Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08AITTAIPEI1109
2008-07-29 23:24:00
UNCLASSIFIED
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

Tags:  OPRC KMDR KPAO TW 
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VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1109/01 2112324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 292324Z JUL 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9610
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8486
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9703
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001109 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001109 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS ¶1. Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news coverage July 26-29 on Typhoon Fung-wong, which swept across the island Monday; on the current status of the U.S.-Taiwan arms deals; on the title of Taiwan's Olympic team; and on President Ma Ying-jeou's upcoming trip to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. Taiwan's interest in obtaining submarines, either by purchasing them from the United States or by building its own, has grasped close media attention. The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran a banner headline on page four July 28 reading "The Submarines Procurement Surface Again Following Four Year's of Silence." In addition, the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" continued carrying reports over the weekend on the Rim of the Pacific joint military. ¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" discussed the true meaning of "diplomatic truce" between Taiwan and China and urged President Ma Ying-jeou to strengthen communication with the United States over the developments in cross-Strait relations. A "China Times" column also listed the major challenges that Ma's national security team is facing and questioned whether Ma has really tried to maintain good communication with the United States. A separate "China Times" op-ed piece discussed Washington's and Tokyo's doubts about the Ma Administration's international strategy and the way it handled Taiwan's relations with the United States and Japan. An editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" discussed the remarks by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense and now World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz to the American chamber of Commerce in Taipei last week and the current state of U.S.-Taiwan arms deals. The article said "if U.S. President George w. Bush does not live up to Wolfowitz's expectations and does not release the arms, then these things will become crystal clear: the pro-China group in the State Department will have triumphed, ... and Taiwan's security will be at the mercy of the U.S. electoral process, giving China even more time to tighten the screws." An editorial in the conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" also discussed the U.S.-Taiwan arms deals and said despite the warming cross-Strait relations, Taiwan has yet to regard Beijing as a neighbor of peace. As
a result, the article said, arms procurements are important for Taiwan. End summary. A) "The True Meaning of 'Diplomatic Truce' as Seen in Light of President Ma's Overseas Visit" The centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] editorialized (7/29): "... Another task that President Ma [Ying-jeou] needs to do [during his overseas trip to Paraguay and the Dominican Republic in mid-August] is to reinforce his communication with the United States. The alarm over the cross-Strait tension has been terminated for the time being since the Ma Administration assumed position. But the warming cross-Strait relations are a big issue for the United States as well. This is because [Washington] is not as sure as it was before as to whether at this moment Taiwan is on the U.S. side or on Beijing's side. Unfortunately, it is the hard fact that Ma has yet to come up with a clear exposition on this matter. The [Ma] Administration's governance so far is also deemed by most people as leaning toward Beijing and does not have a mechanism for self-correction or keeping vigilant. "Nevertheless, in terms of military, economy and international space, the United States is Taiwan's most important support. Since the alleged reports that [the United States] has frozen the arms sales [to Taiwan] began to circulate, the United States has been waiting for the Ma Administration to give an explanation. If given a chance, Ma should try hard to dispel the [United States'] doubts on this matter during his transits in the States, and he might as well clear the matter to the Taiwan people. A president is someone who is meant to make great deeds. Instead of being fussy about meticulousness such as taking a chartered flight to save money, it is better that [Ma] spend his energy on managing the direction of the country's development." B) "The Challenges that Confront Ma Ying-jeou's National Security Policy" Deputy Editor-in-Chief Kuo Chen-lung wrote in the "International Column" in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] (7/29): "The national security policy of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration has apparently become a target of public criticism. The criticism include the [administration's] haste in easing cross-Strait policies, not doing its best to realize the United States' arms sales to Taiwan, and being slow in appointing [whom to be] Taiwan's representative to Japan. Looking into the seventy days after Ma assumed office, Ma's national security team is facing following challenges in four aspects: "First, in terms of mainland China, although [both sides of the Taiwan Strait] started the economic negotiation first, when would the political negotiation start? ... "Secondly, in terms of Japan, under the principle that [Taiwan's] sovereignty cannot be compromised, how [do Taiwan and Japan] set aside controversies [over the Tiaoyutai Islands and Taiwan's role in the Japan-China dispute in exploring the gas field over the East China Sea]? Is the brinkmanship one of the strategies [of Ma's national security team]? ... "Thirdly, in terms of the Untied States, whether [Ma's national security team] has been fully communicating with and informing the United States? Have the relations between Taiwan and the United States had significant progress after [Taiwan's March 22 presidential] election? "Undoubtedly, during the two months after Ma assumed office [on May 20], Ma has been setting cross-Strait relations as the first priority. Latter on, [Ma] had to deal with the crisis resulted from the collision between a Taiwan fishing boat and a Japanese frigate over the waters surrounding the Tiaoyutai Islands. [Ma] takes the United States for granted and does not regard it as a priority. The communication between [the United States and Taiwan's] senior level of officials has been relatively less. "The Ma Administration claimed that the United States has been very satisfied with the progress of cross-Strait relations. In other words, [the Ma Administration] means that it has done better than the previous [Chen Shui-bian] Administration. However, the United States does not simply make judgment based upon the result after the event. The United States wants to have full control over the whole circumstance, including knowing what the cross-Strait issues are, what the public and private channels are, whether there are any extra private deals. If there is any omission [in aspects mentioned above], the Untied States would start to suspect what Taiwan and China have talked about clandestinely? "The Ma Administration recently has noticed the United