MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, CROSS-STRAIT

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000451 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS ¶1. Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their March 28 news coverage on U.S. President George W. Bush's call to his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao Wednesday, in which Hu mentioned that China is willing to resume dialogue with Taiwan based on the "1992 consensus;" on the chances for president-elect Ma Ying-jeou to visit the United States before his inauguration on May 20; on Ma's visit to former President Lee Teng-hui; and on defeated DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh's meeting with President Chen Shui-bian Thursday. The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran a banner headline on page two that said "Hu Mentions the 1992 Consensus; U.S.: Very Interesting." The pro-independence "Liberty Times," however, ran a banner headline on page three that read "The KMT is Going to Let China Define the 1992 Consensus?" ¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" speculated on the possible development of Washington-Beijing-Taipei relations in the wake of Ma's election. The article said the route from Taipei via Washington to Beijing will rapidly shorten the distance between Ma and China, and an enormous breakthrough in cross-Strait relations will likely emerge. A "United Daily News" editorial discussed the 1992 consensus and said it "takes two to tango" for cross-Strait relations to improve. A "Liberty Times" editorial, however, exclaimed that the "1992 consensus" marks the beginning of a serious crisis for Taiwan's survival. An op-ed in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" also chimed in by urging Taiwan not to use the "1992 consensus" as the foundation for resuming dialogue with China, or Taiwan will end up like Tibet. A separate "Taipei Times" op-ed, written by an Australian-based writer, said China is still skeptical about president-elect Ma Ying-jeou. The op-ed said it remains an open question whether Ma is able to work out a clear strategy and resolve the difficulties pose to Taiwan and China. End summary. ¶3. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations ""Bush, Hu [Jintao], and Ma [Ying-jeou] Triangle" The mass-circulation "Apple Daily" editorialized [circulation: 520,000] (3/28): "... China's attitude is the key factor as to whether [U.S. President George W.] Bush allows [Taiwan's president-elect] Ma [Ying-jeou] to visit the United States. It is likely that Bush called Hu Jintao to test the latter's attitude and to persuade Hu to show some flexibility. If Hu wants to give Ma Ying-jeou a congratulatory gift, the first gift should be his tacit agreement to let Washington consent to Ma's visit to the United States. It appears that Hu is not against Ma's visit to the U.S. If it is true, it is very likely that Ma will soon receive an invitation from Washington. "The route [from Taipei to Beijing] via the U.S. will rapidly shorten the distance between Ma and China. A major breakthrough in cross-Strait relations will likely emerge. If China recedes from 'one China' to 'both Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China,' then to the 1992 consensus, there will be a solid foundation for peaceful cross-Strait dialogue. The 1992 consensus (one-China with respective interpretations),is the KMT's bottom line, and the KMT cannot recede beyond it. The bottom line of China is one China without interpretation, which means everyone recognizes one China but does not need to define it explicitly. There is not much difference between the two [the KMT's and China's bottom lines]. The 1992 consensus includes one China with respective interpretations and one China without interpretation, a foundation that both the KMT and the Communists can accept. That is why Beijing feels relieved. Before now, China has never recognized the existence of the 1992 consensus. Now, 'pushing a boat along with a favorable current' is advantageous to both sides. ... "A third party can play as many as more than ten roles, including provider, instructor, bridge builder, mediator, arbitrator, balancer, healer, observer, judge and peacekeeper. In the initial stage during the breakthrough of cross-Strait negotiations, the U.S. indeed needs to play a third-party role. To Taiwan, the most important role the U.S. should play is peacekeeper, through [the use of] force. With [U.S.] protection, cross-Strait negotiations will be nothing but negotiations on the terms of Taiwan's surrender. Ma Ying-jeou's visit to the U.S. has to make the U.S. guarantee these roles mentioned above." ¶4. Cross-Strait Relations A) "One China with Respective Interpretations; Tango across the Strait" The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] editorialized (3/28): RELATIONS "... First it is necessary [for both China and Taiwan] to establish an even structure. The '1992 consensus/one-China with respective interpretations' should be a foundation that both [China and Taiwan] accept. Beijing so far has recognized 'both sides interpreting one China' although Taipei keeps saying that it is 'one-China with respective interpretations,' Beijing, at least, does not need directly to deny Taipei's 'one-China with respective interpretations.' Why not use the '1992 consensus' to envelop 'one-China with respective interpretations' and 'both sides interpreting one China' and let each side say what it wants, as long as it does not disagree [with the other side]. "In this aspect, Beijing has to create more room. Cross-Strait relations so far only use "maintenance of the status quo' as their crux. 