MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS DEALS

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001074 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN ARMS DEALS Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused July 22 news coverage on former President Chen Shui-bian, who appeared at court Monday to defend himself in a defamation lawsuit involving Taiwan's procurement of Lafayette frigates in 1990; and on the Cabinet's plan to resolve the flooding problems in Taiwan. In terms of editorials and commentaries, several op-ed pieces in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed the current state of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. One article urged Taiwan to pay close attention to the warning signals behind the alleged U.S. decision to shelve arms sales to Taiwan. Another one asserted that Washington is just using the arms sales matter to remind the Ma Ying-jeou Administration to act more prudently when seeking to improve cross-Strait relations. A third op-ed said that the Ma Administration's attempts to improve cross-Strait relations have made both the United States and Japan nervous about the changing dynamic in the region. An editorial in the conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" said "peace or not, Taiwan must buy weapons for war, and only from the United States." End summary. A) "Pay Attention to the Warning Signals behind the U.S. Decision to Shelve Arms Sales [to Taiwan]" Andrew Yang, Secretary-General of Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 500,000] (7/22): "... It seems to have become a reality that, during the remainder of its term in office, the Bush Administration will not make any decision regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Congress will go into recess at the END of July, and it appears that the eight arms procurement items for Taiwan, which are now pending in the Congress awaiting its final approval, are not likely to be included on the agenda of the current Congressional session. When the Congress goes back into session in late September, the U.S. presidential election will be drawing near, making it improbable for Congress to discuss the issue. Therefore, chances are slim that Taiwan's expectations will be realized for the eight decided-upon arms procurement items to be approved within the Bush Administration's term of office. Regarding Washington's decision to shelve the arms sales to Taiwan this time, we need to be vigilant about the following aspects: "First, [Admiral Timothy] Keating revealed that the U.S. policy assessment of its arms sales to Taiwan is related to the proactive engagement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the increase of peace factors in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, this is the first time that Washington has linked its arms sales to Taiwan to factors concerning peaceful interaction between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Even though Washington has emphasized over and over again that it adheres to the Taiwan Relations Act, its policy has actually been affected by interactions across the Taiwan Strait. "Second, Keating also revealed that, while determining its arms sales policy toward Taiwan, Washington has taken into consideration China's intent to use force against Taiwan, instead of the fact that Beijing is targeting Taiwan with [over] a thousand missiles. As long as China shows no political intention to use force against Taiwan and is working proactively to strengthen peaceful interaction across the Taiwan Strait, the United States will begin to think about how it is going to sell arms to Taiwan. But Keating also emphasized that the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific is strong enough to deal with China's military threats. In other words, the question regarding whether Taiwan has sufficient defense capabilities has gradually become a less important factor behind Washington's deterrence against China. Third, Keating's remarks also manifest that there are hardly any powerful political activists or policy promoters in Washington political circles to help proactively to push the U.S. bureaucracy and to lobby Congress to make arms sales decisions more favorable for Taiwan. ... The United States' decision to shelve arms sales to Taiwan has made clear the following two points: First, the United States has a new assessment of the geo-strategic changes in the Taiwan Strait. Its decision also shows that, in terms of future peace in the Taiwan Strait, Washington will put its primary focus on diplomacy, then on military. Taiwan will face more difficulties in the future if it wants to solicit Washington's support for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Second, even though Washington will not discuss its arms sales to Taiwan with Beijing unilaterally, it is obvious that Beijing has found another channel, namely, using its foreign relations, economy and cross-Strait relations as tools to strengthen its lobbying and political maneuvering toward the United States. These two major changes are significant warning signals to which Taiwan should pay close attention." B) "The U.S. Uses Arms Sales to Remind the Ma Administration" Emerson Chang, director of the Department of