ALGERIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001320 SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/CT - RSHORE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR PGOV AG SUBJECT: ALGERIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM REF: A. SECSTATE 124815 B. STATE 120019 ¶1. (U) The security situation in Algeria was marked by a decrease in the number of high profile terrorist attacks throughout the country compared with 2007, although the overall number of attacks did not decline and ongoing low-level terrorist activities continued in the countryside. In the first half of 2008 there was a lull in attacks by terrorist groups as security forces stepped up their operations following the December 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters in Algiers. There was a dramatic rise in terrorist attacks during the month of August, however, with at least 79 people killed in various incidents across northeastern Algeria, most of them in suicide bombings. The targets included police stations, a coast guard outpost, and a bus transporting Algerian workers for a Canadian company. Previously, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC),now called Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),focused on targeting Algerian government interests and had been more averse to suicide attacks and civilian casualties. Although Algerian government interests remained the primary focus of AQIM, the attack on the bus confirmed that foreigners continue to be included as targets, and that AQIM continued to diversify its tactics by importing tactics used in Iraq and Afghanistan. ¶2. (U) Two events helped fuel terrorism concerns for Algeria: the September 2006 merger of elements of the GSPC with Al-Qa'ida (AQ) to form AQIM, and the conclusion of the amnesty period for Algeria's Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation in August 2006. National reconciliation remains a contentious issue for many Algerians, who are still divided over whether amnesty and re-integration or a more aggressive, unforgiving approach to terrorism is the best way to address the continuing threat. Although the Charter has officially expired, its terms may still be applied on a case by case basis at the exclusive discretion of the president. ¶3. (SBU) Following the September 11, 2006 announcement of affiliation with AQ, AQIM began to increase the threats against what it termed "crusading" Westerners, particularly American and French citizens, although Russians, Danes, Austrians and now Canadians have been targeted as well. Even before its official affiliation with AQ, the GSPC was an organization whose regional and international ties were expanding. AQIM support cells have been discovered and dismantled in Spain, Italy, Morocco, Mauritania, and Mali, and AQIM maintained training camps and support networks in northern Mali. ¶4. (U) The year was punctuated in the month of August with several high-profile terrorist attacks: On August 3 a police station in Tizi Ouzou, the capital of the Kabylie region, was damaged in a suicide bomb attack, leaving 25 people injured. On August 9 eight people, all civilians, were killed in an attack on a police station in Zemmouri al-Bahri, a seaside town to the east of Algiers. On August 10 three policemen were killed in a bomb attack on the nearby beach of Tigzirt. On August 15 an army patrol was ambushed near Skikda, in the northeastern corner of Algeria and several soldiers, including one senior officer, were reported to have been killed. The heaviest casualties from the August spate of attacks occurred on August 19 when a suicide bomber exploded his vehicle outside a gendarmerie training college in Issers where a large number of prospective new recruits were waiting for the gates to open. The government reported that 43 people were killed and 45 injured. The next day there were two car bomb explosion in the nearby town of Bouira. The first, outside a military building, left four soldiers lightly wounded, according to the official Algerian Press Service. The second exploded outside a hotel and killed 11 people. It was reported that the hotel was being used to house foreigners working on the nearby Koudiet Acerdoune dam project, run by a Canadian company. During the attack, the driver of the suicide vehicle rammed a bus carrying workers of the company and detonated the bomb. ¶5. (SBU) The police and army response to the August attacks was energetic, and public disapproval of the large number of civilians killed in the attacks increased the number of tips phoned in, which may account for the historically low number of attacks that occurred during ALGIERS 00001320 002 OF 003 the subsequent Ramadan holiday in September. A noticeable increase in the visible security presence in major cities may have also contributed to the low number of terrorist incidents during Ramadan. ¶6. (SBU) The majority of attacks have occurred in rural and suburban areas. The terrorists have been very careful to establish remote bases, communicate sparingly, and plan and carry out attacks meticulous AQIM does not have significant popular support, and is not assessed as strong enough to bring down the Algerian government. AQIM appears aware of the need to avoid civilian casualties, but this has been difficult to accomplish as its police and military targets often operate among civilians. When security forces are in the countryside, approaching terrorists often stand out and are intercepted before they can successfully complete their attacks. Roadside bombs and ambushes persist despite the efforts of the security forces. The combination of a population