States' concerns. [Taiwan's] National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Lee Hai-tung and [Taiwan's] Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrew Hsia have gone to California to hold the 'Monterey Talks' with the United States. In the future, between a higher level of officials [of both Taiwan and the United States], it is possible to build a national security channel which is similar to the 'talks between [Taiwan's former National Security Council Secretary-General] Ting Mao-shih and [former White House Deputy National Security Advisor] James B. Steinberg.' However, the current [atmosphere] between Taiwan and the United States is not quite as good as when the United States-Taiwan relations were at their peak. ..." C) "Why Do the United States and Japan Have a Crisis in Confidence Regarding Ma?" Lai I-chung, an executive committee member of the Taiwan Thinktank, opined in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 400,000] (7/26): "... The basic reasons that the Uited States and Japan changed their attitudes toward Taiwan were because the two countries have doubts regarding the Ma [Ying-jeou] Administration's diplomatic strategy and the [administration's] clumsiness in handling the diplomatic issues in terms of the tactics. First, in terms of the handling [of the diplomatic issues], on the second day after Ma was elected president, without having initial negotiation [with the United States and Japan, Ma unilaterally announced that he would like to visit the two countries. Secondly, the brash way in which the Ma Administration left no room for compromise in handling the Tiaoyutai issue, gave no consideration to the fact that the issue affects Taiwan's subtle relations with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. The Ma Administration's changeable attitude also set up new variables during the negotiation [with Japan]. The arms procurement, an indicator of the security and cooperation between Taiwan and the United States, has become a mystery that Taiwan and the United States accuse each other [for delaying the procurement]. Without consultation with Japan, [the Ma Administration]'s release of allegations regarding the candidate for Taiwan's representative to Japan has put Tokyo in an awkward position. All of these incidents have consumed the United States and Japan's trust on the Taiwan government. "However, the most basic issue is that the United States and Japan have doubts about Ma's international strategy. Ma considers that the improvement of cross-Strait relations is in accordance with the interests of the United States and Japan. However, the United States and Japan would not necessarily agree with the argument that cross-Strait relations and relations among Taiwan, the United States, and Japan is a zero-sum game. Ma declared before he assumed office that 'cross-Strait relations are far superior to foreign affairs.' Then Minister-designate of Foreign Affairs [Francisco Ou] even called for a 'diplomatic truce.' In response, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has reminded Taiwan that 'the relations between the United States and Taiwan have their own independent aspects,' which was a hint to Ma that he should not use cross-Strait relations to define the relations between the United States and Taiwan. However, the following developments have made many people on the United States side suddenly realize that significant strategic changes had already taken place in Taiwan. In the past, [Taiwan] regarded the security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan as beneficial for Taiwan when dealing with cross-Strait [relations]. However, nowadays, Taipei wanted the United States to suspend announcing the arms sales to Taiwan before [Taiwan's] Straits Exchange Foundation and [China's] Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait resumed negotiation [in June]. This means that the new [Ma] Administration considers the security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan as a negative factor, not a positive bargaining chip, in cross-Strait relations. ..." D) "If Only Paul Wolfwitz Is Right" The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] editorialized (7/26): "But [World Bank President Paul] Wolfowitz's words also had the flavor of a warning: Taiwan's security, now as then, hinges on the regard in which Taiwan - or more precisely, its government - is held by Congress and the US administration, and that this affection had been tested in recent years by the Democratic Progressive Party government. That affection is still there, though a combination of US wars in the Middle East and the pro-China machinations of members of the State Department and their academic networks, not to mention the China lobby, tends to stifle this affection. That may all be changing, judging from Wolfowitz's confidence (amid none-too-subtle prodding) that the arms freeze conceded by US Admiral Timothy Keating will be lifted, possibly before the end of the congressional session in September, and hence before the next US president takes office. "Amid gloomy forecasts by local defense analysts, there are increasing reports of activity in and around Congress to deliver the arms that the government agreed to so long ago. And yesterday's comments by Jason Yuan, Taiwan's new envoy to Washington, that the delivery of the arms is 'almost a done deal,' suggest that senior KMT figures know more about maneuvering in Washington than it cares to admit - right down to the visit to Taiwan of a top US figure in the weeks to come. This is all well and good. If we can assume that Yuan's comments are a reflection of the reality and not just bluster from an envoy who seems not to know when to close his mouth, then there is hope on the horizon that Taiwan will be able to lurch back in the direction of keeping the Chinese military threat within its capabilities. But if US President George W. Bush does not live up to Wolfowitz's expectations and does not release the arms, then these things will become crystal clear: the pro-China group in the State Department will have triumphed, Taiwan's new envoy will have been discredited even before arriving in the US and Taiwan's security will be at the mercy of the US electoral process, giving China even more time to tighten the screws." E) "Cracks in U.S., Japan Ties" The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" [circulation: 30,000] editorialized (7/29): "... A dramatic contrast to Washington's initial welcoming of Ma's election was the Bush administration's pronouncement to freeze arms sales to Taiwan. This gesture was especially odd because for eight years the Bush administration has been urging Taipei to take more responsibility for its own defense and to buy US$16 billion-worth of American arms, including anti-missile systems, warplanes and submarines. ... On July 16, Admiral Timothy Keating, chief of the U.S. Pacific command, said Washington had instituted a freeze on new arms sales to Taiwan. However, the next day in Taipei, President Ma's spokesman reiterated Taipei's traditional need of U.S. arms for self defense. In response, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said on July 18 that the U.S. policy on supplying arms to Taiwan remained unchanged. The U.S. is Taiwan's main arms supplier, and even though ties between Taipei and Beijing have warmed since Ma's inauguration in May, the island has yet to regard the communist mainland as a neighbor of peace. Despite increased economic, cultural and social interchanges, Taipei and Beijing remain deeply suspicious of each. ... The U.S., Japan, Singapore and all other democracies in the world may be pro-Taiwan at heart, but they are not so in deed." YOUNG

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