International Studies at Nan Hua University, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 500,000] (7/21): "... The freeze of arms sales [to Taiwan] was just a move that the U.S. government used to caution the Ma Administration that it should not look after one thing and lose track of another while improving cross-Strait relations. U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Timothy Keating's remarks that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is stable, so there is no need to sell arms [to Taiwan] for the time being, is mostly diplomatic rhetoric. ... "The existing competitive and cooperative relations between the United States and China will not change simply because the United States freezes or continues its arms sales to Taiwan. This argument was the accepted view when [U.S. President George W.] Bush responded to [former Chinese President] Jiang Zemin's proposition of '[China] withdrawing missiles [targeting Taiwan] and [the United States] ceasing arms sales [to Taiwan]' in 2002. Some officials in the Bush Administration argue that [Washington] had better not upset China at the current stage. However, it is impossible to neglect Taiwan, an important bargaining chip for the military hedge of the United States, in the long run. "The freeze of arms sales [to Taiwan] at this time highlights a question that the Ma Administration has been mulling privately, which is, in order to bring about China's greatest concessions in other aspects, should Taiwan show its weakness or strive to be strong militarily? Judging from China's request [to the United States] for a permanent freeze of its arms sales to Taiwan as well as the United States' discontent with Taiwan [recently], Taiwan's better option should be to strive to be strong first and negotiate [with China] later." C) "The U.S. and Japan Take Turns to Test Taiwan's Bottom Line" Chen I-hsin, a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (7/21): "United States Pacific Commander Admiral Timothy Keating indirectly confirmed during his speech at the Heritage Foundation that the Pentagon might freeze arms sales to Taiwan. This incident, and a previous incident in which [a Taiwan fishing boat and a Japanese frigate] collided in the waters near the Tiaoyutai Islands, might have the same implication -- namely, Washington and Tokyo are taking turns to test the new Taipei administration's real intentions. In other words, those who feel the impact of cross-Strait relations are definitely not solely people from both sides of the Strait. The thawing cross-Strait [relations] do not necessarily benefit multiple parties. ... "Taiwan's new policies, such as cross-Strait reconciliation and a diplomatic truce, differ greatly from the backdrop that forms the United States' current Taiwan Strait structure. If [President] Ma Ying-jeou eventually decides not to return to the position of cross-Strait confrontation held by [former Presidents] Chen [Shui-bian] and Lee [Teng-hui], the structure of the United States' 'Taiwan Relations Act' and the 817 Communique used in handling [cross-Strait relations] will lose their attached backdrop. As a result, [the United States] will have to change the hypothesis of such a backdrop in order continuously to maintain the United States' interests. In other words, if Washington is ready to change the paradigm, it will have to find out Taipei's and Beijing's real preferences. Freezing arms sales to Taiwan has thus become the [United States'] best touchstone [in its plan] to kill two birds with one stone. ..." [Ed. Note: the 817 Communique refers to the August 17, 1982 joint Sino-American communique on arms sales to Taiwan.] D) "U.S. Arms vs. PRC Missiles" The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" [circulation: 30,000] (7/22): "Had Washington given former President Chen Shui-bian a similar public 'ultimatum' that President Ma Ying-jeou's government received last week, Taiwan would not have stalled procurement of U.S weaponry for so long. For the past 15 years, Taiwan has not made significant arms purchases from the U.S.-first, under the second six-year presidential term of the then-KMT's Lee Teng-hui, a hidden Taiwan independence promoter; and then the eight years under Chen of the openly separatist Democratic Progressive Party. Washington was tolerant of both Lee and Chen because their anti-China and pro-independence rhetoric provided bargaining chips for the U.S. in dealings with Beijing. The two countries' relatively poor background in state and external affairs made it easy for the U.S. to exploit the no-unification-no-independence and no-war-no-independence status quo. "Ma and the KMT have been trained by the American GAME long and well. He has forsaken the impossible goal of mainland recovery, freeing the KMT from its one-China spell; and Beijing becomes a cousin next door, not an enemy. The U.S. is a democratic friend, not an anti-China partner. For Chen and Lee, threatening to declare Taiwan's independence from China while refusing to buy more U.S. weapons was a viable GAME of balancing potential friend and foe. But Ma has neutralized their game. ... Peace or not, Taiwan must buy weapons for war, and only from the U.S. Taiwan's destiny, like that of the U.S., is in the hands of arms dealers." YOUNG