MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001230 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies gave significant coverage August 16-18 to the money laundering case allegedly involving former President Chen Shui-bian and his family members. News coverage also focused on Taiwan's loss to China in last Friday's baseball competition in the Beijing Olympic Games; and on U.S. swimmer Michael Phelps' history-making with eight gold medals in the Beijing Olympic Games. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" discussed the United States' attitude toward the Ma Ying-jeou Administration's "diplomatic truce" policy toward China. The article urged the Ma Ying-jeou Administration to work harder in communicating with Washington and Beijing to win their support for the "diplomatic truce" policy. An editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" also chimed in by urging the Ma Administration to explain clearly Taiwan's overall diplomatic strategy before it carries out the "diplomatic truce" policy. END summary. A) "Can [Ma's] Low-profile U.S. [Transit] Visit Win Washington's Support for the Diplomatic Truce Policy?" Professor Edward Chen of Tamkang University's Graduate Institute of American Studies opined in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 300,000] (8/18): "... As of now, the United States has not publicly opposed both sides of the Taiwan Strait negotiating a diplomatic truce. Neither may [Washington] necessarily oppose wholeheartedly a diplomatic truce across the Taiwan Strait. It is just that both Washington and Beijing have smooth communication channels, so [the United States] will have a better understanding than we will in terms of Beijing's ideas about diplomatic truce. ... "When it comes to the issue of diplomatic truce between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, Taipei and Washington apparently have different strategic concerns. For President Ma, a diplomatic truce, if it is achievable, will not only meet Taiwan's national interests, but it will also be advantageous for his re-election. This is why Ma has been working with perseverance to push for [his diplomatic truce policy]. For the Bush Administration, however, it is concerned that, should Taipei insist on pursuing such a policy, it will likely have an impact on other economic and trade negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Nonetheless, if Taipei accepts the suggestion [proposed by AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt during a meeting with Ma after Taiwan's March 22 presidential election] that both sides of the Taiwan Strait negotiate in three stages [i.e. in the first stage deal with charter flight matters; in the second stage deal with economic and trade cooperation; and in the third stage deal with sensitive issues such as a peace accord, minimizing military threats, and Taiwan's international space] and with Washington encouraging them on the side, it will likely help Taiwan to integrate quickly into the developing East Asian economy. This is why the United States has been constantly urging both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resume dialogue since 2005. "[Ma's] low-profile transit stops in the United States are not only conducive to the reestablishment of mutual trust between Taiwan and the United States, but also helpful in creating a good atmosphere for cross-Strait negotiations, as [his low-profile transits] are less irritating to Beijing. However, in order to make the United States and China agree that both sides of the Taiwan Strait start talks on a diplomatic truce, Ma's national security team apparently needs to work harder in communicating with both Washington and Beijing." B) "Taking a Stand Is a President's Role" The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] editorialized (8/18): "... Considering that China has always done all it can to suppress Taiwan internationally, it is absurd to pin our hopes on Beijing not trying to entice our allies simply because of the so-called "diplomatic truce." Predicating the "truce" on China's goodwill begs the question of how much trust there is between the two sides, and how long that trust, if it indeed exists, will persist. These are all unknowable variables. ... The Ma administration wants to abandon the money diplomacy but maintain our allies. What is the overall diplomatic strategy that will achieve this goal? As president, it is Ma's duty to clearly explain this to the Taiwanese. While it is true that his administration has reduced cross-strait tension - at least for now - the closer relationship is a problem for the US because it is no longer clear where Taiwan belongs. Despite this, Ma has not offered an unambiguous explanation, and his government policy continues to lean heavily toward China without any signs that the government sees cause for alarm or a need to correct the situation. "Still, militarily, economically and internationally, the US remains Taiwan's most important supporter. The US government is still waiting for Ma to react to the rumored freeze on US arms sales to Taiwan. A president is supposed to set a nation's primary goals and deal with the big issues. Rather than micro-managing and fiddling with trivialities such as saving a few dollars on chartering regular aircraft for overseas state visits, Ma should expend his efforts on designing the main direction of the nation's future development." WANG