'Anti-Secession Law' is only opposed to 'de jure Taiwan independence.' [China] cannot avoid facing the existence of the Republic of China. After nearly two decades of power struggle across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing has to recognize that there is no status quo without the Republic of China; to maintain the status quo has to maintain the Republic of China. ..." B) "'1992 Consensus' Is the Beginning of a Severe Crisis Concerning Taiwan's Survival" The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 720,000] editorialized (3/28): "... It is obvious that the 1992 consensus referred to by Hu Jintao emphasizes that Taiwan is part of China, and that he does not recognize at all that the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan is an independent sovereign state. For the 1992 consensus spoken of by Ma Ying-jeou, however, even though he stressed that the one China is the ROC, he actually lacks historical and legal evidence to prove that Taiwan is tantamount to the ROC. One can say of the 1992 consensus, be it of Hu or Ma, both regard Taiwan as a part under the jurisdiction of either the People's Republic of China or the ROC. Despite their differences, [Hu and Ma] both ultimately see Taiwan as part of China. ... "Evidently, the so-called 1992 consensus or one China with both sides of the Taiwan Strait agreeing to differ on its definition -- words that people are still talking about nowadays -- both deny the sovereign status of Taiwan. China is bent on annexing Taiwan and refuses to see Taiwan as a sovereign nation. Though we are against the view of the 1992 consensus, we are not surprised to see it [being brought up]. The weird thing is that president-elect Ma, who was elected by the Taiwan people, has forgotten Taiwan's sovereignty immediately after winning the election. One can still recall that, during the last stage of his campaign, Ma emphasized that Taiwan's uture should and will be determined by the 23 million people of Taiwan. One can hardly endorse Ma's political sincerity after having seen how he abandoned his promise like disposable utensils. "The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 in 1971, acknowledging the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing China at the UN. In this vein, there is hardly any room for the international community to imagine that both sides [of the Taiwan Strait] recognize that there is only one China but agree to differ on its definition. As long as Taiwan accepts the so-called 1992 consensus or different definitions of one China, it will be akin to accepting in the international community that Taiwan is part of China, whose sole legitimate government is the PRC government, and that the ROC actually does not exist. As a result, Ma's wishful declaration that the one China is the ROC is nothing but a big joke. ..." C) "Learning from Tibet's Experience" Ruan Ming, a consultant at the Taiwan Research Institute, opined in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (3/28): "... If Taiwanese can stand united to protect Taiwan's freedom, democracy, independence and sovereignty and reject the so-called "1992 consensus," the "one China" principle and a peace agreement, then China cannot turn Taiwan into another Tibet, and it will not dare invade Taiwan, turning Chinese President Hu Jintao's 'Anti-Secession' Law into nothing more than a useless piece of paper. "But if Taiwan is internally divided and lets China apply pressure from the outside, while having the people who have joined up with China to suppress Taiwanese independence apply pressure from the inside, this double-edged pressure could force Taiwan's president to accept the so-called "1992 consensus" and the "one China" principle, muddle over Taiwan's independence, sovereignty and democracy, and RELATIONS instead sign a peace agreement with Hu. China is hoping for just such a historical opportunity to turn Taiwan into another Tibet. ..." D) "Can [Taiwan's president-elect] Ma [Ying-jeou] Work Cross-Strait Miracles?" Sushil Seth, an Australian-based writer, opined in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (3/28): "... Of course, to mollify China, Ma has also said that his administration will not "support Taiwan's de jure independence." He believes that within the broad concept of "one China," both sides might be free to interpret it in their own way. In other words, Taipei will seek to deal with the political side of the relationship through creative ambiguity. "That means Taiwan will maintain its identity and de facto sovereign status without challenging the broad concept of "one China" - a status quo of sorts. "Ma might have his own reasons to believe that China will fall for this, though it didn't in the past. Either Ma is overestimating his reach or China somehow might agree to accommodate him. ..." YOUNG