weary of civilian casualties from over a decade of Islamic terrorist violence, and the growing availability and use of cell phones has made the terrorists more vulnerable to detection and attack by the police. At the same time, the Algerian government has had limited success in reducing unemployment (officially 13 percent, and much higher for men aged 18-30) or in implementing significant economic reforms. This has contributed to a slow but steady recruitment rate for AQIM and criminal gangs in general. ¶7. (U) AQIM's strategy in Algeria appears to be influenced by AQ's experience in Iraq. AQIM has issued directions to avoid civilian deaths and attacks have been concentrated on military, police and foreign national targets. AQIM is likely seeking to disrupt business and commercial activity and probably uses such attacks to discourage foreign investment. The overall civilian death toll due to terrorist attacks has been declining in recent years. During the civil war that began in 1992 and had largely subsided by 2000, Algerian Islamic terrorists killed on average more than 10,000 people a year, with the majority being civilians--well over ten times the number of AQIM victims today. The relative lack of civilian dead enables the new generation of Algerian terrorists to publicize their actions more energetically. ¶8. (SBU) In the past, Algerian security services have expressed concern about AQIM using propaganda based on the call to fight in Iraq as a hook to recruit young people, many of whom never made it to Iraq but were redirected towards joining local groups. In previous years, AQIM propaganda videos originating in Algeria were of amateur quality and poorly produced. This has changed dramatically. It was evident that AQIM has placed a greater emphasis on improving the quality of the videos, and that these videos and communiquQ7s were orchestrated to attract Algerian youth to the AQIM "cause". Several videos posted on the Internet, such as the series "Shadows of the Sword" and "Apostate Hell" showed operations conducted against Algerian military and security targets that included preparations for the attacks and pre- briefings with the commanders that led the attacks. The ability to conduct an attack and claim responsibility via communiquQ7 within hours demonstrated the importance AQIM placed in transmitting its message in an attempt to win the media war. ¶9. (SBU) The February kidnapping and subsequent ransom of two Austrian tourists by Algeria-based AQIM terrorists provided a substantial cash infusion into the network that will likely facilitate operations in the future. The use of suicide car bombs, suicide vests, and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Algerian terrorists continues to indicate a significant level of cooperation and training by AQIM. The proliferation of tactics used in Iraq has had a profound effect on the level of organization and sophistication employed by the terrorists in Algeria. The main sources of funding for AQIM continued to be kidnapping for ransom, extortion, smuggling and the narcotics trade in southern Algeria/northern Mali. Individual cells in Europe also provided support through small-scale funding. ¶10. (SBU) It was estimated that the Algerian security services killed, wounded or arrested nearly 1,000 terrorists in 2008, compared to an estimated combined figure of about 1,100 for 2007. Although the total number of attacks rose in 2008 to 295 compared to 218 in 2007, the number of civilian casualties decreased. The counterterrorism successes of the Algerian services, combined with the public rejection of terrorists, possibly reduced AQIM's overall effectiveness during ¶2008. One of the most effective counterterrorism operations took place in August during which 12 terrorists were killed in the forests of Ouacif and Ain Elhamam, in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou. The surge in terrorist activity in late August may have been revenge attacks for this operation. In addition, over 300 terrorists were sentenced (often in absentia, with sentences never carried out) to capital punishment ALGIERS 00001320 003 OF 003 during 2008, of which 257 were sentenced by the court of Boumerdes alone. During 2008 the government of Algeria instituted a program to hire 100,000 new police and gendarme officers, reinforce the borders, augment security at airports and increase the overall security presence in the city of Algiers. The initiative was effective in reducing the impact of terrorist incidents during the year and also demonstrated the government of Algeria's determination to fight terrorism. ¶11. (SBU) AQIM, thanks in part to high unemployment among Algerian youth, was partially successful in replenishing its numbers after the arrest, surrender, or death of an estimated 1,000 terrorists. Those remaining appeared to be more hard-line and resistant to the government's amnesty offer. Despite the upsurge of AQIM activity in August, overall the security situation remained greatly improved from the situation of the late 1990's. That said, the Algerian military and security forces were often perceived as slow to adapt to AQIM's changing tactics and to accept that they now face a better organized international threat in the form of AQIM rather than a purely internal threat. The Algerian security services and military remained capable of handling a prolonged effort against internal terrorist threats and were a reliable counterterrorism partner. ¶12. (U) Embassy Algiers point of contact for the above report is Mark Molnar who can be reached at molnarml@state.sgov.gov or molnarml4@state.gov on the opennet system. PEARCE