Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ADDISABABA946
2008-04-07 14:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

MELES ON ETHIOPIAN PLANS TO "REDEPLOY" FROM SOMALIA

Tags:  MOPS PREL PGOV ET SO 
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VZCZCXRO5305
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0946 0981414
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071414Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0187
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 000946 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV ET SO
SUBJECT: MELES ON ETHIOPIAN PLANS TO "REDEPLOY" FROM SOMALIA

REF: ADDIS 718

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 000946

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV ET SO
SUBJECT: MELES ON ETHIOPIAN PLANS TO "REDEPLOY" FROM SOMALIA

REF: ADDIS 718

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Ambassador
Yamamoto on April 3 that Ethiopia is looking to "redeploy"
its approximately 2,500 troops in Somalia to the Ethiopian
towns of Dolo Odo and Ferfer along the Ethiopia-Somalia
border. While there are some factors aggravating Ethiopia's
experience in Somalia which the Ethiopian Government (GoE)
can influence, other stronger dynamics outside of the range
of Ethiopia's control or influence will force the GoE's hand.
Ultimately, Meles said, if Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) cannot, or will not, control internal Somali
dynamics, the GoE will not be able to control them.


2. (S) Among those aggravating factors which Ethiopia can
influence, but not control, according to Meles, are the slow
pace of training TFG security forces and civil servants, the
pace of equipment procurement, contributions to the African
Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),and internal cohesion
within the TFG itself. While the GoE continues to seek to
positively influence these dynamics, the dynamics outside of
the GoE's realm of influence -- particularly de facto control
over parts of Mogadishu, Kismayo, and the Lower Juba Valley,
as well as the TFG's pursuit of actual governance objectives
-- are the key issues that will ultimately dictate Somalia's,
and the TFG's, viability.


3. (S) In a separate meeting April 4, State Minister for
Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu told the Ambassador that
redeployment of troops would be in the near future and that
there is consensus within the government for the
redeployment. Tekeda added that TFG President Yusuf and
Prime Minister Nur Adde have been informed of this decision.
Tekeda echoed what the Prime Minister stated earlier, and
said Ethiopia will remain engaged in meeting privately with
moderate elements of the Islamic Courts. He noted Ethiopia's
private meetings with Q former Parliamentary Speaker Sheikh
Sharif in Dubai last year and other meetings with moderate
elements which now support or form the ARS. Tekeda added
that the GoE would continue training TFG troops and would
work out a mechanism for the protection of Ugandan and
Burundian peacekeepers in Mogadishu. While Ethiopian troops
would be redeployed just over the border in Ethiopia, Tekeda
stressed, as did the Prime Minister, that the troops would be
available to reach parts of Somalia, if necessary.

COMMENT
--------------


4. (S) Meles did not give a timeline for implementation of
this "redeployment," but hinted that it would not be too long
in the future. Still, persistent messages from the GoE
highlight a growing frustration over the sustained costs, in
both lives and money, incurred by the GoE in the absence of
tangible actions to bolster safety, stability, and governance
in Somalia. It is possible that rather than indicating a
specific plan to withdraw, Meles' message is more intended to
spark additional USG support -- either in response to the $17
million request submitted to offset the costs of training TFG
police and troops (reftel),or more kinetic efforts to
respond to the jihadist expansion in the Lower Juba Valley.
Tekeda was more equivocal in urging the U.S. to do more and
to get the international community to do more to stabilize
and support Somalia. At the same time, it is increasingly
evident that in the absence of tangible developments in
Somalia and additional international support to offset
Ethiopia's security and financial burdens from intervening in
Somalia, the GoE faces ever diminishing popular support to
sustain a status quo engagement in Somalia. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO