if the referendum was taken off the table, it was only logical for the Polisario to take another look at the whole package. THE KOSOVO EFFECT -------------- ¶6. (C) The swift U.S. recognition of the independence of Kosovo offered both hope and despair to the Polisario, in the eyes of Beissat and Ghali. Beissat said it was "wonderful" to see people celebrating their right to self-determination, and "inspiring" to see the U.S. "stand up for its real values" in supporting Kosovo. He said the Polisario supported an independent Kosovo, and was planning to send an envoy to meet the new government in Pristina, as it had done in Montenegro after that country's independence. However, when DCM pointed out that Algeria had not yet recognized Kosovo and asked if the Polisario would move forward with recognition regardless, Beissat and Ghali both demurred, saying a decision had not yet been made. ¶7. (C) An independent Kosovo, Beissat said, made the Polisario hopeful for its own cause. Beissat believed the Western Sahara issue was "easier" than Kosovo, since "Morocco is weaker than Serbia and the Polisario is stronger than the Kosovars." Furthermore, Beissat said that although Kosovo's independence was a positive development, Kosovo had less justification for independence than the Sahrawis, he believed, since Western Sahara is a formal part of the UN decolonization process while the UN had formally always considered Kosovo to be a Serbian province. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Van Walsum's comments to the Sahrawi leadership in Tindouf may have dismayed them, but we saw no indication that the Polisario plans to change its approach at the next round in Manhasset as a result. Beissat purported to agree with Van Walsum that a change in approach was needed, but indicated that it was up to the Moroccans to make it. The much younger and more energetic Beissat, recently promoted to the senior ranks of the Polisario "government," presents a marked contrast to the veteran hardliner Ghali. In a meeting together, Ghali was surprisingly deferential to Beissat. Their interpersonal dynamic may be a reflection of the recent self-assertion by younger Polisario activists at the Tifariti congress, to which Ghali alluded several times in our conversation. Whether Ghali has been "exiled" to Algiers as part of an internal power struggle remains to be determined; his continuing role on the Manhasset negotiating team suggests he has not been completely sidelined. One thing is clear, however: the Sahrawis' new ambassador in Algiers will not be telling the Algerians anything they don't want to hear. The two men's evident deference to the GOA on Kosovo recognition shows that the client relationship between Algeria and the Polisario is alive and well. FORD